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Abstract 
Since the early 1990s, the Middle East has witnessed a renewed interest in the 
debate over the role of religion in thG process of democratization. This study 
aims to examine the possibility of developing a democratic discourse within the 
Islamic context. It focuses on the evolution of the political thought in Shi'i 
Islam in the context of Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979. 
The reconciliation between religion and democracy is argued to be a two-phase 
process: in the first phase, religion is integrated into the state in order to bring 
about a consensual political system and engage the people in the political 
process. Then, the religious worldview is developed in line with democracy. 
The study examines the socio-economic factors behind the emergence of the 
reformist discourse in Iran in the mid-1990s. It also reviews the evolution of that 
discourse compared with its conservative rival and highlights their approximate 
to the principles of democracy. 
Emphasizing the practical side of religion, the thesis concludes that the 
community's perception and application of the religious teachings have varied 
over the history to reflect the changing realities of the social life, far from the 
claim of religion being a fixed order of dogmas. The past twenty-five years 
witnessed major steps towards adapting the religious values to the modem 
patterns of socialization and politics. It was set off by the need of unifying the 
religious and political authorities within the state system. Later, the process was 
driven by the structural transformations ensued from the revolution and the state 
policies during the 1980s. The final phase came through the reformist's strategy 
to democratize the Islamic regime in the late 1990s. 
My general conclusion is that despite the tremble of the political reform, 
considerable works have been done, particularly on the structural level. The 
experience of the reformist rule indicates the possibility of developing a model of 
democracy appropriate to the local culture, especially the religious beliefs. It also 
indicates the capacity of the Islamic Republic to develop a democratic character, 
at least on the long term. 
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A Note on Transliteration 
The transliterations of names, terms, and places are based on the system 
used for the International Journal of Middle East Studies (INES). In this 
system, the rules for the Farsi words are similar to that of the Arabic ones except 
for few cases. I have tried my best however to make them as approximate as 
possible to the phonetic pronunciation. Names for which there are already 
established English spellings are spelled without diacritics. Names of authors 
who chose certain spelling in their published works were put according to their 
preferences. In the footnotes, I have used the original titles of Farsi and Arabic 
books and articles to which I referred. The same rule is followed in the list of 
sources, however with an English translation. 
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Introduction 
Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the so-called political Islam has 
been a point of contention among the politicians and political theorists 
throughout the world. The phenomenal mobilization under the banner of Islam 
has been a challenge to a common assumption among the theorists of 
development suggesting that, with the course of modernization, religion will 
gradually lose its influence in the public arena. In the early 1980s, some 
researchers predicted a short life for the Islamic revivalism. After twenty five 
years, that assumption seems far from the realities on the ground. The surprising 
eruption of religious sentiments at that epoch has gradually evolved into a trans- 
national movement featuring at least one common character: that is the assertion 
of the involvement of the religion in national politics. Whether this sentiment 
represents a revival of a national identity, a reaction to the claimed humiliation 
at the hands of foreign powers, or a renewed conviction of the viability of the 
religious cure for the grievances of the Muslim societies, this phenomenon 
represents a provocative challenge to the study of politics. 
The broad religious trend combines a variety of trends including 
traditionalists, modernists, anarchists and others. Among those, one trend seems 
to have attracted less attention, that is the one which argues for the possibility of 
formulation a new discourse bringing together the major principles of democracy 
and Islam. 
This study aims to investigate the viability of this discourse, particularly 
with regard to its capability of dealing with the religious, cultural, and political 
barriers which have so far hindered the process of democratization in the Muslim 
societies. The study focuses on the discursive and doctrinal transformations 
within Sh19 Islam in Iran after the 1979 revolution in order to set an empirical 
framework for the analysis of the said possibility. 
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The Islamic Republic of Iran represents, as one scholar puts it, "an ever 
more interesting laboratory for observing political Islam in practice". 
' This is 
partially due to the country has already experienced some aspects of modernity 
including a level of industrialization, constitutionalism, in addition to the fact 
that the Islamic regime has been brought about by a popular revolution. In such 
cases, society becomes intensely politicized and its desires profoundly influence 
the making of the new political system. The Islamic Republic has brought a set 
of traditional and religious-oriented concepts together with some modern ones, 
most of which were hitherto unfamiliar to the religious circles including 
republicanism, election, constitutional rights and so forth. It was assumed that 
such a combination would feature a profound and positive exchange between the 
religious-traditional and modern constituents, thus delivers a modern political 
order inspired by the religious values. 
The thesis argues that the religious political thought, like every other 
aspect of life, does not evolve in a vacuum. Its motion and evolution are closely 
conditioned by its relations to the other constituents of the surrounding 
environment. By the same token, the thesis argues that the political engagement 
of the religion will likely make it more appreciative of the imperative of the 
modern state. The direction towards which religious thought will evolve, 
whether be an embracement of democracy or justification of autocracy, is likely 
to be determined by other factors, namely the influence of the forces within the 
social structure and the international atmosphere. 
To advance the above argument, the study will employ an eclectic 
approach. A special emphasis however is to be put on the approaches developed 
by the theories of political development, particularly those which stress the role 
of political culture. The concept of development is based on the definition 
advanced by the UN Development Program (UNDP), in which development is 
viewed as a comprehensive process aiming to enlarge the people's choices. 
Democratization is conceived with reference to the theories of political culture, 
Bullict, Richard, "Twenty Years of Islamic Politics", The Nliddle East Journal, vol. 53, No. 2. 
(Spring 1999). 
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where the vigour or otherwise of the process is ascribed to the hegemonic 
culture, whether it leans towards participation or self-alienation. 
Although the Iranian affairs continued to attract a considerable interest 
among political researchers, the current debate over democracy, and generally 
the religion-modernity reconciliation within the country has attracted less 
attention. In this regard, I would like to refer particularly to the insightful studies 
of Ansari (2000), Vahdat (2002), and Moslem (2002) which offer valuable 
information and analysis on the course of change within the Islamic Republic. 
Nevertheless, their studies stop short of addressing many important questions in 
this regard. Thus, this study will try to cover some of the areas that, although 
crucial to an accurate treatment of the issues in question, remain in need of more 
investigation. 
The Structure of the Study 
The study is structured in six chapters covering the current debates over 
democratization, its ideological background, the social forces involved, and the 
way it affects the political process. 
Chapter I charts the course of evolution of the Shi i doctrine of authority 
since it took shape in the eighth century until the emergence of the Islamic 
Republic in 1979. The chapter presents a background of the questions arising 
through the ongoing debate over political authority, the sources of legitimacy, 
and the role of the religious establishment. By locating the major developments 
of the above doctrine within their historical context, the chapter tries to explore 
the motives, potentials, and limitations inherent in the established paradigm of 
authority and the chief concerns of its guardians. The argument there is that the 
major revisions of the Shi `i conception of power have been instigated by the 
change of the sociopolitical conditions of the Shia community, particularly after 
the emergence of Sh3 i dynasties in the tenth century and after. To put it 
differently, religion's propensity to adapt to the living realities of its followers is 
largely contingent upon the existence of a helpful environment. This becomes 
even more likely if the religion gets directly involved in the political process. 
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Chapter II discusses the extensive revision made by Ayatollah Khomeini 
on the established Shi `i doctrine of authority. Khomeini's contribution involves 
some essential adjustments to both the basic elements and function of the 
doctrine amounting to a discursive shift within the established paradigm. 
Khomeini is presented as one of those charismatic leaders whose person and 
discourse have, in a certain epoch, bridged the gap between the ages of tradition 
and modernity. He helped his people to rethink their traditions and join the 
march of modernity without fearing the loss of their identity or cultural 
specificity as was the case of the Shah's modernising programs of the 1960s. By 
so doing, religion had had the opportunity to shift from being a pretext for self- 
alienation on the part of the society into an agent for active participation in the 
public affairs. The chapter also presents a new approach to Khomeini's notion of 
"the jurist's absolute authority". While his critics take it as an evidence of his 
authoritarian tendencies, the chapter will argue that the notion is employed as a 
means to remove the mystical character of the religious authority and reuniting 
the hitherto-divided religious and state authorities. 
The discussion then focuses on the application of the principle of `social 
justice' through the political and economic strategies of the post-revolutionary 
governments. The aspiration for justice is the axis of the S1119 political 
worldview. Chapter III aims to explore the thread which runs through the 
constantly changing Iranian political environment. This process is regarded as a 
quest for identity on the part of the Islamic regime. Since this study is concerned 
in the first place with the type of transformations which feature durable and far 
reaching effects, the emphasis here is put on the cultural and institutional 
changes. It has been quite a long time since the study of development in the 
Third World shifted from emphasising the role of the so-called modernising 
elites into focusing on the social structure as a whole as the pivot of 
development. In this light the chapter goes through some of the major 
developments since the Islamic Revolution until the present day trying to explore 
the landmarks which signify the advance of the democratic discourse. In other 
words, the chapter considers the totality of the political process during the last 
twenty five years as a laboratory to explore whether the approximate direction of 
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the Islamic regimes is leaning towards democracy or vice versa. The chapter will 
use Thomas Kuhn's theory of paradigm shift as a conceptual framework to 
explain the emergence of the reformist discourse. My aim is to highlight the wide 
gap between the model of ruling and socialization which prevailed since the 
revolution and the one advocated by the reformist faction. I argue that the shift 
of the public opinion towards the reformist paradigm represents a definite 
disassociation from the established paradigm of religiosity and politics. The 
chapter will outline the deficits which brought the traditional-revolutionary 
paradigm to its knees and made the shift of paradigm inescapable. In addition to 
the authoritarian and populist dispositions of the Islamic regime, the chapter will 
underline its potential to develop from within. 
Chapter IV illustrates the model of state advocated by the conservative 
faction including its standpoints towards such issues as citizenship and political 
rights, legitimacy and the rule of law, republicanism and the role of people, as 
well as the grounding principles of the faction's political ideology. The 
discussion expands on the main thesis of this study which regards the political 
involvement of the religious ideology as the determinant factor behind its 
evolution. 
The conservative camp represents mainly the traditional segment of the 
Iranian society including the clerical establishment and the leading Bazaar 
traders. It upholds the traditional jurisprudence, and generally the jurisprudential 
perception of the religion, as the defining framework of the questions which arise 
in the political and social arena. Nevertheless, the conservative discourse shows a 
clear deviation from the earlier traditions of the Shi i seminaries. This is 
undoubtedly a consequence of the integration of the religion into the state 
system and the constant expansion of the modern patterns of administration, 
socialization, and politics. 
Chapter V aims to highlight the intrinsic incompatibility between the 
conservative and the reformist discourses which permits my assumption that the 
reformist advent to power in the late 1990s represents a paradigm shift in the 
sense advanced by Thomas Kuhn. The reformist trend emerged through the 
thcrmidorian phase of the Islamic Revolution. Thus it bore, at least partially, a 
reactionary feature in regard of the norms, values, and patterns that prevailed 
during the first post-revolutionary decade. The reformist discourse appeals 
mainly to the modern segment of the Iranian society and leans towards liberal 
democracy. The chapter will go through the main themes of the reformist 
discourse including the notion of religious democracy, the theoretical ground of 
the discourse and its distinctive conception of secularism. 
Chapter VI expands on the assumption that a democratic discourse can 
make no difference unless it is upheld by influential forces through whose 
activity the call for democracy shifts from an elitist aspiration into a mobilising 
appeal embraced by a considerable segment in society. The chapter thus aims to 
examine the viability of the course of democratisation with regard to the 
political forces that support it and the ones which oppose it. One of the main 
arguments of the study is that the evolution of the religious thought towards 
democracy or otherwise depends to a large extent on the function of civil forces 
of the society which enlighten the people, mobilise them to exercise their rights 
and role, and hence enact their preferences. The chapter discusses briefly the 
relevance of party politics to the Iranian context, and the social background of 
the major factions. Then, it will introduce the main groups which contest over 
power in the country. 
The concluding section of the study will present a recap on the major 
points discussed, especially the ones related to the thesis's main arguments. Thus 
it will include a final assessment on such points as the possibility of religion- 
democracy reconciliation, the role of the people within a religious-based political 
system, the capacity of the religion to adapt to the modern patterns of 
politicization and lifestyle, and so forth. 
As stated earlier, the development of political thought in post- 
revolutionary Iran has attracted only a slight attention among the large body of 
research which focuses on Iran and the religious politics in general. This study 
therefore tries to offer an insight into that particular area. It focuses particularly 
on the reformist trend, its ideology and perfonnance, for the trend is assumed to 
be pioneering the modernist trend among the wide variety of Islamist groups in 
the Middle East. The trend can claim an exemplary role for many reasons 
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including its having a considerable number of well-trained politicians, activists, 
and intellectuals, its open embracement of democracy as the ultimate goal and 
the centre of activity, and its capacity to produce a relatively large and high 
quality literature in the support of its ideology and standpoints. The study will 
show that despite the failure of the trend to retain power, its eight-year rule has 
effectively changed the political environment of the country. While he stands 
down in August 2005, almost everyone feels that Iran after Muhammad Khatami, 
the reformist president, is far different from what it was at the eve of his election 
in 1997. 
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Chapter I 
The Foundation of 
the Doctrine of Authority in Shi'ism 
Shi i political thought is undergoing a major shift. The theory of political 
authority as it is developing in the context of contemporary Iran is mainly 
concerned with the ruler's power, particularly his authority to use coercive power 
in such cases that might result in taking an individuals' life or limiting his right 
to property. ' The established belief acknowledges that a divinely-designated 
imam can enjoy such an immense power, and the debate thus concerns the 
delegation of the imam's authority to the fallible - i. e. none-divinely- designated 
leaders. This explains why a good deal of the argument revolves around the 
source of the ruler's authority. Until recently the issue under question has been 
the nature of the delegation of authority from the imam to the leader, namely the 
qualified scholar. Since the early 1980s, however, the debate has come to be 
concerned with the relative weight of the authority delegated by the imam 
compared to that entrusted by the people. The shift of concern has been the 
result of the change of the doctrine's jurisdiction; from being the basis for a 
communal, mainly spiritual leadership into being the major constituent of a state 
ideology. 
With the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini's version of wil yat al-faqih 
in 1979, the ruler was authorised on both civil and religious ground. The civil 
aspect is realised through general elections while the religious one is secured 
through the conferment of the imam's authority onto the highest in rank among 
the religious scholars. The point of contention thus has been about the 
implications of that combination and the relative weight of political legitimacy 
secured by each of the two sources. 
This chapter discusses the foundations of Sh19 political thought and the 
course of development through which the theory of wilayat al-fadih 
(=guardianship of the jurist) has emerged and become established as the major 
1 Sachcdina, Abdulaziz. The Just Ruler in Shiitc /slam, (Ncw York 1988), p. 231 
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response to the question of political legitimacy in Twelver Shi'ism. This will 
provide for a better understanding of the backdrop for many of the current 
debates. The chapter will start with a brief discussion of the factors responsible 
for the formation of the school's political thought. Then it discusses how the first 
version of the doctrine of power has emerged and developed since the tenth 
century. This will help to understand the primary theoretical challenges to the 
doctrine of jurist guardianship. 
The Foundations of Shi`ism 
Shi`ism, the minor of the two main branches of Islam, had shifted from 
being a mainly political to a mainly religious group to escape suppression at the 
hands of the hostile rulers2. The transformation involved a review of the 
principles underpinning the group's leadership and its attitude towards the state. 
At the same time, there was a process aimed to drive the politically-minded and 
extremist trends out of the school's mainstream. Twclvcr Sh 'ism has emerged in 
the early tenth century 3 within which the Usüfi trend has established its 
dominance only in the late eighteenth century. The more traditional Akhbäti 
trend was driven to the margin at the hands of Wahid Behbehäni, (1705-1803), 
an influential scholar who challenged its dominance in the Shi'l school of 
jurisprudence4. 
Shia religiosity and culture are dominated by three major themes; the 
tragedy of Karbala, the doctrine of Infallible Imamate as shaped by the sixth 
imam Ja'far al-Sädiq, and the occultation of the twelfth Imam Muhammad al- 
Malidi. 
2 Kohlberg, Et an, "The Evolution of the Shi'a". in Kohlberg, Be/icfand Law in Imaini Shi ism, 
0lampshire. UK 1991) article 1, p. 4. 
'Montgomery Watt, William, The formative Period ofIslamnic Thought, (Edinburgh 1973). p. 39 
Morgan, David, Medieval Persia 1040-1797 (London 1989), p. 160 
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1-Karbala Tragedy: 
Shia communities start the new year of the Islamic (Hijrl) calendar with 
a ten day-mourning ritual, during which professional speakers and eulogists 
remind their audiences of what happened in Karbala over thirteen centuries ago. 
For some Shi'as, the communal service known as `Ashiiirr is an expression of 
grief and mourning, for others, an indication of their readiness to sacrifice for the 
cause of religion, and universally, it is the way in which Shia communities have 
maintained their distinct culture over centuries and generations5. 
The town of Karbala, 60 miles south Baghdad was the scene for a bloody 
showdown whereby scores of the Prophet's family members and their supporters, 
led by his grandson Al-Hussayn, were brutally massacred at the hands of the 
Umayyad forces in 680/60AH. The impact of the massacre remains paramount. 
None of the many tragedies which Shi'as have endured in their history has been 
as influential as `Ashürä. 6 There are certain events, Welhausen suggests, which 
exercise an amazing effect, not because of the events themselves and their 
inevitable consequences, but because of their memory in men's hearts7. `Ashüra 
is, undoubtedly, one of these events, for it has been symbolised as a myth of 
heroism, purity, and self-sacrifice for a good cause. 8 
Politically, `Ashürä was reproduced as the cultural foundation for 
renouncing the legitimacy of all forms of temporal rulership. Soon, it would 
bring about an aspiration for an ideal form of justice that could be realised only 
by the Prophet's descendents taking over power. 9 Post-`Ashürä Shi'ism has not 
consisted of a clearly definable group. It was the debates over leadership and the 
extent of political involvement that raised the need for definition, and divided 
For a detailed account on the annual camcmorial ceremony ( Ta zia), see Haltn, Heinz, Shia 
Islam : From Religion to Revolution, Translated by A. Brown, (Princeton, 1996) chapter 11, pp. 
41-95 
`' Richard, Yann, Shi'itc ! slam, Translated by A. Ncvill, (Cambridge, USA. 1995) p. 29 
\Velhausen, J., The Rcligio-Political Factions in Early Islam. Ed. R. Ostle. Trans. R. Ostlc and 
S. Walzer. (Amsterdam, 1975). p. 116 
Kohlberg. op. cit.. p. 3 
Sachedina, op. cit.., p. 26 
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SITias into many branches, including the Zaydis, the Ismai[s, and the Imämi 
Shi' as. 
The latter trend was comprised of the followers of the fourth imam Zayn 
al-`Abi(fin, the grand son of `AH bin Abi-Talib, the first Shi i imam, and his 
successors. The trend would later evolve as the Twelver Shi i sect, whose 
position was mainly apolitical1). The attribution of Twelver Imämis relates to 
the particular paradigm of religious leadership that became the chief feature of 
communal belonging. However it had to wait for Ja`far al-Sädiq (702-765) to put 
the notion of the centrality of leadership in a definite religious form. 
2-The Legacy of Ja`far al-Sadiq 
The sixth imam assumed the office of imamate in 733 until his death in 
765. This epoch was characterised by the decline of the Umayyad power. In 
contrast, the move towards politicisation with the revolt of Zayd, the uncle of al- 
Sadiq, against Caliph Hisham in 739 gave rise to Shi'ism. 11 After the Umayyad 
dynasty collapsed in 750, the Islamic Caliphate was taken over by the `Abbasids, 
a branch of the Hashim clan of the Prophet Muhammad. Many historians, such as 
Wclhausen, believe that the `Abbasids reaped the benefit of the struggles made 
by Shi i factions to depose the Umayyads. '2 The last two decades of the 
Umayyad reign, and the first decade of the `Abbasid reign provided an interval 
during which the rulers were busily defending their power. Therefore, al- Sädiq 
and almost all other scholars of different schools in Islam had the opportunity to 
pursue without interruption their cultural and educational causes. 13 
Al-Sädiq was famous for his thorough and hard work. He is said to have 
had hundreds of disciples'4. Such claims by SW ii narrators are hard to verify 
since many of their written works are said to have been lost. 15 However the 
Kohlberg, op. cit.. p. 4 
Ya'qübi, Ahmad, T5r7kh a/-Ya`qübi, (Quin 1984). v. 2, p. 325 
12 Welhausen, op. cit.. p. 165 
" Hassan, Hassan, Tar1kh a/-/slain. (Cairo 1964) vol. 3, p. 193 
1' Al-Hasani, Hashim M., Sirat a/-Aycrnmah al-Ithnai 'Asher, (Beirut 1990) vol. 2. p. 246 
15 On the works of al-Sadiq and his dicsiplcs, and especially the so-called 400 sources (ai/). see 
Kohlberg, Etan, "Al- Usiil al-arbawnia". in Kohlberg, op. cit.., article VII, pp. 128-166 
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significance of al-Sädiq's work is evident by the sizable body of traditions he 
left. According to some sources, the whole body of traditions of the twelve S111 9i 
imams was narrated by 5415 actual witnesses among whom 3217 narrated only 
al-Sädiq's teachings. 16 This indicates the amount of time he had dedicated to 
teaching, and the variety of religious subjects with which he dealt. Today, almost 
two thirds of jurisprudential rules common among Shi'as are referred to al- 
Sädiq's traditions which explains why the Sh1 i legal school was named after him 
as the `the Ja'afari School'. 17 
It was al-SCidiq's efforts which transformed the Shi'i faith from a sense of 
political or social affinity with the Prophet's family (Ahl al-Bayt) into a distinct 
religious school. In this regard, al-Sädiq has elevated the community leadership 
to a theological level. It was exclusively attached to the divinely-designated 
persons whose role was regarded as an embodiment of God's grace and 
continuity of the Prophet's mission. Therefore, obedience to the leader would be, 
literally, linked to that of God and the Prophet, regardless of any political or 
social considerations''. Such an extremely high regard was necessary in order to 
distinguish religious grouping under the God-ordained leadership (infallible 
Imamate) from the politically-motivated groups that were widespread during 
that epoch. 
Al-Sidiq's commitment to theological causes was evident in his 
renouncing of all revolutionary movements including the Häshimite movement 
which wanted to nominate him as caliph. '9 His approach was even tougher when 
it came to those who claimed a religious-based right of leadership20. Nonetheless, 
al-Sadiq welcomed with reservations those revolutionaries whose claim was 
limited to political leadership as was evident in his treatment of Abu Muslim al- 
Kllurdsani, the `Abbasid commander. According to Tabarsi, the Shi i narrator, 
Abu Muslim who helped the `Abbasids to take over Persia, had sought the 
1( Al-Fade, Abdul Hadi, Tarikh al-Tashri'c al-lslainl (London 1992). p. 206 
Hahn. op. cit.. p. 24 
' Hilfi, 'Allamah Jamal al-Din, Al-Aliain. (Kuwait 1985) p. 200 
Ya'qübi, op. cit., p. 349 
Al-Mufld, Shaikh Muhammad, A1-Irshjv (Tehran, n. d. ) vol. 2, p. 185. Sec also Al-lsfahani, 
Abu al-Faraj, Magätcial-Tilibyyin, (Beirut 1987). p. 140 
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support of al-5adiq against his rival `Abbasid leaders. Al-$adiq did not want to 
interfere, nevertheless, he gave him a warm welcome21, far different from his 
treatment of his own revolutionary relatives who claimed a divine right of 
leadership including his cousin Muhammad bin `Abdullah bin al-Hasan, known 
as al-Nafs al-Zakiya (the pure sole). 22 
Al- Sädiq's Concept of Religious Imamate 
As Montgomery Watt rightly put it, up to the year 750, the proto-Sh19 
idea of charisma was in an extremely fluid state23. The charismatic figures of the 
house of Hashim were popular among the Muslim masses during the period from 
700 to 850.24 The Shi i community became the major source of recruitment for 
the militant groups struggling for power. Due to the political chaos, al-Sädiq 
concluded that the time was not right to engage in political activity. Given the 
revolutionary situation, his withdrawal could not have been easily accepted by 
the SI-59 community. Hence, he had to redefine the concept of leadership on a 
different basis. His new conception makes a clear-cut distinction between 
political leadership and religious Imamate with regard to the following 
principles: 
a) Denouncing political leadership as lacking morality, compared to the 
religious imamate which is based on pure religious values. Religious sanctity was 
exclusively assigned to the special concept of imamate, which was no longer 
associated with a political role. 25 This principle has brought about the dichotomy 
of Imamate-usurpation that dominated the SW ii political thought for quite a long 
time26 and, effectively, hindered the apprehension of politics as a sphere of 
continuous change. 
21 Al-Tabarsi, Al-Fadl, I'läm a/-ll'ari(Najaf, n. d. ) p. 279 
22 Al-Tabari, M. ibn Jarir, TSrikh al-Uniar? ºva al-Aful k, (Beirut, 1967) . vol. 7, p. 601 
23 Montcgomcry Watt, "The Significance of Early Stage of lmami Shi`ism", in N. Kcddi (ed), 
Religion And Politics In Iran. (New Haven. 1983) p. 23 
24 Montegomcry Watt, The Formative Period, p. 54 
25 Kulaini, Muhammad bin Yaqüb, A/-Käl (Beirut 1990) vol. 2. p. 287 
`(' Sachedina, op. cit... p. 90 
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b) Ridiculing the struggle for power as futile. To advance this argument, al- 
$adiq employed the doctrine of divine predestination (gadar), according to which 
the timing of the rise and collapse of dynasties is pre-determined by God. 27 Its 
implication is that the size or strength of opposition cannot determine the fate of 
dynasties and rulers whose deposition was not due. This notion was previously 
utilised by the Umayyad dynasty to frustrate their opponents. Here it is 
noteworthy that the doctrine of predestination was discredited by al-Hassan, the 
second SW ii imäm. 2 Goldzihcr suggests this tendency has been common among 
Muslims during most of the Umayyad and `Abbasid eras during which the rulers 
encouraged people to be indifferent towards politics. 29 Apparently al-Sädiq's 
argument intended to extract Shi`as out of the revolutionary groups, without 
being obliged to offer a political alternative. It became, however, the basis for a 
wide range of anti-activist traditions in the Shi i school. 
c) Modifying the pre-requisites for leadership and its outcomes. In the new 
concept of Imamatc, the leadership is no longer a public office. The imam is 
designated by God through the words of the Prophet (nass) regardless of the will 
of the community members. 30 Accordingly, the authority is no longer given by 
contract (brti`a) nor is the imäin accountable before the public. 31 
The tendency to differentiate political from religious leadership was 
apparently intended to break the linkage between religious-based legitimacy and 
the struggle for power. This revolutionary tendency was common among Shi'as, 
especially the revolutionary trends such as the Zaydis. The separation of the two 
scopes, though never plainly acknowledged as Sachedina argues32, became an 
established principle among Shidi scholars. Similarly, the qualification for 
Kulaini, op. cit., vol. I, p. 430 
'" Rahman, Bodiur, "Responsibility for Action in an Early Historical Document of Islam", The 
Islamic Quarterly vol. 34, no. 4,1990. pp. 235-245 
2" Goldzihcr, Ignaz, Muslim Studies (London 1971) Translated by C. R. Barber & S. M. Stern , 
edited by Stern. Pub. George Allen & Unwin. pp. 93-4 
tl Murtadä, al-Sharif `Ali al-, Rasae/a/-Sharif a/-Murtadü (Quin 1984) vol. 2, p. 264. On SW ii 
theology of the designated imamate, see 'Allima Tabätabä'i, "The Imams and the Imamate", 
in Nasr, Dabashi and Nasr (ed. ), Shi'ismn: Doctrine. Thou{ht and Spirituality: (New 
York, 1988). pp. 156-167 
' Kulaini, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 433 
32 Sachedina, op. cit.. p. 62 
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leadership was linked to the possession of infallible knowledge as distinguished 
from interpretive knowledge acquired by fallible scholars. 33 Al-Sädiq's special 
conception of leadership has served to change the Shia attitude from being in 
opposition to the state to being apathetic34 as a means of consolidating the 
school and preserving its distinctiveness. As suggested by Hodgson, the 
emphasis on infallible knowledge and designated succession has crucially aided 
the consolidation of the school behind al-$adiq and his line. 35 
3- The Occultation of the Twelfth Imam (260/874) 
According to the SW ii sources, the eleventh imam, al-Hassan al-`Askari, 
had a son, Muhammad, born in 869 but he was not allowed to appear in public in 
order to protect him from the `Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkcl (847-861)36. Only a 
few of the close members of the family had seen the heir of the Imamate before 
he went into hiding. Apparently, the earlier Shi i scholars supposed that the 
hiding would not last long37. Nevertheless, as the years went on, the hope for the 
early return of the imam gradually dimmed and the community divided over the 
viability of Imamate39. A traumatic state went on for years. As the notable 
scholar `AIR Ibn Bäbwayh, known as Shaykh al-Sadüq wrote in 979, people were 
39 
still doubting the case of occultation and seeking an explanation. 
The occultation has symbolised the absence of the possibility of 
reinstating justice and legitimate government in the world. 
4° One day, Twclver 
Shi`as believe, the savior Mahdi will appear, summon the believers to arms, 
" Kulaini, op. cit., 294 
Arjomand, The Shadow Of God and the Hidden Irnam, (Chicago, 1984), pp. 58-9 
Hodgson, Marshall, "How did the Early Shi'a Become Sectarian". Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, 75, No. I, January-March 1995. (pp. 1-13), p. 12 
'6TCS1, Muhammad, A/-Igtissd 6una Yata'allaq be al-l'tigäd(Beirut 1986) pp. 233-4 
"This supposition was implied in in any rules endorsed by early Shia jurists. For instance, 
religious taxes (zak: it)and (khwns)were advised to be reserved until the hidden imam re- 
appeared, and followers were to retain swords to show their readiness to join the imam's army, 
and so on. Sec al-Shaykh al-Mufid, Al-iVfugnc'ah, (Quin 1990) p. 286 
'K Hussain, Jassim, The Occultation of the Twelfth lrnam, chapter 3, c. edition, retrieved on Oct. 
7.2003 from: www. yamahdi. com/books/pdf/occultat ion 
'9 AI-Sadüq, Muhammad bin Al!, Kainil al-Din, (Qum 1995) the preface, and v. 1, p. 126. 
41 Algar. Hamid, "The Oppositional Role of the ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran", in N. Keddic, 
Scholar.,, Saints, Sofis, (Berke Icy 1972), p. 232 
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destroy all tyranny, and fill the earth with justice even as it has been filled with 
injustice. No one can guess the time or place in which his triumphant 
reappearance will take place. 41 For Shia scholars the occultation means that 
bidding for power is no longer legitimate since such endeavor lacks the potential 
to succeed. If the case was not as such, the imam would have reappeared42. 
Accordingly, the religious rules whose enforcement requires the state power 
would be suspended43 or entrusted to temporal rulers. 44 By so doing the 
aspiration for social justice was given an idealistic character and dealt with as a 
theological rather than a practical concept. 45 
Post-Occultation Challenges 
Despite the turmoil on the religious front, the Shia community saw an 
overall improvement in its fortunes aided by the decline of the `Abbasid power 
throughout the greater part of the tenth century. 46 In many regions, the `Abbasid 
caliphate had its power taken over by local commanders including, Shi i tribal 
lords. In North Africa, Isma`i[ Shi'as established a counter-caliphate in 909. 
Northern Iraq and then Syria came under the control of the I; lamdanids in 944. 
The Buyids were able to take control of Baghdad, the centre of the Islamic 
caliphate. It is not surprising, Kohlberg suggests, that the tenth century has come 
to be known as the SW ii century 47. The rule of the Buyids (945-1055) was 
characterised by tolerance and respect to all schools of thought. Their reign saw 
the emergence of some important theories regarding the relationship between 
religion and state in Islam, notably the theory proposed by Mawardi the notable 
Shhfii scholar and the one proposed by Sharif al-Murtadä, the Shia leader. Both 
scholars draw a clear line between the legitimacy acquired through public 
'' Tüsi, op. cit. 
'' Najaft, Muhammad H., Jawihiral-Kalirn, (Tchran 1993) v. 22, p. 182 
" Ans iri, Murtad5., Kidb Al-A4akjsib. (Quin 1999) v. 3, p. 554 
°' AI-Bahrani, Yousif, AI-Hadieq al-Nizerah, (Beirut 1993) v. 25, p. 488 
45 Algar, op. cit.. 
°" Kohlberg, "The Evolution of the Shia", op. cit.. p. 14 
41 Kohlberg, op. cit.. p. 15 
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consent (bai `a) and the permissible obedience to the ruler who acquires power by 
the means of usurpation as in the case of the Buyids. 
During the first half of the eleventh century, religious scholars have 
emerged as a major force in the Shia community. The evolution of their role was 
aided by the recognition of relative knowledge, hence, independent judgement, or 
ijtihad, as a proper source for authoritative rulings in religious affairs. 48 Ijtihad 
gives a role to rational judgment (`aq/ almost on par with the imams' traditions 
(naq>) when giving religious rulings relevant to the realities of social life49. 
Through the process of ijtihad, the scholar abstracts the principle embedded in a 
contextual judgement previously made by an infallible imam and applies it to the 
other contexts which bear similarities to the previous one. In respect of political 
thought, ijtihad has helped to remove the limitations inherent in the traditional 
theology which, effectively, restricted Shi i political thought to the narrow 
framework of the doctrine of Imamate. It must be recalled that the model of 
leadership adopted after al-Sädiq was tailored to fit exclusively the holders of 
divinely ordained knowledge, namely the infallible iinhms50. With the relative 
knowledge being recognised, the office of communal leadership would be 
perceived impartially whereby every Shia individual could qualify for the office 
through the acquisition of fallible knowledge. 
Ijtihad was first employed in the Shi i school by Hassan al-`Umani and 
Ibn al-Junayd al-Iskäfi. The two scholars have lived in Baghdad in the late tenth 
century and were famed for pioneering the call to integrate reason as an 
independent source for religious ruling51. The initiative of `Umani and Iskafi was 
pursued by Mufid, Murtadä, and Tu-s" whose influential works have earned them 
4" Akhavi, Shahrough., Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany, 1980), p. 1 
41' halm, op. cit.., p. 99 
`" Moczzi, Mohammad., Divine Guide in Early Shi'ismn (Albany, 1994) p. 125 
5' AI-Qummi, 'Abbas, AI-Kund wa a/-Algib, (Tehran. 1989) vol. I p. 199. Both 'Umani and 
Iskifi lived in the second half of the tenth century, there is no definite date for their death, yet 
Tchrani reluctantly puts lskäfi's death at 381 AD/991. see: Tehran, Agha Buzurg, Al-Thari'ah 
c/a Tisanlfa/-Shia, (Beirut 1983) vol. 14 p. 259). For more information on the two scholars, 
see al-Amin, Muhsin. A' yan al-Shi'ah, (Beirut 1986) vol. 2 p. 212 
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the spiritual leadership of the community and signalled the emergence of the 
earliest form of religious establishment in Shi'ism. 52 
The First Approach to the Issue of Authority 
The Shi'as rise to power was an upsetting blow to the dogma of passively 
awaiting the return of the Mahdi (intizir al-faraj), an integral principle of the 
belief in his occultation. According to the doctrine of Mahdism, the possibility of 
a just rulership has disappeared from the world. Thus all forms of cooperation 
with temporal rulers were seen as an affirmation of injustice and usurpation, 
Bence they were impermissible. The latter assumption was affirmed by the 
inherent tendency of the Imämi Shi'as to dissociate themselves from all ruling 
powers as a result of the lack of any prospect of taking political power. 53 In 
contrast, the new socio-political developments have made the dogma to appear 
irrelevant. This challenge has prompted the scholars to rethink the old doctrine 
of leadership. 54 The problem posed here was how to allow people to take part in 
the state affairs without damaging the bedrocks of the doctrine of Imamate, 
which has been so far the major agent of communal cohesion. 
The approach of the three scholars, Mufid, Murtadä, and Tüsi involved a 
revision of the doctrine of Imamate whereby the office of rulership was 
differentiated from the person of the imam. Shaykh al-Mufid (d-1022) was 
taught by `Umani. Sharif al-Muratadä (d-1044) was the son of a notable family. 
Abu Ja'far al- Tüsi (d-1076) is known for establishing the religious school of 
Najaf. All the three have assumed the leadership of the Shia community in 
Baghdad and were famed for being the fathers of the Shº`i jurisprudential school. 
Theoretically, it was said that the imam in person is the appointee of God 
to care for the interests of the umma. If the imam is not available, the office of 
Imamate is to be suspended. On the other hand, the interests of the umma are to 
52 Halm admits that Shia scholars were spiritually influential during this period, however, its 
institutional form has emerged only during the Safavid era. Halm, op. cit.. p. 108. This 
assumption has also been held by other writers (see for example the account of Arjomand, op. 
cit.., p. 211). 
5i Halm, op. cit... p. 88 
54 Balm, ibid. p. 94 
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be administered in the best possible manner by other people. The focus here is on 
public order and other material interests rather than the righteousness and the 
quality of the ruler which is the focus of the doctrine of Imamate. 
To effect that change, the scholarly discussion over the state was 
transferred from the domain of theology to the domain of jurisprudence, where 
the formulation of religious rules follows reason-based criteria. The function of 
the state was attached to the conceptual framework of commanding good and 
prohibiting evil (al-arnr hi '1-ma `ri f wa'a/-nahy `an al-inunkar). In this 
framework, the focus is on the state's objectives and performance. On the same 
basis, the state institution carne to be seen as being an independent from the 
person of the ruler. Employing Plato's explanation of the emergence of the state, 
Tüsi holds that: 
The presence of an obeyed ruler would effectively balance the 
relationship between people, by deterring heedlessness, punishing 
felons, and helping weaker people to recover the rights abused by 
stronger ones. Thereby the community would more likely be 
virtuous. In contrast, the absence of an effective leader would 
result in the spreading of corruption, indiscipline, disorder, and in 
general, a hardship of livelihood. This is an established and 
indisputable fact. " 
Tüsi concludes that the assumption of power, if helpful to achieve the 
said objectives, is desired by God. Mufid outlines a set of nonns to be observed 
by state officials in order to ensure the legitimacy of their rule. In his view, a 
legitimate official should commit himself to preventing injustice, helping 
powerless people achieve their rights, and ensuring the good of the community. 
Upon the observation of these norms, individuals are allowed to cooperate with 
temporal rulers. 56 Mufid's approach was enriched and methodologically 
reaffinned by his two disciples Murtadä and Tüs 57. In his Mas'älah fi'1-'ainal 
nla'a al-Sultan (=A treatise on working for the ruler) Murtadä justifies political 
participation on an ethical basis, which is clearly distinguished from the 
551"üsi, 
ell-/gtisäd, p. 297 
'" Al-M1 of id, al-A/ugnc'ah, p. 810 
57 Arjomand, op. cit.., p. 63 
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normative principles legitimating political domination5K. His thesis was written 
in 1025, but it still dominates Shi i jurisprudential debates over the relationship 
with illegitimate rulers59. 
This conciliatory approach was aided by the notion of hisba as 
conceptualised by Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi, the notable Sunni scholar 
(d. 1058). Hisba provides an operational framework for carrying out the range of 
duties under the category of the commanding of good and the prohibiting of evil. 
It aims mainly to maintain social order and general welfare. 60 In this view, the 
responsibility for fulfilling those duties is borne by the society as a whole. An 
individual can undertake the responsibility within his capacity as a member of 
the society, i. e. an actor in the public sphere 61. According to the prominent 
Iranian scholar Ayatollah Montazefi, most of the duties categorised as hisba arc 
identical to the public services undertaken nowadays by the various branches of 
62 the modern state. 
The new approach has benefited Shia laymen, and helped to enhance the 
role of the scholars. On the intellectual front, it was a remarkable step towards a 
new paradigm of authority in Shi'isrn concentrating on achievable and rationally- 
defined objectives rather than idealistic ones. From then on, most of the debates 
over the religious-based authority would revolve around the extent of 
correspondence or differentiation between this approach and the old one. 
The Emergence of the theory of Jurist's Guardianship 
The rise to power of the Seljuq Sunni warlords in Baghdad in 1055 
signalled a reversal in Shia interests in politics. Tüsi, the community leader, 
5" This treatise was translated into English by Wilferd Madclung: "A Treatise of the Sharif al- 
Murtada on the Legality of Working for the Government (Mas'ala ft '1-'aural ma'a'I-sultan)", 
Bulletin of'the School of Oriental and African Studies, , vol. 
43, no. 1, (1980), pp. 18-31 
"' Arjomand, op. cit.., p. 65 
`'" Mawardi, Abu al-Hassan, Al-Ahkäm al-Sultäniyyah wa al-Wilayät al-Diniyyah, (Qum 1986) p. 
247 
K5shif al-Ghit5, 'Ali, AI-Ni ral-Sati ; (Najaf 1961) vol. 1, p. 504 
`'- Montazcri, Hussayn. Dirasit T Wiläyat a! -Fagih, (Beirut 1988) vol. 2. p. 259 
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moved from the capital to the peripheral village of Najaf. His death in 1076 was 
followed by a century of decline in Shi i educational institutions. 63 During the 
fourteenth century, a revivalist movement emerged by the students of the school 
of 1-lilla, 20 miles south Baghdad including al-Muhaqqiq al-Hi1G (1205-1277), 
`Allama al-I-Iilli (1250-1325) and `Amili, known as the First Martyr (1333-1384). 
Their intellectual work made a significant breakthrough in the religious studies 
and helped to revitalise the rationalistic methodology of Shi'i jurisprudence. 64 
While kept aloof from politics, the school of Hilla has made an important 
contribution to the religious debate over leadership, notably the formulation of 
notion of deputyship of the imam. 
The term `the imam's deputy' (ni'ib al-imam) was first employed, in a 
limited sense, by Abu al-Saläh al-Halabi (d-1055) who permitted the qualified 
scholar to assume the office of judge under the usurper's rule. In his view, the 
judge acts on behalf of the absent imam and in the capacity of his deputy 
notwithstanding his apparent submission to the usurper. 65 In contrast, the notion 
proposed by al-Muhagqiq al-Hilfe suggests that every qualified jurist is a 
potential deputy of the absent imam, hence authorised to oversees the tasks 
falling within the imam's competcnce. 66 Compared to the approach of Mufid and 
Murtada which aimed to facilitate the participation in the state affairs by the 
Shia laymcn67, Hilli's approach aims to consolidate the position of mujtahid as 
the source for emulation and the responsible for spiritual affairs of the 
community. I, Iilli's disinterest in politics is evident in his skeptical approach to 
political issues such as the enforcement of laws by fallible rulers6 . 
Nevertheless, 
his work has effectively helped the rise of the qualified scholars (inujtahid to the 
highest authority in Shia community. 
63 Sadr. N1. Bägcr, Al-Ma`ä/im al-Jaa7dah /i7-Ust7, (Beirut 1981), p. 62 
Hahn, op. cit.. p. 101 A 
Halabi. Abu al-Saläh, A/-Kärral-Figh. (Isfahan 1993) pp 420-423 
66 AI-Muhaqqiq AI-Hil(i, Sharic' a/-Islam. (Tehran 1990) vol. 1, p. 138. This assertion concerned 
particularly the authority of the mujtahid to manage the religious taxes (khurns) in his capacity 
as deputy of the imam. 
67 Arjoinand, op. cit.., p. 141 
AI-Muhagqiq AI-Hi1G, op. cit.. p. 260 
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The Rise of the Safavid Dynasty (1501-1722) 
The rise of the Safavid dynasty in Iran marked the most significant event 
in the pre-modern history of Shi'ism since the Occultation. From 1501 onward, 
Iran and Shi'ism became inextricably associated. Shi'ism gave the new state its 
national identity and earned the political power it needed to forge a committed 
society. 69 Declaring Shi'ism as the official religion, and the decisive efforts 
which were made to incorporate the population within the school, has served the 
emergence of the school's spokesmen as a powerful force in the public sphere. 70 
Shaykh `AG al-Karaki (d- 1534) was the first eminent Shi'i mujtahid 
serving at the Safavid court. Politically-minded, Karaki was keen to establish his 
status as a `partner' in the king's authority. In his lengthy book Jämi` al-Magäsid 
and other treatises, he asserts that the imam's deputy is the only holder of 
legitimate authority. 7' Enayat suggests that Karaki had a great conviction in the 
jurist's guardianship. 72 This suggestion is arguable. An analysis of his various 
works shows that he was not decisive when it came to the political aspect of the 
jurist's authority. Nevertheless he empowered the iinäm's deputy with two 
important privileges, namely the endorsement of the ruler's authority and the 
assumption of all religious functions initially assigned to the infallible imam. 73 
Karaki's proposals were initially disputed by his peers74, but gradually gained 
wide currency in the religious circles. Embracing a realistic view, Karaki has 
acknowledged the division of labor between state and clergy, yet he tended to re- 
balance the share of power possessed by the two sides. For him, the imam's 
deputy was independent and his department was by no means subject to the rule 
of the king75. In Arjomand's account, the recognition of Karaki as the imam's 
"" Richard, op. cit... p. 78. 
7' Hahn, op. cit.., pp. 106-9 
" Karaki, `Ali, Järni` al-Magäsid T Sharh 7I-Qawä'id. (Qum, 1999), v. 11, p. 266 
72 Enayat, 1-lamid, "Iran: Khumayni's Concept of the Guardianship of the Jurisconsult", in James 
Piscatori (ed. ), /slam in the Political Process. (Cambridge 1984), 160-180: p. 161 
Karaki, `Ali, "Qati'at al-Lijäj", in Bustani, Mahmoud (cd) AI-Kharajiät (Quin, n. d. ), p. 56 
74 Arjomand, op. cit.., p. 136 
75 Romlo. Hassan, Ahsan al-Taiv rikh, (Tehran 1978) v. 12, p. 249 
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deputy by Tahinasb, the second Safavid king, could be regarded as the milestone 
marking the creation of a Shi i hierocracy in Iran. 76 
During the interval of chaos following the demise of the Safavids in 1722, 
the Varna lost their political influence but retained stronger positions at the 
local level. Shortly after the rise of the Qajar dynasty in 1794, the `ulamä 
recovered much of the influence they had lost77 and were ready to play a wider 
role in national politics"". The Qajar era was characterised by state impotence 
and increasing foreign interfcrence. 79 Both factors have contributed to the rise of 
the political role of the Varna, especially during the reign of Fath `Ali Shah 
(1797-1834). 70 The decisive moment came in 1808 when the king sought the 
support of the `ulama against the Russian encroachment in the northern territory. 
Three of the eminent mujtahids wrote theses endorsing the authority of the king 
and asking people to stand by him. 8' Ja'far Kashif al-Ghitä, the great mujtahid of 
the time seized the opportunity to outline his proposal on legitimate authority. 
Kashif al-Ghitä (d. 1813) was known for his great interest in reasoning and 
rationalistic derivation of religious rules. He was described by his biographers as 
politically minded and famed for his efforts to mobilise people to defend Najaf 
against the Saudi-Wahabi assaults (1801-1806), as well as mediation between the 
Ottomans and the Qajars in 1812. x2 
In comparison to preceding scholars, Kashif al-Ghita dealt with the 
question of political authority in a relatively precise manner. He firstly defines 
the main point, namely the issue of political leadership "which needs an 
effective, intelligent, and decisive ruler". 83 Then he states the problem pertaining 
"' Arjornand. op. cit.. p. 130 
" Cole, Juan R., "Irrami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulctna", in N. Keddi, Religion And 
Politics, p. 40 
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Leaders". Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 24,1999, p. 272 
Radawi. Mahdi, in Mirzä Quintni, Jäme'-al-Shetit. (Tehran 1991) vol. 1, p. 24 
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to rulership, namely the state suppression of individual whereby, he argues that: 
"Initially all human beings are equal. No one is superior to any other, unless he is 
authorised by God, the master of all". 84 His aim was to assert the legitimate 
objectives of state and its performance as a sufficient basis for claiming 
obedience. His proposals came through comparing the obedience to the imam 
and to the king, where the former is ascribed to God ordinance whereas the latter 
is linked to the legitimate objectives pursued by the state. 85 Käshif al- Ghita was 
among the few scholars who acknowledged the conventional basis of the state 
and set aside the theological dichotomy of Imamate-usurpation. For him, the best 
ruler is the imam or his appointee, including the qualified jurist, 
Should they be unavailable, incapable, or reluctant to undertake 
the responsibility, any fair-minded and skillful Muslim might take 
over. Accordingly people should give him full obedience. 
Insurrection is tantamount to opposition to God and the Prophet. 
Finally he concludes that "provided the authority of the king has to be 
endorsed by the imam's deputy, I hereby, endorse the authority of king Fath `AG 
Shah". 86 
In a sense, the assertion of Käshif al-Ghitä has effectively extended the 
authority of the mujtahid to the political domain. While Hilli focuses on the 
religious aspect of the imam's dcputyship, and Karaki employs this prerogative 
to claim a kind of partnership in power with the king, Käshif al-Ghitä takes the 
matter to its logical conclusion by claiming the right of religious leader to rule or 
otherwise endorse the authority of the incumbent ruler. Apparently, he was the 
first eminent mujtahid to claim such authority in plain words. In my opinion, his 
proposal is tantamount to the prototype of the theory of jurist's guardianship 
(wilayat al-fagih), however without putting forward this particular term. 
The doctrine of jurist guardianship was finalised and methodologically 
established by Ahmad Naräg3, the religious leader of Kashän, central Iran (1771- 
1828). Unlike Kashif al-Ghitä, the political application of the theory does not 
Käshif al- Ghiti, ibid. 
Kashif al- Ghitä, ibid. 
' Kishif al-Ghitä, ibid 
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seem to have concerned Narägi. In the preface to his thesis, he ascribes his 
concern with the issue to the irregularities committed by non-qualified judges 
who unlawfully claim the position of imam's deputyship, i. e. the authority to act 
independently. 97 He also gives numerous examples to illustrate the scope of the 
authority enjoyed by a qualified fagih, none of which relates to the political 
spherc. 88 Nevertheless, his formulation he made has provided later scholars with 
a ready formed theory to be employed in the political sphere. The spectrum of 
the fagih's authority in the thesis of Narägi falls into two categories: 
All functions attached to the office of imamate unless they are assigned to 
the imam in person. 
The duties concerning public interest under the category of hisba. They are 
to be fulfilled by the fagih or other individuals with his consent. 99 
To establish his proposal theoretically, Narägi referred to a number of 
narrations attributed to the imams, none of which is sufficient to support such a 
radical conclusion. Admitting this problem, he argues that they all voice the 
same idea, namely the authority of fagih and that none of the preceding scholars 
have denied their authenticity. `° In a previous work, I have made an extensive 
examination of the narrations adopted by Narägi focusing on their authenticity 
and reliability with reference to both the criteria of Shi i jurisprudence and the 
opinions of a number of eminent scholars. My conclusion is that Narägi's thesis 
cannot be firmly grounded on the imams' traditions. 91 However, it could be 
legitimized on a rationalistic basis, as Ayatollah Khomeini did later, `''' which 
effectively takes the theory into another territory, but, absolutely not the 
traditional platform. 
N7 Narägi, Ahrnad, 'Aiv idal-A}ynm, (Quin 1989) p. 186 
"Narägi, ibid. pp. 190-192 
Narsgi, ibid. pp. 188-9 
Naragi, ibid. p. 189 
Alsaif, Tawfiq, Nazariat al Sulta flal-Fiqh al-Shi i, (Beirut 2002) pp. 172-6,185-91 
92 Khomeini, Ayatollah, Kitab al-Bay, (Quin 1985) vol. 2, p. 461. The weakness of the above 
narrations was admitted by Khomeini in his study of the principles of jurisprudence. Sec: 
Subhitni, Ja'far (cd. ), Tahthibal-Ustil(Quin, 2000), p. 95 
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Naragi's proposal gained currency in the scholarly circles only after it 
was challenged by his disciple Murtadä al-Ansäri in 1862. Ansäe (1799-1864) was 
probably the first leader recognised by Usüli Shi'as as a universal exemplar 
(inarji' a1-tagrc). 93 His theoretical work enjoys considerable authority in the 
Shi`º school of jurisprudence. His work on the religious accommodation of 
worldly affairs, entitled al-Makisib, has been commented upon, and elaborated 
by most of the later great mujtahids. Of these works, there are at least twenty 
published books. One of Ansäri's most important legacies has been his review of 
the theoretical basis of the relationship between the religious leader and 
individual members of the community. After him, Cole argues, the office of 
exemplar introduced the possibility of a strong and centralised leadership94. 
Although Ansari refrained from political activity, the structure he helped to 
establish had a great potential for mobilising the Shi'as in political causes. 95 
Ansäfl was not satisfied with the extensive powers invested in the fagih 
by Narägi's theory of jurist's guardianship. He fundamentally challenged its 
basis and applications and concluded that none of them could be safely 
established on the basis of the imams' traditions. Unlike his predecessors, Ansäri 
took the doctrine of Imamate as the only criterion for correcting the delegation 
of power from the imam to fallible persons. He acknowledges the absolute 
authority of the imam but firmly rejects a fallible person's eligibility to hold such 
immense powers 96 In his view, the powers of mujtahid are restricted to the 
instruction of religious laws (fatwä) and judgement (gadah. `ý7 Here, it is 
noteworthy that Shia scholars are in agreement on the absolute nature of the 
imam's authority in the broad sense, `' yet some of them are sceptical about its 
applicability in the cases that involve a clear curtailment of the basic rights of 
individuals. Bahr al-'Ulu-m, for instance, argues that it is almost impossible to 
93 Halm, op. cit.. p. 120 
94 Cole, op. cit.. p. 34 
95 Cole, ibid. p. 46 
°` Ansäri, op. cit.., p. 553 
07 Ansi ri. Murtadä, Kitüb al-Qa(h ta al-Shahadit, (Quin 1993) p. 47 
`'Y Khurasani, Akhünd M., yashiat al-Makisib, (Tehran 1986) p. 92 
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find any indisputable evidence in the entire history of the imams proving that 
they have actually exercised the claimed absolute authority. 99 
In Ansäii's view, the powers of the imam cannot be delegated simply 
because they either stem from his infallibility or because infallibility is a 
prerequisite for exercising them. 1°° He argues that there is no undisputable means 
to distinguish those particular powers that pertain to infallibility from the ones 
pertain to his office as ruler. Therefore, the only practical way to avoid violating 
the imam's sanctity would be to restrict the fagih 's authority to the scope of 
non-disputable cases. Having done so, Ansän says, we would not have the 
imam's authority invested in the mujtahid, but rather a number of tasks that 
could be independently based upon general or specific principles available in 
Shari'a. Such a basis is different from the one upon which the imam's authority 
is based. '()' 
One of Ansaii's significant innovations was his differentiation between 
two aspects of the imäin's authority: the first is the power based on infallibility 
or, as he puts it `power upon'. The second is the power attached to his office as 
ruler, or, as he puts it `power for'. 102 The former cannot be invested in a fallible 
person since it is of an absolute nature. The latter type of power is applied to 
meet `the need for supervision' in particular cases where individuals such as 
orphans, people with a mental disability and so on, need to be supervised. In such 
examples, Ani suggests, the authority is of fostering. The authorised guardian 
has the power to care for the dependent individual including the management of 
his properties but not the power over his person. This type of authority could be 
obtained by every trustworthy adult with the consent of mujtahid in his capacity 
as judgel0`. 
Despite Ansä i's discontentment with the theory of jurist's guardianship, 
his profound argumentation with regard to its bases and applications has drawn 
Bahr aI-'Ulüm, Muhammad, Bu/ghat a/-Fagih(Tchran, 1984) vol. 3, p. 215 
Ansäri, Kit: ib al-Makäsib, v. 3, p. 556-7 
1m Ansäri, ibid, p. 553 
102 Ansäri, ibid. p. 560 
jÖj Ansäri, ibid. p. 552 
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the attention of the religious seminaries to the focal questions of authority and 
its implications. It could be said without reservation that almost all subsequent 
debates about authority in the Shi i seminaries have, by and large, revolved 
around the assumptions and conclusions laid out by Ansäii. On the other hand, 
the political developments during the following years have fueled the debate 
about the political application of the theory. From the Tobacco Revolt on, the 
involvement of the `ulamä in politics intensified, which brought into question 
the nature of this involvement, its basis and limits. 
Towards the Twentieth Century 
The Tobacco Revolt of 1891 was the first opportunity to demonstrate the 
political potential of the exemplary institution established by Ansän. The revolt 
was triggered by a concession given by Näsir al-Din Shah, the fourth Qajar king 
(1848-1896) to a British company involving a monopoly of the local tobacco 
trade. Mirza Shiräzi (d-1895), the successor of Ansarº, has protested and issued a 
religious decree (fatwä) prohibiting tobacco trade and usage. The decree was 
observed throughout the nation and forced the king to back down. 104 Despite its 
limited purpose, the Tobacco Revolt was the first mass mobilization against the 
state. It has also facilitated a special role for the clergy who appeared as the most 
likely candidate to represent the people and their interests115. In his 
correspondence with the king, ShiraZi did not deny the king's authority but 
reminded him of its `limits' as well as his duty to safeguard the national 
independence and the rights of the nation. Apparently Shirazi is the first Shi i 
grand mujtahid to use the concept of `nation' in the political sense. Before that, 
mujtahids tended to use the term of `subjects' rather than nation or people. 106 
Fifteen years later, there was another showdown with the state over the 
limits of the king's authority. On both sides, the Constitutionalist and the 
On the career of Mirza Muhammad Hassan Shiräzi, see: Litvak, Meir, Shi'i Scholars of 19th 
Century Iraq, (Cambridge 1998), p. 84 
115 Keddic, N, "Iran, Understanding the Enigma: A Historian's View", Middle East Review of 
International Affairs Journal, V 2, No. 3, September 1999. retrieved from 
(www. ciaonet. org/oij/iiieria/ineria98 
_keddic. 
ht m l) 
"K' Kadivar, Jamilah, Tahavü/e Goflain n Siisi Shia dar/ran, (Tehran 2000) p. 209 
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royalist, there were clerics, traders, and secular intellectuals. 107 The 
Constitutional Revolution was the threshold that Iran crossed to join the modem 
world. Since 1906 the country had a constitution, a parliament and, above of all, 
a nation aware of its rights and role. 
It is noteworthy that the doctrine of wiläyat al-fagih was not a prominent 
issue during the Constitutional Revolution despite the fact that many high 
ranking clerics, including grand mujtahids, have played major roles in the 
revolution108. There arc, however, various explanations for this. According to 
Mahallati, a Constitutionalist cleric, the question of jurist's governorship had not 
been raised by the public. The `ulamä used to address questions only when they 
were raised by the public. '09 Naini, another Constitutionalist mujtahid, 
expresses doubts about the theory's efficacy in curbing state tyranny. Instead, he 
argued that only a well-defined set of institutions, rules, and procedures can do 
that job. 11° Na'ini's treatise on the constitutional government is the earliest 
scholarly work of its kind from the religious seminaries. " The highest-ranking 
mujtahid of the time, Akhünd Khuräsäni, rejects many of the arguments 
supporting the theory and suggests that the authority of the fagih is limited to 
the religious affairs. "2 Fazlullah Nürº was the only eminent mujtahid to uphold 
the idea of the fagih's political authority. Unfortunately, he stood by the king 
against the constitution which effectively invited accusations that his argument 
came from political, rather than purely religious, motives. With the 
For a background on the positions of the clerical groups, sec Arjoinand, Said, (ed. ), Authority 
and Political Culture in Shi'ism, (Albany 1998), p 180. 
Lahidji was among few researchers undervalued the role of the clergy in the Constitutional 
Revolution. He argued they were not the leaders nor were they informedly constitutionalist. 
Lahidji, Abdol Karim, "Constitutionalism and the Clerical Authority" in Arjomand, op. cit.., 
pp. 133-158 
' Mahalläti, M. Ismail, "AI-La'äli al-Marboutah f Wujüb al-Mashrütah", in Zargarinajäd, G. 
(cd. ), Rasic/Mashroutiat, (Tehran 1995) pp. 495-549: 525 
' 1' Na'ini, M H, "Tanbih al-Uroma wa Tanzih al-Millah" in Tawfiq Alsaif (ed. ), Dhiddal- 
Istibdid, (Beirut 1999) pp. 252-9 
111 The treatise of Na'ini (= An Admonishment to the Nation and Exoneration of the Faith) was 
first published in 1908-9 in Najaf, Iraq. On the major elements of the book, see: Algar, op. cit.., 
p. 239 
112 Khurasani, op. cit.., p. 92 
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Constitutional Revolution, the `ulainä have gained more political power and their 
role was formally acknowledged in the constitution1 3 1. 
Conclusion 
Imami Shi`ism emerged as a political trend but developed into a religious 
school with mainly apolitical tendencies in the eighth century. Until the 
occultation of the twelfth imam in 874, the Shi'i worldview was dominated by 
the dichotomy of imamate/usurpation in which all fonns of rule other than the 
infallible imamate were regarded as illegitimate. The improvement of the socio- 
political circumstances in the tenth century had incited a shift in the SW ii 
thought and reflected on three aspects: a) the fallible knowledge was established 
as an authoritative source of the religious ruling, b) the religious scholars 
emerged as a communal leadership, and c) cooperation with temporal rulers was 
permitted. 
A formal Sh3 i religious establishment emerged in Iran during the Safavid 
reign, and acquired more influence on public affairs at the late nineteenth 
century. With the Tobacco Revolt of 1891, the religious establishment emerged 
as a major political fore and had its role recognised in the Constitution of 1906. 
Although the doctrine of wiläyat al-fagih has appeared since the early nineteenth 
century at least, the religious establishment did not seriously seek to establish an 
exclusively clerical government. It was the ripening of the general circumstances 
in the late twentieth century that enabled the doctrine and its major advocate 
Ayatollah Khomeini to emerge as the determinant force on the political arena in 
Iran, a development that led to the Islamic revolution in 1979. 
The long debate over religious authority has been centred on three points: 
o The source of authority, whether it is based on divine designation or 
objective considerations 
o The extent of power wielded by a fallible person, particularly when it 
involves a curtailment of individual rights and property, 
In Halm, op. cit.. p. 126 
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o The role of the religious scholars as the source of religious teachings. 
Successive modifications throughout a long history have culminated in a 
paradigm of authority different from the one fostered by the doctrine of 
imamate. The two paradigms agree in some respects and differ in others, 
including: 
1- Legitimacy: In both paradigms, Imamate is the only legitimate form of 
government. Nevertheless, the new one acknowledges a kind of provisional 
legitimacy based on the competence of the temporal ruler to promote the public 
interest. Thus, unlike the doctrine of Imamate, political participation within 
temporal rule is permitted. 
2- Obedience: In the old paradigm, individuals were asked to obey their 
rulers in order to avert oppression, whereas in the new paradigm, the conformity 
with state regulations was pennitted on rational grounds, i. e. to enforce public 
order. This came through the acknowledgement of the secular nature of the state 
which effectively took society-state relation out of the religious framework. 
3- The role of people: Compared to Sunni scholars, Shi i fiqh has largely 
ignored the contractual aspect of legitimacy namely the bai`a. Murtaga was 
among the few scholars who indicated the possible role of the people in 
generating legitimacy. He suggests that a usurper's rule can acquire legitimacy if 
it satisfies the public. ' 14 Along the same line, 'Amifi, the First Martyr (d. 1384), 
and Migdad al-Sayüii (d. 1425) suggested that a legitimate ruler should step 
down if people are no longer satisfied with his rule. He rules on their behalf and 
must not impose himself upon them. 115 However, these ideas remain isolated in 
Shi'i jurisprudence in general. During the Constitutional Revolution some 
scholars came to regard the people as an essential part of the political system and 
their participation as the guarantor of justice. 
14 Murta4a, Tanzih al-AnbiZ (Beirut 1999) p. 139 
`Amif, Muhammad, AI- awa'ed wal-FawäeJ, Q (Qum, n. d. ) v. I, p. 406. Sayürº, Miqdäd, 
Nadhed al-Qawi'iti a/-Fighia, (Quin 1982) p. 492 
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Chapter II 
The Project of Ayatollah Khomeini 
The emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini's version of the doctrine of jurist 
guardianship (wiliyat al-fagih) signifies a sharp discursive shift in Shi i political 
thought. It involved an overhaul of the established paradigm of authority based 
upon the theology of infallible leadership (imamate). By delegating the iinäm's 
political authority to the state, Khomeini put an end to the confusion in which 
Shi'i political thought had been caught up for centuries. 
Khomeini undertook the challenge to politicise a doctrine that was never 
meant to work in real politics, or, at least that was not sufficiently equipped to 
do so. His treatise on Islamic government provided a unique approach, applying 
the principle of jurist guardianship to the broader political crisis over how to 
provide a religious-based solution in Muslim society. The short book entitled a! - 
Hukuhhna a/-Islamiy, 7h (Islamic Government) was the only precise treatise on 
legitimate government that Khomeini wrote. It was delivered in January 1970 as 
a part of his study on the jurisprudential issue of authority. 
I Although the 
treatise was meant to address the jurisprudential aspects of the doctrine, it went 
far beyond this limit and dealt with some theological, political and cultural 
questions related to the subject. Later, Khomeini elaborated on the 
jurisprudential aspect as part of his research on earning and contracts entitled 
Kitib a! -Bay` (firstly published in Najaf, 1971) where he dealt with the various 
sources of earning and authority. 
Most of Khomeini's views in this book resemble those common to the 
religious seminaries. In his argument regarding jurist political authority, 
Khomeini candidly observed his peers' reservations towards the technical 
This treatise was proposed in form of thirteen scholarly lectures given in Najaf in January and 
February 1970. Shortly later, it was published and smuggled into Iran. In 1977 it was published 
in Iran under the title of Lctters from /ream Mosavi Kishifal-Ghiti without stating the 
author's name. 
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weaknesses of the texts and the chains of narration of the imam's traditions. 
2 He 
relied heavily on rational reasoning in his discussion of legitimate authority in 
order to skirt around the weak points that earned Ahmad Narägi, the founder of 
the doctrine, a great deal of criticism. Khomeini attached his concept of religious 
leadership to the principle of the continuity of religion on the one hand, and to 
the rational justifications of state authority on the other. Apart from the two 
books mentioned above, Khomeini's political views were expressed mainly 
through his many speeches and letters, the majority of which were published in a 
twenty-two-volume compendium entitled $ahifeh Nc r. 
3 Khomeini's other works 
include forty books and treatises on various religious subjects, most of which 
remained unnoticed except Kashf a! -Asrar (1945) which was seen by some 
scholars as his first political proclamation. 
4 Nevertheless, his arguments therein 
are hardly relevant to his later thought. 
5 
Khomeini's thought has been carefully examined by many researchers. 
Hamid Enayat takes a comparative approach, aiming to locate Khomeini's views 
within the broader scope of Islamic political thought in the twentieth century. 
6 
Ervand Abraharnian, while a critic of Khomeini, challenges the common 
perception of him as a traditional fanatic or fundamentalist and argues that he 
was a populist leader representing the aspirations of Iran's petite bourgeoisie. 
7 
Mohsen Kadivar has examined the idea of the fagih's absolute authority and its 
claimed divine source, with reference to Shi i jurisprudence and modem political 
2 Subhäni, Ja`far, Tahthibal-Usr7, (Qum, n. d. ), vol. 3, p. 146. 
Khomeini, Rohollah, Sahifch Nw: Compiled by the Institute for Compilation and Publication of 
the Works of lmim Khomeini, (Tehran 2004). An c. version is available on the web address: 
www. ghadeer. org/indcx. html 
4 Algar, H amid, The Fusion of the Gnostic and the Political in the Personality and Life ofhnam 
Khomeini, retrieved on Oct. 20,2003 from: 
www. khoineini. coin/GatewayToHeaven/Articles/Pcrsonalityoflmam. htinl. A list of 
Khomeini's works is available on: www. ghadecr. org/imani/iniani. htnil 
5 On the development of Khomeini's political thought, see Nabavi, S. A., 'Tatavür-e Andishah 
Imam Khomeini' Faslnamah /mim Szidiq, no. 6, (Summer and Autumn 1998). e. edition, 
retrieved on Jun., 3,2004, from: www. hawzah. net/Per/Magazine/IS/006/is00604. htm 
6 Enayat, Hamid, `Iran: Khumayni's Concept of the Guardianship of the Jurisconsult' in 
Piscatori, Islam in the political process, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 160-180. 
7 Abrahamian. Ervand, Khomeinisn: Essays on the Islamic Republic, (Berkley, 1993) 
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thought. He has taken a nonnative approach and made an exhaustive critique on 
both ideas. 
8 
In this chapter, I will outline the unique contribution made by Khomeini, 
namely his attempt to alter the role played by religion, from being an agent of 
alienation between the public and the state to an agent of association, which 
effectively facilitated the emergence of a consensual political system, probably 
for the first time in Iran's modem history. My assumption is that a lack of 
national consensus has been a symptom of a cultural split brought about by the 
ruler's disregard for the role of religion on the one hand, and by the theological 
limitations inherent in the religious worldview on the other. The reconciliation 
between religion and state is crucial for ensuring both the coherence and 
efficiency of the political system. 
I will start by highlighting the relevance of consensus to the stability and 
development of the political system and the role of religion in this regard. After a 
brief account of the reflections of modern trends upon Khomeini's thought, I will 
highlight the theoretical barriers with which he had to negotiate in order to 
advance his arguments. 
Consensus and Stability 
Throughout the twentieth century, the dualism of authority - religion on 
the one side and state on the other - has made it difficult to reach a national 
consensus over the conceptual foundations of Iran's political order. Consensus is 
essential for nation-building and political development. It serves to form the 
national will, remove tension from state-society relations and facilitate peaceful 
participation of the population in political activities. As Binder holds, the 
developed political system is characterised by an historical-cultural consensus 
which lends stability and continuity to what would otherwise be a chaotic, 
characterless system which is always in flux. 
9 Lack of consensus is partly a 
symptom of cultural fragmentation where the state and the majority of the 
" Kadivar, Nlohscn, Hukürnat-c Walcri-c, (Tehran, 2001) 
" Binder. Leonard. Islamic Liberalism. p. 41. 
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population act politically with reference to different, even contradictory, 
conceptual frameworks. 
For the state to perform in a smooth and consistent manner, there has to 
be a universally agreed normative structure to legitimise the political process. 
That is particularly important, for the affairs of state represent a realm of conflict 
emanating from the incongruity between the public's expectations and the 
state's response. 
10 Easton's `input-output' model provides a practical method for 
examining the state's pcrfonnance as the prime factor for maintaining 
legitimacy. He holds that the complexity and diversity of state affairs make the 
division of labour, and therefore structural differentiation, indispensable. This 
division could endanger the harmony within the political system unless there is a 
inechanisin observed by both the state and society to ensure an orderly exchange 
of demand and response. 
It Consensus, according to Tsurutani, signifies the 
willing adherence on the part of both government and population to a mutually 
agreed set of procedures for decision-making which is recognised by both sides 
as necessary and appropriate for maintaining public order, general well-being, the 
resolution of issues and conflicts, and the elicitation of social goals. 
12 An 
agreement of this kind accredits the political system with legitimacy which 
Almond likens to a thread running through the system's input-output process, 
endowing it with its special quality and coherence. 
13 
Likewise, consensus is indispensable for sustainable development. 
Tension is seen as a concurrent associate of the process of modernisation in 
developing nations, mainly because of the constant change of structures, roles 
and procedures. Such a problem has been shown to have been understood in the 
classical studies of development, although it is perceived as a feature of a 
transitional stage whereby the traditional value system breaks up in order to pave 
10 I leld. David. Political Theory and the Modern State. p. 120. 
Easton. Da%id. 'An Approach to the Analysis of*Political Systems'. World Politics, vol. 9, issue 
3 (Apr.. 1957) pp. 383-400: pp. 386-7. 
"I'surutani. Tahetsugu. 'Stability and Instability'. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 30. No. 4. (Nov.. 
1968). pp. 910-933: p. 911. 
13 Almond, G.. "A Developmental approach to Political Systems'. World Politics, vol. 17, issue 2. 
(Jan.. 1965) pp. 183-214: p. 192. 
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the way for a new system that is relevant to modernity. In the period of 
conversion, says Apter, values of the community remain in a constant flux, the 
socialisation process becomes a tension-creating system, inciting all kinds of 
conflicts in respect of status, value and roles. He regards such tension as a key 
feature of the development process and a prelude to the prevalence of modem 
patterns of social behaviour. This shift involves status-based relations being 
supplanted by contractual forms, organic by mechanical solidarity, instrumental 
by conclusive ends, sacred by secular beliefs and traditional by legal-rational 
authority. 
14 
The process of modernisation is said to be a success only if it breaks 
through the trenches of traditions. In this sense, the process has a twofold 
function which is destructive in respect of the traditional elements of the social 
institutions and constructive in respect of new ones. The classical assumption 
regarding the displacement of value systems seems to have ignored the 
contingent nature of such a process: 
First: Since we are dealing with non-material objects, the process of 
replacement cannot be taken as an orderly and inevitable operation; indeed we 
are talking about the degree of penetration of modem values into the social- 
cultural web. New patterns can either touch the heart of social system or be 
confined to the surface. 
Second: The assumption that society undergoes a process of value 
adaptation after it receives the shock of modernisation disguises the consecutive 
impact, i. e. the polarisation of the social system into pro-modem and pro- 
traditional spectrums. The extent and permanence of dissension depends upon 
the function of the penetration noted above. During the intervening period of 
polarisation, the old patterns of behaviour, that is, the norms, values, roles and 
institutions upon which political action is based, cease their legitimising 
function. The ability of the political system to shorten the period of polarisation 
14 Apter. David. The Politics of Aloderni=ation. (Chicago. 1965). pp. 66-8. 
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and restore its legitimacy by relying on the modem classes or by integrating the 
traditional ones would be at stake. 
15 
The actual experiences of modernisation in the Middle East show that 
fragmentation has persisted, and in some cases it has endangered the political 
system and the modernisation process altogether. 
16 Such events as the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran brought a number of researchers to question the assumption 
that industrialisation and social change would necessarily result in the traditional 
elites and belief systems giving way to the modern state elite, and in religion 
being relegated to the private realm. 
17 
The idea of the degree of penetration indicated above suggests that the 
resilience on the part of traditional patterns is a determining factor in respect of 
the length of the transitional period and the level of social consciousness affected 
by the new patterns. To put it in a different order, the willingness of the 
population to adapt to modern patterns is determined by two factors: a) whether 
or not the people will perceive the new patterns as a worthy alternative to what 
they are asked to abandon, and b) whether or not the offer proves to conform to 
the people's common belief. Whereas the first point is directly related to the 
efficiency of the state's performance, the latter is related to the appeal of the 
offer to the cultural orientation of the population. For many researchers, this 
point partially explains why modernisation in the Middle East has stumbled, and 
has caused many theorists in recent years to question the sharp division between 
tradition and modernity and the assumption that religion cannot help the process 
of development. 
18 
Religion, State and Modernisation 
After the rise of the Pahlavi regime in Iran, the social role of the clergy 
was perceived as the salient challenge to the coherence of the state, which calls 
to mind the assumption advanced by Max Weber regarding the inevitable clash 
151 field. D.. Political Theory and the Aloderºr State. (Cambridge, 1989) p. 88. 
" Razi. G.. 'Legitimacy. Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East'. The: lnierican Political 
Science Review, vol. 84. no. I (Mar.. 1990) 69-9 1: p. 72. 
" He)%vood. Andrew. Political Ideologies, (New York. 1998). p. 291. 
18 Lickelman. D. and Piscatori. J.. , 1lr, slim Politics. (Princeton 1996). p. 24. 
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over authority between state and hicrocracy. The double function of religion is 
well acknowledged by sociologists: as an apology and legitimisation of the status 
quo, and as a means of protest and liberation. 
19 Reza Shah, the founder of the 
Pahlavi dynasty, was an admirer of the model established by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk of Turkey which associates modernisation with consolidating the state 
structure and secularising the public sphere. 
20 During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
government undertook a large scale program to modernise industry, education, 
transportation, communication systems and a land reform program, all of which 
aimed to bring about a new public order based upon secular principles. 
21 The 
assumption was that the reconstruction of the economy, public services and the 
education system would necessarily help the hegemony of modem patterns of 
socialisation and eventually curtail the political power of the traditional forces, 
22 
notably the clergy. 
The inodcrnising project has proven to be a relative success, resulting in a 
considerable improvement of state administration, public services, as well as the 
economy. Nevertheless, it has evidently failed to achieve its core objective, 
namely the assurance of long-term political stability. The relative stability felt in 
the 1970s was largely indebted to the strict policies implemented by the security 
apparatus, notably the secret police (SAVAK). This could not compensate for 
the lack of legitimacy and harmony between the state and society, reflected in 
the persistence of the feeling of insecurity among the ruling elite. 
23 
According to Bashiriych, an Iranian sociologist, modernisation in the 
form adopted during the Pahlavi reign (1925-1979) effectively worsened social 
'" Billings. D.. and Scott. S., 'Religion and Political Legitimation',, lnnual Review of Sociology', 
Nol. 20 (1994). pp. 173-202: p. 173. 
'0 Omid. I Loma, Islam and the Post-Revolutionary State in Iran, (New York 1994), p. 20. 
21 For a brief assessment of the said program. see Bill, James, Modernization and Reform from 
above : The Case of Iran'. The Journal of Politics. vol. 32,. issue I (Feb., 1970). pp. 19- 40. 
22 Tabari. Azar, `Shi'i Clergy in Iranian Politics' in Keddie, N. (ed. ), Religion and Politics in /ran. 
(London 1983)p. 60 
23 Cottam. Richard. The Islamic Revolution' in Keddie, N., and Cole. J. (ed. ), Ski'i. sm and Social 
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fragmentation, 
24 
although it helped to improve the standard of living. 
Bashiriyeh's account is in line with the concerns expressed by many theorists 
regarding the impact of Western-modelled modernisation on Third World 
societies. As for Binder, 
The most conspicuous manifestation of the impact of the West 
has been the creation of gaps in social communication, in 
stratification, in values, in economic orientation, and in political 
techniques among the various sectors of society. 
25 
The exacerbation of social divisions in the context of Iran suggests one of 
two possibilities: either the processes of nation-building and modernisation have 
actually failed to proceed from the first stage, i. e. the disintegration of the 
traditional structure into the final stage and the restructuring of a modern one, or 
the assumption of adaptation was not applicable in this particular context. In cny 
opinion, both possibilities have some relevance, but the major problem appears to 
be the misconception of the role of religion and its relevance to national 
consensus. 
The state's endeavors to contain the political influence of the religious 
establishment evolved into an indirect confrontation with religion itself, leading 
to determined efforts to manipulate religious activities. On their part, the `ulatnä, 
who claim the authoritative representation of the nation's culture, turned to their 
old means of confrontation: politicising religious symbols and mobilising the 
population against the state. The predisposition of religion to function for or 
against the state and its modernising policies is fairly understandable. After the 
sixteenth century, Shi`istn became a major part of Iran's national identity, 
therefore any national agreement over public order has to consider a satisfying 
role for religion and its representatives. However, the established Shi i doctrine 
of authority lacked a definite and up-to-date formulation for the state-religion 
relation. The misconception of the nature and role of the state and the lack of a 
normative basis for political participation created a sense of alienation among 
the majority of the population. On the part of the state, the lack of public support 
24 Bashiriyeh. H., Marano' Tawse'ahSiisi dar Iran. (Tehran, 2001), p. 133. 
-' Binder. I... 'National Integration and Political Development'. The . nrerican Political Science 
Review. vol. 58. issue 3 (Sep.. 1964) pp. 622-631: p. 631. 
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gave rise to a sense of insecurity among the ruling elite, prompting it to rely on 
mainly coercive means to maintain the political system. 
In brief, the function of religion throughout most of the twentieth century 
has been seen as more of a hindrance to the course of modernisation. On the 
other hand, the dual structure of religious and political power has provided the 
potential for destabilising the political systein. 
26 Therefore, reconciliation 
between religion and state is not only indispensable for ensuring stability and 
public order, but also for forming the kind of consensual political order that 
allows the population to embrace the state and interact positively with its 
institutions, helping it to achieve its objectives. The role of Ayatollah Khomeini 
concerns this very point. He was the one who helped to transform the established 
Shi'i doctrine of authority so that it was able to interlink with the state, and by 
so doing he facilitated the integration of the masses into national politics. 
The Effects of Social Change 
Khomeini's discourse features a combination of traditional and modem 
political notions. His affirmation of religious principles alongside the modern 
notions of republicanism, the nation's right to seif-determination, public liberties 
and so on, has earned him attention among both the modem and traditional 
spectrums of the nation. 
The traditional elements were, however, the original constituents of his 
thought and discourse. Ayatollah Khomeini started his learning career in Qum in 
1920, an epoch characterised by a clerical withdrawal from politics due to the 
failure of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-6. Until 1962, his circle was 
largely limited to the traditional clerical spectrum. His first master was `Abdul- 
Kareem Hairi, an apolitical scholar who chose to distance himself from the 
clerical arguments over constitutionalism. Professor Algar made a detailed 
survey on Khomeini's teachers, 
27 
none of whose names is familiar among the 
Constitutionalist clergy. The latter group was representative of the modern trend 
in the religious community in the early 20'h century. During the political fray of 
'`' Arjomand. S.. The Turban for the ('Town, (New York 1989). pp. 77-8. 
27 Algar. I L. The Fusion, op. cit. 
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the 1950s, Khomeini's name did not appear among the clergy members who 
allied with the liberal reformist group of the National Front against the Crown. 
Generally speaking, the effective communication between Khomeini and 
the modern intellectual movement probably dates back to the period of his 
residency in Najaf (1965-1978). 
28 Although he continued to identify with the 
traditional spectrum, Khomeini had to consider the changing conditions of 
Iranian society since he had left the country. The change in social relations and 
realities was evident throughout the society, including the spectrum upon which 
he relied for political and material support. It is well-known that Khomeini had 
no support among the traditional clergy, especially those belonging to the upper 
echelons. 
29 His faithful followers carne mainly from two major camps: the first 
includes students, political activists, and junior clerics who identified mainly 
with the Islamic left. The second includes fragments of the modem Islamic 
intellectual trend represented mainly by Nehzat-e Azädi (Iran Freedom 
Movement). Both camps were familiar with constitutionalist ideas and deeply 
influenced by the anti-traditionalist views of `Ali Shari`atº. Indeed, it was the 
supporters of Shari`ati, not the clergy, `who took the somewhat blasphemous 
step of endowing him with the title of Imam'. 
30 To this we have to add the fact 
that during the 1970s, the notion of human rights also gained currency in Iran 
with the election of Jimmy Carter as president of the United States in 1977, and 
his proposals concerning political reform in the allied governments. 
31 It is not an 
exaggeration to claim that up to the decade preceding the Revolution, the 
majority of Iranians, especially those who were expected to be active in any 
major political fray, were far from being acquainted with the traditional clergy, 
both in the sense of communal loyalty or intellectual affinity. 
With the above considerations in mind, Ayatollah Khomeini would not 
have had such a tremendous appeal if he had limited his discourse to traditional 
religious language. There is no doubt about the originality of his political 
23 Cottam. op. cit., p. 78. 
'" Parsa. Misagh. State. Ideologies, and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge, 2000). p. 140. 
30 Bro'%n. Carl. Religion and State: The Aluslint : ipproach to Politics. (New York. 2000), p. 169. 31 Cottam. op. cit.. p. 82. 
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approach; however, the issue in question is his modernist tendency, given his 
career in traditional learning. Therefore, his embracing of modern notions could 
be explained as a reflection of his alliance with the modernist trend. On the other 
hand, Khomeini's denouncement of religious apathy brought him to rethink a 
great deal of the principles and traditions established in the religious community. 
Here, it is worth noting that pragmatism and openness towards non-traditional 
notions were often seen among the politically-minded scholars. This leads to the 
conclusion that a greater involvement in public life is directly translated into a 
greater desire to ease the rigidity inherent in the traditional paradigm of 
authority. By the same token, it could be said that Khomeini's determination to 
achieve his objective, namely the establishment of an Islamic modern state, 
effectively put him face-to-face with the impediments that sprang from the 
conflict between the contextual considerations of the old paradigm and 
contemporary realities. 
Compared to his peers among both Shia and Sunni scholars, Khomeini is 
in fact closer to the modernist trend, although, in a broad sense he is hardly 
considered as a modernist. Unlike many of the Muslim scholars who considered a 
restored caliphate as the likely form of an Islamic state, Khomeini advocated a 
republican system. Within this form, he endorsed the legislative role of 
parliament, popular will as the source of authority, universal suffrage for all 
citizens and the priority of public interests over some fixed religious rules. These 
notions were previously rejected by most of the religious scholars for their 
Western orientation and incompatibility with the principles of Sharii`a. 
32 
Some analysts doubt the originality of Khomeini's advocacy of 
republicanism. 
33 
These doubts could be supported by the fact that he did not 
establish his proposals within the Shi i theological framework, neither did he 
make sufficient effort to integrate them with the established jurisprudence. 
Apparently, Khomeini was aware of this theoretical weakness, but did not seem 
to have had a solution other than his own assertion of their authenticity and 
32 Abed. S.. 'lslam and Democracy'. in Garnham, D. and "Tessler. M. (cd. ). Democracy, War and 
Peace in the , Middle East. (Indianapolis. 1995) p. 121. 33 Sec for example: Enayat. op. cit.. p. 172. 
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compatibility with the ethos of religion. In his view, there was nothing wrong 
with religion or with the modem notions he advocated. The problem lay in the 
failure of the religious seminaries to grasp the changes in the surrounding world. 
Khomeini argued that the religious seminaries (hawza) had alienated themselves 
from the real world and consequently were no longer able to explore how religion 
could possibly interact with the realities of the time and society. 
34 He often 
censured the traditional scholars for what he described as the failure to grasp the 
adaptability and all-embracing nature of religion which enables modem notions 
to be fairly accommodated within a religious framework. 
35 
Khomeini thus perceived the problem as methodological in the sense that 
a solution would be possible if an updated methodology was employed. In 
contrast, Ayatollah Shabestari, a Reformist scholar, saw the problem as being 
within the paradigm itself, rather than its methodology. He argued that the 
notion of republicanism and its related principles are impossible to establish 
within the traditional paradigm, simply because they pertain to a different 
discipline, namely, political philosophy. However, he insisted that they can be 
firmly grounded on the general principles of Islam. 
36 
The Impediments of an Out-dated Doctrine 
I have already mentioned in Chapter One that, according to the 
established Shi i doctrine of authority, the state was deprived of legitimacy in 
the sense that it could not be legitimised while the infallible imam was absent. 
Although, thanks to the establishment of Shi i states, the rigid limitations in this 
regard were relatively eased, there remained in Shi'ism a strong tendency 
towards apathy, and participation in state affairs was never acknowledged as 
being fully appropriate for the community of believers. 
37 
" Khomeini, Rohollah, Sahi eh Nt r, vol. 21, p. 34. 
35 Khomeini. ibid.. p. 88 
36 Shabestari, Muhammad, Naqdi barQara'. t-c Rasmi az Din, (Tehran, 2000), pp. 169-71. 
37 In comparison. Arjomand argues that no doctrine of illegitimacy of government during the 
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The exaggerated emphasis placed upon the office of leadership, especially 
its attachment to the person of the imam, made it impossible for the doctrine of 
imamate to engage with political realities. This problem has been detected by 
many scholars throughout the history of Shi'ism. Only a few of them, however, 
have dared to address the key issues in relation to this. The majority have 
contented themselves with the established assumption which takes it for granted 
that no one is obliged to help with the establishment of a just government while 
the infallible imam was absent. 
During the twentieth century, Iranian society saw the revival of Shi i 
activism through the Constitutional Revolution and the movement for oil- 
nationalisation, neither of which achieved their goals, partly because the Varna 
stayed away from the fray. In Arjomand's account, the failure of the `ulamä to 
properly conceive the secular implications of constitutionalism led to that 
retreat. 
38 I would like to see the problem from the other side: the absence of an 
alternative doctrine capable of embracing constitutionalism without infringing 
the religious basics could be seen as the reason for the withdrawal of the `ulamä 
from political arena in the early 201h century. During the 1950s there was a 
similar cycle: a considerable segment of the `ulamä supported the reformist 
movement led by Mohammad Mosaddaq, 
39 
yet they failed to mobilise the 
clerical mainstream led by Ayatollah Burüjerdi, the great exemplar of the time 
(d. 1961). The lack of a normative standpoint to justify political participation 
effectively resulted in the break-up of the clerical, and hence the public, support 
of the movement. In brief, it can be seen that the degree of public involvement in 
politics in Iran was directly affected by the behaviour of the `ulamä. In the 
meantime, there was no consensual framework for regulating the political 
behaviour of the `ulamä. As a result, there were different approaches, each of 
which refers to a distinct interpretation of the doctrine of imamate. 
40 
3s Arjomand. ibid. p. 267. 
39 Akhavi, S., Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, (Albany, 1980), p. 60. 
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This is, however, an intrinsic problem within the traditional paradigm. 
The Shi'i doctrine of leadership emerged and evolved as a theological notion 
intending mainly to justify a communal type of leadership concerned with 
spiritual, rather than political, affairs. As suggested by Momen, while Sunni 
scholars were concerned with developing an applicable political theory, their 
Shl'i peers had an absent imäm who could only be a subject of theological 
speculation, rather than of political theory. 
41 Shia `ulamd addressed the 
question of leadership and authority within one of two frameworks. The first was 
theological, concerning the lives and qualities of the imams, obviously a 
restatement of what had been repeatedly said in the past, with no relevance 
whatsoever to any actual situation. The second was jurisprudential, focusing on 
the relationship between the exemplar and the follower with regard to spiritual, 
mainly personal, affairs. 
42 Here too, politics was not a matter of concern. 
Khomeini's project to politicise the traditional doctrine came through a careful 
handling of the theoretical barriers residing in the two frameworks, the 
theological and the jurisprudential. Here are some details: 
First: the Theological Problem 
The theological debates over authority were meant to address the 
question: is it possible for fallible people to bring about a just government'? In 
the traditional paradigm, justice was conceived in an ideal sense that could be 
realised only under a divinely-ordained ruler, i. e. an infallible imam. 
43 All other 
forms of government were regarded as illegitimate. With the imäm in hiding 
since 874, Shi'as were supposed to await his return when he would supposedly 
fill the earth with fairness and justice. `Allama Na'ini, an eminent scholar, 
n Momcn, M., 'Authority and Opposition in Twelver Shi'ism', in Burrell, R. M. (cd. ). Islamic 
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argued in 1908, that the stipulation of the imam's personal leadership, while 
beyond the reach of the people, endows the idea with hope. 
44 
Khomeini's project started by denouncing the applicability to the 
political realm of the theological notion of passively waiting for the absent imam 
(intizär al-faraj). His revivalist interpretation of the notion implies a separation 
between the duties and rights of the imam, which can be addressed in theological 
terms, and those of ordinary Muslims, whose rights and obligations are 
understood in regard of the actual requirements of their lives. He argued that 
passively awaiting the imam conflicts with the ethos of religious teachings. 
While the imam is expected to return some time in the future to bring about ideal 
justice in a global context, Khomeini maintained, a faithful follower would rather 
struggle to help realise the objectives of the religion, namely a just government, 
wherever possible. 
45 He strongly criticised the linkage between the two aspects 
as it inevitably facilitated the suspension of the sacred law and frustrated the 
people's desire to improve their lives. His main argument suggests that sacred 
law was prescribed by the Prophet to accommodate the life of the Muslims. 
Since religion transcends time and place, none of its rules can be arbitrarily 
suspended. 
46 Khomeini dismissed the idea that the absence of the imam justifies 
the suspension of the ordinances concerning or requiring state power47 and 
insisted that the obligatory nature of those rules places a responsibility upon the 
Muslims, the religious leaders in particular, to do their utmost to have them 
realised, i. e. to help the establishment of a religious state. 
48 The suspension of 
those rules, he argued, was the fruit of indifference on the part of the Muslims 
and the tyrannical nature of their governments. 
49 By this argument, Khomeini 
" Na'ini, 'Allama, "I'anbih al-Umnah wa Tanzih al-Millah', in Alsaif, Dhidd al-Istebdid, (Beirut, 
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meant to circumvent the traditional assumption by which the Shia clergy 
cleared itself from the responsibility of enforcing the religious law or struggling 
for political power, 
50 
a tendency that had remained prevalent since the 
occultation of the Twelfth Iman. 
Khomeini also argued that justice in the relative, rather than ideal, sense 
is an acceptable criterion for legitimising power, and that the presence of the 
infallible imam is no longer a stipulation for securing the religious character of 
the state. 
51 
Second: the Jurisprudential Problem 
The jurisprudential debates concern mainly the source and extension of 
powers retained by the ruler. The `ulamä's involvement in politics since the 
Safavid era made it possible to consider the fag-ih as a potential vicegerent of the 
infallible imam. Yet, to what extent the imam's powers should be delegated to 
the fagih remained a controversial point. The core argument concerns the right of 
a fallible person to use coercive power, i. e. to take people's lives and property by 
inflicting physical punishments or by confiscating or limiting individual property 
rights. 
52 To understand the irony of the argument, we have to look back to the 
logical formulation which the earlier Shia theologians developed to defend their 
particular doctrine of imamate. One of the major arguments advanced in this 
regard was the notion of divine grace (al-tuff al-ilühij according to which the 
designation of the imam was conceived of as an expression of such grace. 
`Allama Hilfi, the prominent scholar, suggests that divine grace is realised 
through the exemplary function of the prophets and imams. Such a function, he 
contends, must be of a propagating and convincing rather than an enforcing 
nature. The application of religious rules by force cannot be regarded as grace. 
53 
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Bearing this in mind, the authority of the imam to dispose of people's 
lives and property remained open to contrasting interpretations; some scholars 
implicitly denied such a generalisation, 
54 
others accepted it on the basis that an 
infallible imam would only do what was right, 
55 
while a third group stipulated 
that there should be public consent before the said powers take effect. 
56 The 
debate concerned mainly the person of the ruler, i. e. the imam or the fagih, rather 
than the institution of the state. This is obviously not alien to the context within 
which the doctrine has evolved. Throughout the entire history of the Muslim 
community, the state has never been independent from the ruler; all the material 
means of control and sources of power have been in the ruler's hands. There were 
no institutionalised restrictions on his powers, nor any effective means to hold 
him to account. State actions were driven by his whims and desires, rather than 
by rational calculations relevant to the public interest. With these considerations 
in mind, the `ulamä were anxious that a fallible ruler empowered with the 
imatn's authority could not be controlled; in addition to the material means that 
he would already possess, lie would be able to have his whims sanctioned on a 
religious basis. As Na'ini argues, tyranny and corruption are the likely 
consequences of the monopoly of power by the ruler, whether he is a pious faq-Ih 
or anyone else. He suggests that only institutionalised restrictions on power can 
block the tyrannical tendencies of the rulers. 
57 Na'ini's argument is not, 
however, unfamiliar to the Islamic culture; a Quranic verse explains the tendency 
of man to transgress all bounds as a consequence of his `feeling of self- 
sufficiency' (Holy Quran 96: 6-7). 
This argument explains why the `ulatna' disagreed over the idea of power 
delegation. There are, however, other arguments concerning the nature of the 
imam's authority and its basis. Some scholars held that the divine designation of 
imam provided him with a supernatural character which bestowed upon him a 
kind of existential authority transcending the realm of man (wi/üyah 
54 Bahr al-Ulüm, M., Bulghat al-Fagih, vol. 3, p. 215. 
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takiviniyah). Thereby, the imam would exercise his authority as if the world was 
of his belongings. 
58 
The crux of this argument is that since a fallible person can 
by no means claim such an exceptional privilege, he is necessarily incapable of 
assuming the imam's authority. Another argument suggests that the imäin's 
authority steins from his infallibility which is realised in his knowledge and inner 
piety. 
59 
Accordingly, the two qualities - knowledge and piety- are taken as 
criteria which are to be tuet, in a relative sense, by those who seek the deputyship 
of imam. The fonncr requirement has had more advocates among the Iranian 
scholars, especially those with esoteric tendencies. 
60 The majority, however, 
emphasise the latter one. 
As mentioned in chapter one, tenth century scholars differentiated 
between the office of imamate and the person of the imam and the state's 
function came to be seen as indispensable for securing the common good which 
is defined in conventional terms. 
61 Khomeini took the argument further and 
suggested a differentiation between two connotations embedded in the notion of 
wiläyah. Acknowledging the claimed supernatural qualities of the imams, 
62 he 
argued that those qualities are irrelevant to the actual role which is meant to be 
undertaken by the imam in the capacity of political leader. 
63 His wilayah 
(authority) in the political sense is of a rational and conventional nature, 
therefore it is linked both to his human qualities and to the particular 
requirements of the office. In other words, the overall authority of the imam is to 
be understood in two senses: it is existential (wiläyah takwiniyah) and associated 
58 See for example the account of Agha Riz5 Hamad5ni on public resources (khar, j) in his AMisbah 
al-Fagih, (Quin, n. d. ) vol. 3, p. 108. 
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with his person64 and it is relative or conventional (wiläyah i`tibel yah), 
concerned with society's religious and political affairs. 
65 For Khomeini, the 
assumption of power is conceived under the latter category where the focus is 
placed on the objective requirements of the office, namely to have relevant 
knowledge and personal piety rather than divine sanction. 
66 The two qualities, in 
addition to public consent, were adopted by the constitution of the Islamic 
Republic as prerequisites for holding the office of the supreme leader (article 
107-9). 
The crux of Khomeini's argument is that the imam's authority does not 
belong to his person in the strict sense but to the office of ruler that he is 
supposed to occupy. Khomeini's account of the legal status of the public funds 
(kharra_/) sheds more light on his firm belief in the conventional nature of the state 
and religious rule. Kharäj was the main source of the treasury in the traditional 
Islamic state, hence Shia scholars tended to restrict its administration to the 
legitimate ruler, naively the imam. A few of them went even further to equate 
kharäj with the imam's private property. 
67 In contrast, Khomeini took a strong 
position and ridiculed the latter claim as irrational and an insult to the ethos of 
the Ja`afari school. His account suggests that kharäj belongs to, and is managed 
by the state. 
68 
Grasping the fact that, in the modern state, authority is no longer centred 
on the office of the ruler, Khomeini came to realise that the extensive authority 
presumed for the imam can take effect only if it is conferred upon the 
government as a whole: 
Government, which is an offshoot of the absolute authority of the 
Prophet, peace be upon him, is one of the prime ordinances of 
64 For an esoterically-oriented definition of existential authority, see Khomeini, Misbäh, op. cit., 
pp. 84-90. 
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Islam preceding all secondary ones including prayer, fasting, and 
pilgrimage... The government can unilaterally suspend any 
legitimate contract or course of action, religious or worldly, if it is 
seen against the interests of the Islamic country. 
69 
In another statement, he advised that the authority of the fag-ih is to be 
understood within the framework of an Islamic government. This authority 
comes into effect only if it secures public consent. 
70 The essence of the two 
ideas suggests that the imäm's powers are not delegated to the person of the 
faq`flh but to the state as a whole. 
71 In this sense, the fag-ih functions as a medium 
through which authority is legitimately transferred from the imam to the state. 
Accordingly, there is no sufficient basis for arguing over the extent of powers 
that might be delegated. The role of the state, whether it is legitimate or 
illegitimate, is to manage the affairs of its citizens and their property: judges 
give rulings for punishing crimes, the army sends soldiers to war where they may 
be killed, financial departments impose taxes and other laws that limit people's 
rights to manage their property, and so on. Therefore, the transferability of the 
imam's authority should be thought of in terms of the state's functions whereby 
the point is that either government is empowered with the said authority or it is 
not a government at all. 
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This approach has provided a well-argued solution to the controversy 
over the delegation of power and the nature of the fagh's authority within a 
modern state. It must be said, however, that it is not yet a universally agreed 
solution among Shia scholars. In chapter four, I will introduce some contrasting 
opinions in this regard, many of which contest this concept of relationship 
between the fagih and the state, and the degree of legitimacy secured through 
this course. 
Khomeini, Sahifeh, op. cit.. vol. 20, p. 170. 
"' Cited in Arusta, M., Ehtcmäm bch Aräy-c'Umümi, //ukümat-c/s/aini, no. 17, Autumn 2000. 
" Q5ei nnagämi, 'Abb is, Qudrat wa Al/ashrou'iat, (Tehran, 2000). p. 116. 
7 Khomeini. op. cit. 
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The Primacy of the State 
There are many understandable reasons for Ayatollah Khomeini's 
absolutist tendency: his charismatic character, being a leader of a transformative 
revolution, and being a religious exemplar. An absolutist government has a lot of 
negative implications, but it has also some important positive ones. The 
European absolutist state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries served as a 
unifying force in the preparation for the emergence of the `bourgeois' 
constitutional state. 
73 Although this was usually applied to political and 
economic aspects, the unificatory function could be seen as an appropriate role 
wherever the problem of social fragmentation exists and harms national unity. I 
have already noted that Iranian society was characterised by a discrepancy 
between the conception of political order held by the state and the one held by 
the population. I have argued there that such a discrepancy was due to the 
problematic role of religion. 
Ayatollah Khomeini wanted to reconcile religion with the state as the 
only way, at least in his view, to bring together the state and the society. He 
would not have succeeded in overcoming a long-established tradition of apathy 
by referring to the same traditions. Therefore, he had to enforce a revivalist 
reading of these traditions in order for them to serve his project. This was 
possible by employing his personal charisma to convince the community of the 
validity of his proposals. Charisma is viewed by Max Weber as probably the 
greatest revolutionary force in periods of established tradition. 
74 In such periods, 
Ake suggests, the hegemony of traditional institutions makes it unlikely for the 
population to accept, without hesitation, the state's claim to their loyalty unless 
it is put forward by someone whom the masses respect and trust. Therefore, `this 
personal respect can be used to buttress the state until it wins its own 
legitimacy'. 75 The problem of political integration in new states is understood in 
73 Hall. S.. 'The State in Question', in flail. S.. Held. D. and McLennan. G., The Idea of, llodern 
State. (London. 1984). p. 7. 
" Bendix. Reinhard. 'Reflections on Charismatic Leadership'. lsian Survey. Vol. 7. No. 6 (Jun.. 
1967). 341-352: p. 343. 
'' Ake. Claude. 'Charismatic Legitimation and Political Integration'. Comparative Studies in 
Society and ! Iisto, l'. Vol. 9. No. 1 (Oct.. 1966). 1-13. p. 2. 
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terms of the population refraining from identifying themselves with the new 
system. The charismatic leader is therefore a major instrument for bridging the 
gap; in a sense, to make the population `think of the state as "we" rather than 
"they"'. For Wallerstcin (1961), `political integration can only be presumed to 
have taken place when the citizen accepts the state as the legitimate holder of 
force and authority, the rightful locus of legislation and social decision'. 
76 
Because of the emphasis placed on the person of the leader, and the 
impediments of the transitional period, charismatic rule can hardly be other than 
arbitrary and absolutist. In the context of Iran, this issue came to the fore in the 
post-revolutionary period when government policies were opposed by many 
religious scholars, especially with regards to the codification of laws. To handle 
this problem, Khomeini advanced the two correlating notions of the absolute 
authority of the ruling fagih and the superiority of the state over all other 
institutions including religious ones. 
77 
The Absolute Authority of the Fag-ih 
For Ayatollah Khomeini, the maintenance of the Islamic regime is the 
primary obligation of all Muslims, well ahead of most religious duties including 
those that are seen as essential to the faith. His argument seems logical: the state 
is a powerful means for creating the environment necessary to enable Islamic 
laws to be applied. 
78 
Apparently, Ayatollah Khomeini was not fully acquainted with the 
compelling requirements of state affairs when he took power. In a rare testimony, 
he told an audience of senior judges of the lack of administrative skills among 
the revolutionary elite and the experimental nature of some policies adopted 
after the Revolution. 
79 There was initially a kind of simplistic attitude towards 
state affairs, as Khomeini had repeatedly suggested that the available 
jurisprudence would be sufficient to satisfy the state requirements when a new 
ib Cited in Ake. ibid.. p. 1. 
" Fiajjarian, S. Az Shähed-e Qudsi to Sh hec%e Bazaari, (Tehran, 2001) pp. 113-4. 
7" Khomeini, Islamic Govermmnent, p. 23. 
7" Khomeini, Sahi ah Nrir, vol. 13, p. 9 
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political system was installed. 
80 Shortly after the erection of the Islamic regime, 
its leaders found that the kind of state conceived by clerics was, to a great 
extent, alien to the actual reality of the situation. According to the former 
president Hashemi Rafsanjäni, the legislative business of the parliament was a 
difficult experience due to the constant pressure from senior clerics in the Qum 
seminaries: `The parliament could hardly pursue its business, for there was 
always a point seen by the `ulamä as incompatible with a certain religious 
81 
rule,. 
The turning point carne apparently in 1983 when Khomeini determined to 
free the state from the constraints of traditional jurisprudence. Until then, the 
parliament had resorted to the notion of secondary rules (ahkäin thanaviyah) to 
handle the conflict between religious rules and public interests as identified by 
the various branches of the state. The term `secondary rule' denotes a reasoning 
methodology employed on a temporary basis as a way out in exceptional 
situations. 
82 A common instance of such a notion is the right of the state to 
temporarily dictate the pricing of scarce goods, even though it violates the basic 
religious principles fostering private property. The repeated utilisation of this 
methodology came under attack from some scholars, including Ayatollah 
Golbaigäni, the second highest ranking religious leader after Khomeini, who 
wrote to Khomeini and to the parliament in March 1982 protesting against the 
employment of secondary rules, as it represented a deliberate negligence of the 
established primary rules (abkam awaryah). 
83 In 1983 there was another 
controversy over the penal code between the clerical members of the Guardian 
Council and the parliament for the same reason. Similar arguments arose in the 
following years which brought Ayatollah Khomeini to rethink the foundational 
principles regulating the interaction between state and jurisprudential 
institutions. In this regard, he developed the notion of rnaslahat-c nezärn (the 
Khomeini, Islamic Govcrnincnt, p. 86. 
Cited in 'Fataw; i-yc Im5in', (editorial) f-/atizah, issue 23, (Dec., 1997). 
12 Kalantan, 'Aliakbar, Hukrn That avl Jar Tashri'e Is/ mi, chapter II, c. edition, accessed (Feb., 
8,2004) www. balagh. org/lib/far,, i/0K_fcqh/0I/hokm-i%20thanavi"/%20dar%20ta: hri-i"/%20islanii/04. htni 
. 4; Hajjariän. op. cit., p. 120. 
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regime's interest) as a framework for conceptualising the authority of the state in 
dealing with the public interest. The new concept held that the application of 
religious rules should be dictated by their capacity to safeguard the public 
interest. Consequently, the role of the legislators, both the mujtahids and the 
members of the parliament, came to be defined in terms of identifying the 
common good rather than expressing the will of God, or delivering religious 
obligations. He also re-defined the fagih's authority as absolute (al-wilClyah a! - 
inutlagah) and the nature of his ruling as an authoritative command (hukm 
welaei. This ruling sought to override an established notion in the old paradigm 
suggesting that a mujtahid is superior to the state, and is not obliged to obey its 
rules if they do not satisfy his own judgment (especially because the majority of 
the officials are laypersons). The idea of the faq-fli's `absolute authority' was 
meant to emphasise the encompassing nature of the state's authority, and that all 
citizens are subject to its rule. The principle of the `regime's interest' was meant 
to establish the state's interpretation of the public interest as a criterion for 
justifying its action, on a par with the established concept of religiously-defined 
interests. The `authoritative command' or hukin iveläelwas meant to emphasise 
the coercive nature of government rulings; the government has the right to 
initiate compulsory orders in its own right, unlike a non-ruling mujtahid whose 
directive is one of instruction (fatwa). 
Conclusion 
Ayatollah Khomeini's project sought to adapt the established Shit 
paradigm of authority to the modern state. Given his religious orientation and 
the fact that he belonged to the traditional spectrum, Khomeini was not expected 
to disassociate himself from the tenets of the established paradigm. However, his 
acquaintance with philosophy and his interest in politics led him to consider the 
time gap that made the political aspect of the old paradigm largely irrelevant to 
the contemporary culture of Iran. Khomeini was probably aware that the strict 
limits inherent in the paradigm would not allow for the historical change that he 
helped to bring about. Thus, his reworking of the paradigm would concern 
mainly those principles that hindered his project. The extent of such a revision 
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was conditioned by his cultural background, his intellectual capacity and the 
compelling requirements of the actual politics in the field. 
The major adjustments he made included a new definition of the notion 
of justice in relative terms whereby the personal leadership of the infallible imam 
was no longer a stipulation for a legitimate state. Having done so, Khomeini put 
an end to the idea that the Shi'as could not consider having a state of their own 
before the return of their absent imam, a notion that had remained intact since 
the late ninth century. To deal with the legal ramifications of his new definition, 
he entrusted the qualified fagih with the office of the imam and conferred upon 
him the same extensive powers claimed for the infallible imam. This is one of the 
notions that earned Khomeini a great deal of criticism from both religious and 
secular parties due to its authoritarian implications. 
84 Nevertheless, a careful 
examination of Khomeini's writings and political behaviour would help to clarify 
that such a formulation was necessary for handling the theological impediments 
noted above. Khomeini was fairly aware of the conflict between the traditional 
concept of the state where the person of ruler was the most important issue, and 
the modem situation, where the issue of authority is concerned with the political 
system as a whole. What was important for him was the political system rather 
than the ruling fagih. This is evident by his endorsement of the constitutional 
amendment of 1989 which made administrative qualifications superior to 
religious scholarship as a criterion for candidates for the supreme leadership of 
the regime. 
Khomeini linked the religious character of the regime with the fag-ih 
assuming its leadership, but on the other hand he stipulated the political 
authority of the fagih upon the existence of the political system. In other words, 
he did not consider the political authority of the fagih to be realisable outside of 
the state, since the powers presumed for the imam require a state in order for his 
powers to be conferred upon it. In this sense, the imam's powers are to be 
entrusted to the state institutions in which the fagih takes part. The fagih thus 
symbolises the religious aspect of the state and functions as a conduit for 
84 Enavat. op. cit.. p. 168. 
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channeling the imam's authority through to the state system. It is this rather 
complex formulation that enabled a modem political system to become 
integrated into the broad traditional value system and earn legitimacy on 
religious grounds. 
In addition to his adjustment of the old Shi'i paradigm, Khomeini 
introduced a number of notions derived from modem political thought, among 
which the most important is the notion of republicanism. His advocacy of the 
republic as a modern form of Islamic state earns him a unique position among 
Muslim scholars, not only for his acceptance of the notion in theory, but also for 
his positive treatment of its implications and his facilitating its application in 
real life. 
With the Revolution of 1979, the compelling requirements of state 
affairs brought more challenges to the old paradigm, and again Ayatollah 
Khomeini was the one who took up the challenge. Among his significant 
contributions was his endorsement of the legislative role of parliament (which 
had a lay majority) even in subjects with purely religious bearings, such as the 
codification of the Penal Law. 
85 This shows, on the one hand, Khomeini's 
decisiveness when dealing with unforeseen theoretical challenges, and, on the 
other hand, the secularising power of bureaucracy as stated by Max Weber. 
Although the Islamic Revolution has generated a wave of radical trends 
throughout the Muslim world, the ideas that Khomeini introduced to Islamic 
thought have revitalised the debate over the relationship between religion and 
democracy. Following Khomeini, ideas such as the equal participation of women, 
universal suffrage, legislation on the basis of popular will, the separation of 
powers, and so on, seem to have had more currency among Islamist groups, in 
contrast to earlier periods when most of the above notions were regarded as 
incompatible with the teachings of Islam. Here it is noteworthy that Ayatollah 
Khomeini was not the first Muslim scholar to introduce these ideas; nonetheless, 
his assumption of power in 1979 bestowed on his refonns the authority that they 
would not have gained otherwise. 
85 On the. jurisprudential implications of legislation by fallible man, sec Sachedina. op. cit.. p. 25. 
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Chapter III 
The Rise of the Reformist Paradigm 
This chapter discusses the implications of the emergence of the reformist 
faction. It argues that the said development was influenced by the failure of the 
model of governance which prevailed after the Islamic revolution. The reformist 
model involves a serious deviation from the revolutionary one, thus I explain its 
rise as a paradigm shift in the sense proposed by Thomas Kuhn in his famous 
book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Obviously, Kuhn's theory meant 
to analyse the development of knowledge and focused mainly on the course of 
progress of the natural sciences. Kuhn himself was not convinced of its 
applicability to the field of human sciences. 
' I use it here to analyse not 
scientific, but political, progress. I believe that the theory provides a proper 
framework for investigating post-revolutionary transformations and especially 
the emergence and prevalence of the progressive force. In this respect, I would 
like to stress particularly the following aspects of Kuhn's theory: 
I- A paradigm is a `disciplinary matrix' for its adherents; everyone takes 
for granted the doctrines, presuppositions and methods of investigation offered 
by the paradigm as a real image of the world. 2 
2- The fault-line, i. e. the weakening factors, of a paradigm lie within its 
own system; that is its failure in solving puzzles that arise within the 
environment which it has created. 3 
3- Progress is not a cumulative evolution but a paradigm shift. A 
paradigm breaks down through a sudden, widespread and emotional movement. 
Kuhn likens that shift to a `gestalt switch' by the adherents of the old paradigm 
towards an alternative, characteristically incompatible one. 4 The change does not 
1 Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure ofScicnlirc Revolutions, (London, 1970), p. 160. 
2 Kuhn, ibid., p. RO 
Kuhn, ibid. p. 94 
4 Kuhn. ibid. p. 150 
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limit itself to the solution of the particular problems that instigated the change, 
but undermines the credibility of the whole paradigm. 5 
The course through which the reformist model emerged and was 
established bears many of the features described in Kuhn's notion of a paradigm 
shift, nevertheless, with some adjustment concerning his assertion that only one 
paradigm can prevail at a given time. 6 This adjustment was actually suggested by 
many of the researchers who elaborated on his theory. 7 
The chapter will begin by describing the revolutionary paradigm, how it 
emerged and prevailed, and the fault-line that instigated its crisis. It proceeds by 
describing the context within which the adherents of the paradigm started to 
rethink some of its major elements. And finally it shows how the new paradigm 
emerged, and where it succeeded or failed to deliver on its promises. 
I consider that development as the most important one since the Islamic 
Revolution. It involves a wholesale conversion from the classic theory of power 
established in Shi'ism to a new theory, more in tune with liberal democracy. 
Given the course of political change common in the Middle East, it is 
distinguished for its being led by committed Muslims, openly supported by a 
considerable segment of the society, and implemented through democratic 
means. It is particularly significant, for it involves fresh approaches to such 
issues as the role of religion, secularism and other issues that have long been 
issues of contention among politicians and researchers of political development 
in Muslim societies. 
The Revolutionary Paradigm 
The fault-line of the paradigm which prevailed after the Islamic 
Revolution lies in its very foundations, notably the ideological justifications of 
post-revolutionary rule, and the heterogeneity of the elite which led the country 
5 Kuhn. ibid.. p. 99. 
Kuhn, ibid., p. 160. 
Smith, Mark, Social Science in Question, (London 1998), p 198. 
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during that phase. The chapter will show that the Islamic Republic emerged 
without an articulate definition of rulership within the newly-bom political 
system. Thus, most of the strategies adopted in that formative period were based 
on practical considerations. They were put in place so as to deal with the 
compelling and changing requirements of the new political arena, and also to 
satisfy the multi-directional pressures exerted by the newly-emerged political 
and social forces. The constant switching of major strategies indicates the 
absence of a solid and articulate political ideology which would otherwise have 
ensured consistent strategies in the middle and long terms. 
My argument does not deny the post-revolutionary elite's faithfulness to 
their ideological orientations. Obviously, every group has a kind of ideology to 
guide and justify its actions. The ideology can be comprehensive, so to provide 
the background for all types of political and non-political actions or can be 
limited to certain aspects of political life. What I emphasise in this argument is 
that, first: the post-revolutionary elite were heterogeneous, thus, what we call a 
post-revolutionary political ideology was in fact a combination of sub-ideologies. 
Second: the dominant sub-ideology, that is the one held by the clergy, lacked the 
sophistication necessary for handling the complexities of state politics, 
especially for a period of extensive transformation such as that which ensued 
from the revolution. 
1) The Heterogeneous Elite: 
The Islamic revolution `brought together a diverse cross-section of 
religious and secular lay leadership, social classes, and political parties as well as 
guerilla movements'' all of which joined forces to bring down the monarchy. 
What lay beyond that phase was unclear to most of them, given that Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, had not defined the type of government 
he favoured. ` Like many other Muslim scholars, he spoke of `general principles 
and specific traditional Islamic institutions which provided the basis for an 
Esposito, John, Islam and Politics, (New York. 1997), p. 194. 
Mohaddessin, Mohammad, Islamic Fundamentalism. " The Mcw Global Threat, (Washington, 
D. C., 1993), p. 19. 
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Islamic state'. ") The leading role in the revolution and the revolutionary 
government was held by the Islamic trend which consisted of both traditional 
and modern segments. According to Nikpay, an Iranian sociologist, the evolution 
of political religiosity during the pre-revolutionary era was substantially 
influenced by the challenge of modernisation, whereby the response of the 
religious community oscillated between the call to modernise Islam and the call 
to Islarnise modernity. There emerged three types of religiosity: 
it. an instrumental type, which took Islam as merely an anti- 
imperialist ideology. 
b. an ideological type, which emphasised Islam as a basis for 
political and social reform, and 
c. a jurisprudential-political type, which focused on the religious 
attitudes and behaviours. " 
To locate the three trends within the social structure: the first was 
embraced by the nationalists or the so-called `Pan-Iranists'. The second was 
embraced by both the Islamic intellectual trend and the young followers of the 
late `Ali Shari`ati. The third trend was mainly represented by the clergy. Rcnäni, 
a professor at Esfahan University, places that division within the broader process 
of transition from traditionalism to modernity which, according to some writers, 
was the major source of discontent in modern Iranian society. 12 He argues that in 
the course of the revolution `two different sectors of the society revolted against 
two different sectors of the old regime'; for the traditional sector, the revolution 
was meant to stall the modernising process fostered by the Shah's regime. In 
contrast, the modern sector revolted against the persistence of the traditional 
patterns of politicisation within that regime, despite its claim to modernity. 13 
The worldvicws of these trends differ from each other so deeply that the plurality 
of opinions has served to create disharmony among the political elite instead of 
Esposito, op. cit., p. 195. 
Nikpay, A.. 'Ideology. Din, va Engcläb-c Iran', Malin, nos. 3&4, (Summer, 1999), c. edition, 
retrieved on Mar., 10,2003. from: www. hawzah. nct/Per/Magazine/int/003/mtOO3I6. htin 
Sec, for example, Bashirich, I-I., Mavanc' Tawse'ah Siesi dar/ran, p. 133. 
Renani, 'Täthir-e Qanün-e Asäsi bar Sakhtär-c Egtcsäd-c Si5si-e Iran', Iran (May, 5,2004). 
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enriching a multi-dimensional, hence unified, approach to how the new political 
system would be constructed. 
On the other hand, on the political scene there were so many political and 
ideological groups which, although not represented in the post-revolutionary 
government, were actively trying to take part in the making of the new political 
system. It is an inherent characteristic of revolutions that, with the collapse of 
the old regime, social energies are released and a wide variety of groups and 
organisations emerge `seeking to reap maximum benefits from the emerging 
political vacuum'. '4 Therein, a good deal of the views which were adopted by the 
ruling elite at that period and prevailed in the following years did not develop 
through informed debate but through the means of pressure and personal 
influence. In this respect, `Ezzatollah Schäbº offers an insider's testimony on the 
political process during the formative period of the Islamic Republic. Sehabi was 
a member of various post-revolutionary institutions, including the Revolutionary 
Council that led the revolution, the Council of Experts, which drew up the 
Constitution, and the first two governments. His account includes details of the 
personal, ideological and cultural quarrels within the ruling elite and how the 
political factions outside the government substantially influenced the 
government's policies. In this testimony, Sehabi claims that the first draft of the 
Constitution was drawn up after the model of France's Fifth Republic and 
envisaged a liberal democratic system, but was gradually changed towards social 
democracy and eventually towards theocracy. 15 The course of change was 
substantially influenced by that kind of pressure and to a lesser extent by 
informed debate. 16 
2) Inadequate Ideology 
Despite their being politically active long before the Islamic revolution, 
Ayatollah Khomeini and his religious alliance did not have a political ideology 
that was sophisticated enough to handle the difficulties which arose in the course 
14 Kamrava, Mchran, Revolutionary Politics, (London 1992), p. 67. 
15 Schibi, E., in Arnavi, B., Ektcsäd-cSi: isi-cJrunhouri-c Lslaini, (Tehran, 2003) 9-58., pp. 42-6. 
" Schäbi, ibid., p. 51. 
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of its transfonnation from being an ideology of socialisation to an ideology of a 
state. Shi'istn has emerged and developed to accommodate and justify an `out of 
state' type of socialisation. The anti-political character of Shi`ism did not change 
after its engagement in modern politics. Dabashi holds that since the early 
nineteenth century, and `as anti-colonial resistance began to gain momentum in 
Iran, Shi'ism was effectively implicated in the nationalization of that 
resistance'. 
17 
The historical antipathy of Shº`ism towards the state has materialised in 
an inherent tendency to ignore the state and politics at a scholastic level. Thus 
the Shi i experience of state politics within such governments as the Sarbedarän, 
Safavids, and Qajars is completely disregarded by the religious seminaries. These 
states have not only been denied legitimacy, but also ignored as if they never 
existed. Jurisprudential textbooks and the interpretive studies of the `ulama 
barely mention the many Shi i states which emerged both in and outside Iran, 
even when they deal with topics related to state and authority. 
Given that path of development, Shº i jurisprudence became evidently 
impoverished in respect of the rules and regulations related to state and power. 
Books concerning political theory and current affairs which were published 
within the religious community in the pre-revolutionary era were negligible, both 
in number and quality. It is useful to mention here that that kind of neglect was 
common among both major branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi'i. The clerical 
contribution to the political knowledge of the Muslim community was described 
by Ridwän al-Sayyid as very limited. 'R The reason, according to al-Sharafi, lies 
in the earlier scholars' preoccupation with the ideals of the formative period of 
Islam as embodied by the government of the Righteous Caliphs and `the 
complete neglect of the government within its historical context, as an entity 
subject to change in nature and dynamics'. '9 For Ayatollah Montazeri the 
1' Dabashi, H., 'The End of Islamic Ideology', Social Rcscarch, vol. 67, no. 2, (Summcr, 2000), e. 
edition, retrieved on Mar., 5,2003, from: 
www. findirt iclcs. com/p/articlcs/mi_ni2267/i. 
_2_67/ai_63787340 
Al-Sayyid, R., Al-Jama'ah wa a/-Mujtarna' na al-Daw/ah, p. 364. 
AI-Sharafi, A., 'Mushkclat al-Hukm fi al-Fikr al-Islami al-Hadith', al-/jtihäd, no. 14, (Winter 
1992) 69-93, p. 70. 
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`ulamä's unawareness of the multi-dimensional nature of the political process is 
to be blamed on their self-alienation from politics. 20 The same explanation is 
held by Hassan al-Turabi, the Sudanese scholar, 21 and to some extent al-Sayyid 
who argues that the antipathy between the religious and political institutions 
appeared long before the first encounter between the Muslim world and Western 
culture. `'` 
The lack of a proper awareness of the imperatives and mechanisms of 
state politics appears to have resulted in the religious activists ignoring the 
complexity of the process through which the political system should be 
transformed. Prior to the Islamic Revolution, the prospect of political 
engagement had been swinging between two extremes: a traditional trend 
thought that state business was too complicated, tricky and even dirty to be 
undertaken by pious men. 23 The activist trends, on the other hand, thought that 
the state could be Islamised if the `bad' holders of the key positions were 
replaced by good ones. Ayatollah Khomeini, for instance, tells his disciples: 
Once you have succeeded in overthrowing the tyrannical regime, 
you will certainly be capable of administering the state and 
guiding the masses. 
The entire system of government and administration, together 
with the necessary laws, lies ready for you. If the administration 
of the country calls for taxes, Islam has made the necessary 
provisions, and if the laws are needed, Islam has established them 
all. 24 
Ayatollah Khomeini envisaged an Islamic state with a very simple system 
of organisation. He deemed large institutions for legislation or judiciary 
unnecessary. In an Islamic government, he holds, `a simple planning body takes 
the place of the legislative assembly... This body draws up programs for the 
different ministries in the light of the ordinances of Islam'. `5 A large 
20 Montazeri, H.. Dirasit if Wil yat a/-Fagih, vol. 2, p. 300. 
'' '1 uribi, Hassan, He warpt /7al-/slam, al-Dirnugratiyya, al-Danlah, al-Gharb, (Beirut, 1995), p. 
151. 
22 AI-Sayyid, op. cit., p. 412. 
''' Khomeini, Islamic Government, p. 88. 
'' Khomeini, ibid., p. 86. 
25 Khomeini, ibid., p. 29. 
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bureaucracy does not help the state to be more efficient; rather, it consumes time 
and money while failing to ensure the fair administration of public affairs. 26 I 
have already noted in the previous chapters that one of the deficiencies of the 
Shi`i theory of power, and hence the doctrine of wiläyat al-fagih, lies in its 
underestimation of the part played by state institutions in comparison to the 
exaggerated significance given to the person of the ruler. 
In addition, there has been a commonly held perception that the 
establishment of the rule of faith will be rewarded with the grace of God, as the 
Holy Qur'an says: `If the people of the towns had but believed and feared Allah, 
We should indeed have opened out to them [all kinds ofJ blessings from heaven 
and earth' (Holy Qur'an, 7: 96). In general, the state as an independent 
institution, its requirements, dynamics and its limitations related to its 
international relations, were largely disregarded by the religious community. 
According to Ibrahim Yazd, who was a member of the Revolutionary Council 
and the interim government: 
Prior to the revolution, all of us thought that, as Muslims, we had 
the answer to every question. [We thought that] the Islamic 
Republic would ensure both freedom and justice; such an issue 
was taken for granted. No one, including the religious intellectuals 
and clergy, had had any doubts about that. After twenty years of 
experience, we sec that those questions are not as easy and basic 
as we have anticipated. 
We thought of a state which was not against the religion, 
observant of the people's faith... We did not think of [such 
questions as] what Islamisation means exactly. 27 
The above argument will certainly bring to the fore a legitimate question: 
how can it be said that the post-revolutionary Islamic elite lacked an adequate 
political ideology, whereas we acknowledge their embracing of Islam, and while 
the Islamic Shan`a is deemed by the elite, and indeed by many others, as a 
sufficient ideology in its own right, an ideology comparable to Marxism and 
liberalism? 
26 Khomeini. ibid., p. 31. 
27 Yazd, lbrähim, Sch Jumhoun p. 404. 
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To answer this question, we have to distinguish between Shar'i`a in the 
abstract sense and Shaii'a in the ideological sense, which is perceived and 
interpreted by the religious elite. In the former sense, Shan`a is supposed to 
outline a normative scheme of values and principles upon which practical rules 
and regulations can be grounded. For this scheme to apply to the realities of 
social life, there have to be efficient methods of interpretation and application. 
The efficiency of interpretation is contingent upon a set of factors outside 
Shan`a itself, including the scientific competence of the interpreter, the proper 
understanding of the subject matter and its location within the web of social life, 
as well as the implications and ramifications which would ensue from the 
application of certain rules to that subject. Thus my argument does not extend to 
question the adequacy of Shan`a per se, although there is room for such a 
question, as will be indicated in chapter five. My discussion is limited to the 
adequacy of the ideological sense of Shan`a, namely the notion of traditional 
jurisprudence, or Iigh sunnati, which emerged through the process of regime 
consolidation as the ideological framework within which state policies would be 
formulatcd. 28 
Shaii'a has been absent from real life for centuries and the traditional fiqh 
is said to have lost touch with the actual realities of modern life and 
government . 
29 As Hakimi, a senior teacher at Qum seminaries, says: 
One who goes through the jurisprudential textbooks will probably 
think that Islam is an outdated religion, a religion disconnected 
from the progression of human life, from politics, administration, 
and the constructive movements in such realms as science and 
economy. 30 
'" Rafsanjäni, Hashemi, 'UbürazBuhrän, (Tehran, 1999) p. 60. 
29 Shabcstari, M., Nagdibar Qara5t-c Raani az Din, p. 65. 
30 Hakimi, Muhaininad, Muhammad & 'Ali, A/-ffa}at. (Quin, 1987), vol. 2, p. 356. 
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The Paradigm Shapes Up 
Kamrava categorises the Islamic Revolution among the spontaneous, as 
distinct from the pre-planned, variety. 31 With this type, the ideology of the 
revolution takes shape only after `the ultimate winners of the revolution have 
become clear and have established their reign over the country'. 32 What appears 
in the aftermath of the revolution to be the ideals and objectives of the 
revolutionary movements are, at best, vague promises open to differing 
interpretations. They are even contradictory in their eventual outcomes, `a 
contradiction which is more the result of the inherent looseness of the 
revolutionary process itself rather than the sinister manipulation of revolutionary 
turn-faces'. 33 The Islamic Revolution was no exception; it emerged suddenly 
with no plan or preparation, says Nourbakhsh, the former director of the Iranian 
Central Bank: 
No one had foreseen that the revolution would succeed in such a 
short time. Thus we did not seriously seek to prepare a set of 
theories which would guide the administration of the country. 
Mostly, it was the personal desire of some fellows to inquire into 
the theories of economy, and into some aspects of Islamic 
economics, but nothing serious. 34 
The new system took shape through the process of trial and error. 35 To 
make things worse, that process took place while the country endured the effects 
of enormous economic and political pressures from the United States, alongside a 
full-scale war with Iraq. Ayatollah Khomeini was probably the one who 
recognised the long-term implications of that deficiency, and thus rejected the 
proposal by some members of the Revolutionary Council for a twenty-year 
period of dictatorial rule in order to build the new political system before putting 
a constitution in place. 36 Khomeini's swift pursuit of the process of the state- 
building earned the Islamic regime its formal frame of identity and the crucial 
31 Kamrava, op. cit., p. 27. 
3' Kamrava, ibid., p. 35. 
33 Kamrava, ibid., p. 73. 
34 Nourbakhsh, Mohscn, in Amavi, op. cit., p. 62. 
'' Raf `pour, Tavsc'ah va Tazadd. p. 124. 
36 Yazdi, op. cit., p. 421. 
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basis for stability. Within less than two years, there was a new constitution, a 
president and a parliament, all of which came through popular ballot. 
If that process continued in the same manner, the regime would probably 
have accomplished the remaining mission, which is the formulation of its 
political ideology, thus acquiring a final identity. This was a crucial task, for it 
would have helped the consensus on the legal form of the new political system to 
evolve into a consensus on its cultural and political essence. Throughout the 
twentyfive-year experience of the Islamic Republic, the major hindrance to 
political development has been the lack of consensus upon the identity of the 
Islamic regime. Despite the consensus on the religious character of the regime in 
the broad sense, it could not provide for a similar agreement on what is meant by 
each of the principles furnished by the Constitution, including the realisation of 
religious ideals in the public sphere, constitutional rights, the sources and limits 
of authority, and so on. It is because of these shortcomings that factional 
rivalries in today's Iran are not limited to the normal differences over power 
distribution or the different provisions of policy-making, as is the case in the 
democratic systems. They extend down to the very bedrock of the regime. 
From 1981 the clergy-dominated alliance of `the Line of the Imam' 
commenced a process aiming to consolidate its rule through suppressing or 
marginalising its political rivals. The Line of the Imam combined three groups: a 
small but powerful number of pragmatic politicians, a pro-tradition group of 
middle ranking clerics and Bazaar traders and guilds, and a broad, but disunited 
leftist collection of groups and activists. The process of regime consolidation 
helped the third group to claim the strongest position in the political theatre, 
thus its tendencies had the most influence on the political process in the 
formative period of the Islamic regime. The reference to some groups as leftist or 
pragmatic must be considered within the Iranian context, since there is a 
common scepticism towards the relevance of such descriptions. 
37 Similarly, the 
inclination towards a controlled economy should not be mistaken for the 
Buchta. Wilfried, Who Ru/es /ran, (Washington DC. 2000), p. 11. 
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advocacy of a socialist ideology, since socialism has never been accepted by the 
religious community. 38 
The hegemony of the Left was the fruit of the combination of activist 
interpretations of Shi'ism with anti-imperialist sentiments which engulfed 
Iranian society in the 1970s. The leftist inclination became established after 
many of its principles were included in the Constitution. 
The Constitution of 1980 represents the first and most comprehensive 
documentation of the political ideology of the Islamic Republic. The features of 
the new political system as envisaged by the ruling elite in the early post- 
revolutionary period were illustrated in the preamble and throughout its 175 
articles (177 after the amendment of 1989). The ultimate objective of the Islamic 
system was defined as `to create conditions conducive to the development of 
roan in accordance with the noble and universal values of Islam'39. This objective 
takes effect by liberating roan from all forms of tyranny and `entrusting the 
destinies of the people to the people themselves in order to break completely 
with the system of oppression'. In political terms, people are to have full-scale 
participation in the political process: 
The Constitution provides the basis of such participation by all 
members of society at all stages of the political decision-making 
process on which the destiny of the country depends. In this way 
during the course of human development towards perfection, each 
individual will himself be involved in, and responsible for the 
growth, advancement and leadership of society. Precisely in this 
lies the realisation of the holy government upon earth (in 
accordance with the Quranic verse `And we wish to show favour 
to those who have been oppressed upon earth, and to make them 
leaders and the inheritors. ' [28: 5]. 
The Constitution extends the mission of the Islamic Revolution beyond 
Iranian territory. It asserts the `continuation of the Revolution at home and 
abroad', the striving with `other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the 
way for the formation of a single world community', and `the struggle for the 
Hunter, S. & Newsom, D., Iran after Khomeini, (New York. 1992), p. 63. 
19 This phrase and all the coining phrases between two brackets and the quotation are from the 
Constitution's preamble. For more details, see Amuzegar, Jahangir, Iran Economy under the 
Islamic Republic, (London, 1993), p. 26. 
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liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the world'. Article Three 
states various objectives to be pursued by the Islamic state, including: 
o the elimination of all fonris of despotism, autocracy, monopoly 
of power, as well as foreign influence. 
o ensuring political and social freedoms; the participation of the 
entire people in detennining their political, economic, social and 
cultural destiny. 
o the elimination of discrimination and the provision of equal 
opportunities for all. 
oa just economy compatible with the Islamic criteria, aiming to 
create welfare, eliminate poverty, and abolish all forms of 
deprivation with respect to food, housing, work, health care, and 
the provision of social insurance for all. 
o the pursuit of self-sufficiency in scientific, technological, 
industrial, agricultural and military domains. 40 
The Paradigm in Action 
Throughout the Constitution as well as the speeches and communiques by 
Khomeini and other leaders, there appears a scheine of five notions which make 
up the essence of the ideology of the revolutionary elite. These notions include: 
Islam, justice, public participation, independence and renovation. While in the 
abstract, that scheine seeins a meeting point for the entire revolutionary elite, 
this agreement could not, unfortunately, extend to the practical level. From the 
early 1980s until now, the differing interpretations made each of the above 
principles a pivot for contention instead of functioning as an agent of ideological 
hannony. In the following pages I will discuss how the principle of justice was 
conceived and applied through two major aspects of public life, namely the 
management of the economy and political participation. The discussion provides 
an example of the way in which the revolutionary paradigm evolved and became 
established. 
The whole clause is a summarised text of Article Three of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic. 
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Social justice has represented a prominent theme in political and 
philosophical debates since ancient times. As a nonnative principle, it validates 
the processing of such major pursuits in the social life as the distribution of 
common resources, privileges, the organisation of public institutions, and so on. 
There appears to be no single definition of social justice; however, Miller 
suggests that it is better understood as a part of the broader concept of justice in 
general . 
41 The early accounts of social justice are generally based on the idea 
that a just society is the will of God. Later accounts treated the notion in the 
frame of natural law and the social contract. Recently, the debate on social 
justice came to he dominated by the contest between various socialist visions 
and the liberal model, most notably the contractual theory of justice, advocated 
mainly by John Rawls in the frame of his `justice as fairness' mode 1.42 Miller 
holds that the conception of social justice is highly conditioned by the way in 
which a society is organised. He considers three social types, namely the 
primitive, the hierarchical and the free market-based society as distinctive frames 
of organisation, each with a different conception of justice: 
The social structure of a particular society generates a certain type 
of interpersonal relationship, which in turn gives rise to a 
particular way of assessing and evaluating other men, and of 
judging how benefits and burdens should be distributed. 43 
The market model conceives the free economic market as a just system 
for distributing goods and services. Rawls criticises the utilitarian character of 
the model as it fails to satisfy its individualistic foundation, wherein `each 
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override' . 
44 Alternatively, Rawls holds that a just 
society must involve two basic criteria: basic liberties are the same for each 
citizen, and when social or economic inequalities do exist, the distribution of 
social goods must benefit the least favoured: 
41 Miller, David. Social Justicc, (Oxford, 1979), p. 17. 
;' latridis, Demetri us, Socia/Justice and the Welfare State in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Impact ofPrivatization, (London. 2000), p. R. 
s' Miller, op. cit.. p. 255. 
Miller, ibid.. p. 40. 
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The basic structure of society is arranged so that it maximises the 
primary goods available to the least advantaged to make use of the 
equal basic liberties enjoyed by everyone. This defines one of the 
central aims of political and social justice. 45 
Similarly, the principle of justice occupies an exalted position in Islamic 
thought. In SW ii belief, justice is one of the five primary principles (usün of the 
religion. 46 According to Motahhati, justice is the essence of all religious 
teachings; it has an equal rank to the belief in the oneness of God, it is the basis 
for belief in resurrection, the reason for sending the prophets and assigning the 
imims, and the canon of individual perfection and society's safety. 47 Along the 
same lines, the leader of the Islamic Republic holds that ensuring justice and 
fairness is the most urgent incentive for the emergence of the Islamic regime. 49 
Khamcnei maintains that a just system must be based on three foundations: just 
laws, just executives and an active role by the people. According to this view 
`the only just laws are those of Islam, since Islam receives its laws from God who 
has absolute knowledge of the world'. 49 
Despite the said exalted position of social justice in the religious 
traditions, its application does not match the rhetorical emphasis put on it. That 
is an outcome of the absence of a sophisticated ideology which otherwise would 
have ensured a cumulative process towards institutionalising social justice in the 
Islamic system. In the following pages, I will discuss how the principle was 
applied within the two areas of economy and political participation. 
ns Rawls, John, Political Libcra/isin, (New York 1993), p. 326. 
°`' The other four include belief in the oneness of God, in the Prophethood. Imamate and the 
Resurrection. 
" Motahhari, Murtaza, 'Adl-e Eli (Tehran, 1993), p. 37. 
'y Khamcnei, Ayatollah, communique on the first anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini 
(May, 31,1990). Retrieved on Nov., 2,2004 from: www. wilayah. net/pr/bayanat/speeches/68- 
69/bayan342. htmlink 1439 
;" Khamenei. Ayatollah, Friday Prayer Speech, (Mar., 27,1990). Retrieved on Nov., 2,2004 from: 
www. hwzah. net/pcr/c/cf/efc/efcb/cfcbw/cfebw. htin 
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Management of the Economy 
Three factors are said to have influenced the provision of the fair 
distribution of income in the post-revolutionary era: first: the traditional patterns 
of socialisation in which society is conceived of as a collection of `small 
producers, where everybody owns his own workshop and where production on a 
mass scale and the relations of wage-labour do not arise'. 50 Second: the outrage 
regarding the royal regime's favouring of the upper class and major cities in the 
distribution of national resources. This is to be understood with reference to the 
fact that the major source of national income, namely oil exports, was in the 
hands of the state. According to Parsa, in 1974, forty-seven of the wealthiest 
families controlled around 85 percent of the large firms, among which ten 
families owned from ten to 74 businesses for a total of 390 corporations. The 
royal family owned 137 of the 537 largest corporations and financial 
institutions. 51 Third: a common illusion links the lack of fairness under the 
former regime to its fostering of a free market economy and strong ties with the 
international market. 52 
It appears that the profound influence of the three factors on both the 
elite and ordinary people took place because of what I take as an ideological 
vacuum, - that is the absence of any other ideology capable of offering a better 
way through which the Iranian society could emerge from its difficulties. This 
vacuum is described by Rogani Zanjäni, an economist and former cabinet 
member, as follows: 
In addition to the lack of administrative skills among the 
revolutionary forces, we had a more fundamental defect in a 
theoretical respect. The capitalist system evolved through 
systematic dialogue between theory and reality. The socialist 
system followed the same course. In comparison, Islamic 
economics as furnished by the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic had never interacted with real life, neither the theories 
5" Bashirych, Hossein, The State and Revolution in Iran, (London 1984), p. 174. 
51 Parsa, Misagh, `Economic Development and Political Transformation', Theory and Society, 
vol. 14, no. 5, (Sep., 1995) 623-675, p. 668. 
52 Khamiishi, A. N., (President of Iran Chamber of Commerce and a former MP), interview, Iran, 
Aug., 3,2002 
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nor the people who proposed and implemented them. As a result, 
it was abstract and divorced from the actual executive and 
administrative realm of the country. 53 
For a short while, the doctrine of `Monotheist Economy' proposed by 
Abulhassan Bani Sadr, the former president, gained huge popularity as a possible 
model for the Islamic economy, but faded away in the political chaos. The 
doctrine, however, is more of a critique of the single crop and dependent 
economy than a foundation for an economic model. Bani Sadr dismisses the 
Western emphasis on absolute property as contradictory to the Islamic notion of 
the absolute ownership being the exclusive privilege of God. He holds that `in 
Islam there is only the right to ownership of labour and its product and this right 
is relative'. 54 There were also various writings about Islamic principles in 
relation to the economy, none of which, however, is tantamount to a distinct 
model comparable to others common in the world. 55 
The lack of a coherent economic theory gave rise to the favouring of a 
state-controlled economy whereby the pursuit of economic equality took the 
form of direct redistribution of wealth from the wealthiest to the poorest 
segments of society. This tendency was easily accepted by the clerical circles, for 
it recalls a widely-cited tradition attributed to `Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first Shi i 
imam, suggesting that: `Allah, the Glorified, has fixed the livelihood of the 
destitute in the wealth of the rich. No destitute person would starve if the rich 
did not consume the resources at their disposal excessively'. 56 It also has some 
similarities with the established mechanism of social solidarity embedded in the 
religious duties of zakit and khurns. Through these two forms of financial duties, 
between five and twenty percent of added profits on an annual basis is 
redistributed from the wealthy to their impoverished fellows. It is not clear 
whether this idea was put forward in that early period. Nevertheless, in a 
statement by Ayatollah Khomeini, there was a criticism of some jurists who 
" Zanjäni, in Amavi, op. cit., p. 144. 
Cited in Bashiriych, op. cit., p. 72. 
Sadri, M., `Dastan-c Dcgargünt dar Iran-2'. Donya-e Egtesid, (Sep., 19,2004), e. edition: 
x% %%-\\. donya-e-cgtcsad. com/83-06-29/070629. htm 
AI-Sharif al-Radi, Na/! j a/-13alighah. edited by F. Tabriziän, p. 955. E. edition, retrived on 
Nov., 1,2004 from: www. aqacd. coin/shialib/books/07/nahj/nahj-2g. htinl 
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opposed a government plan to introduce a new tax code on the basis that all 
forms of tax other than khurns and zakit were illegitimate. 57 
The move to control the market was opposed by the traditional clergy and 
the leading Bazaar traders, for it implicitly violates the right of property and free 
contract, both of which are established principles in the Islamic traditions and 
defined on an individual basis. In order to manage this difficulty, the ruling elite 
relied heavily on the ahkäm-c thanavich, or the secondary rules that allow the 
ruler recourse to his personal judgment of the public interest in a state of 
emergency. It is obvious that such a tendency was motivated by the elite's 
certitude that the established jurisprudential doctrines were not sufficient for 
addressing the urgent needs of the state at that time. Hence they wanted to 
impose their personal judgment directly on the management of the 
transformation of what was thought of as an unjust and dependent economy into 
one that was Islamic, just and self-sufficient. Ayatollah Golbaigäni, the second 
ranking source of emulation (inarje` al-tagrd in the religious establishment, 
warned Khomeini and the MPs that the excessive use of secondary rules would 
probably ruin the integrity of the Shari`a. s" 
The centralist tendency came into effect through the nationalisation of 
the major economic sectors and land re-distribution. In June 1979, the 
government took over the country's thirty-six banks, followed by the 
confiscation of nearly all the major firms in the engineering, agriculture, 
construction, insurance and distribution sectors. 59 The nationalised industrial 
firms totalled 580 by March 1983.60 According to one report, the Organization 
for National Industry acquired 564 units with around 185,000 employees in 
1980.61 Bunh d-c Mostaz`afän (Foundation for the Disinherited), the body 
Tabrizi, Mosavi, 'Jiegah-e Hukümat dar Andishch Emam', Matin, (Winter 1999) c. edition, 
retrieved on Mar., 10,2003, from: www. hawzah. nct/Pcr/Magazine/MT/00I/mt00116. hhn. See 
also Khomeini, Sahifch Nüc, vol. 19, p. 186. 
Hajjari in, AzSh: ihcd-cQudsi p. 296. 
Rashidi. 'Ali, Egtcsid-c Mardum-sa/är, (Tehran, 1997), pp. 58-63. 
Rashidi. ibid., p. 69 
Jcnan-scfat, M.. 'Sun'at-c Iran pas az 13ahrnan 57', Hamshahr7, May, 20,2002. 
www. hainshaliri. net/liainnews/1391/810230/cconw. htm 
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responsible for the administration of the properties of the ousted royal family, 
held 400 (inns in 1982.62 Another 177 f inns were held by Bwniad Shahid (Martyr 
Foundation), a revolutionary agency responsible for the welfare of the families of 
the revolutionary martyrs. 63 The total confiscated assets were estimated at 
around 31.2 percent of the entire private investment in the country. 64 
The policy of land re-distribution provides another example of the 
ideological confusion as well as the political chaos that characterised that period 
and resulted in many major policies being adopted without appropriate 
consideration of their implications. The course of land re-distribution was 
initiated by the peasants at the peak of the revolutionary process and probably 
was a surprise to the political leaders. Many provinces saw peasants and workers 
seizing lands, factories, buildings and other properties of the figures of the ousted 
regime or, in general, those who were identified as wealthy or influential under 
the previous regime. 65 It is not clear whether the ruling elite was supportive of 
this type of action. Nevertheless, it brought them face to face with a drastic 
challenge to identify their concept of social justice, whether it rests on the 
respect for personal property or fosters the redistribution of private large 
holdings. 66 
To deal with the widespread seizure of the property of absent landlords, 
the government issued the `Law for the Transfer and Revival of Land' in April 
1980, promising a wide re-distribution of state and privately-owned barren 
lands. 67 The latter category outraged the traditional clergy, voiced notably by 
Ayatollah Golbaigänº and resulted in Khomeini stopping any more 
`'' Jcniin-scfat, ibid. 
63 Madani, Arnir, Mavinc' Tavsc'ah Egtcs. idi/ran, (Tehran, 1995), p. 142. In 2003, the assets of 
Buniäd Mostaz'alan included 384 finn active in industry, transport, civil engineering, tourism, 
agriculture, trade and finance, with a workforce of 60.000 employees. AI-Ishaq, the director of 
the corporation, cited in Iran. (Jan., 4,2003). 
Jenän-sefat, op. cit. 
65 Farazmand, 'Ali, The State, Bureaucracy, and Revolution in Modem Iran, (London, 1989), p. 
206. 
Hunter and Newsom, op. cit., pp. 62-3. 
`'' The text of the law is available on the official site of the Ministry of Jchäd-e Keshävarz'i 
(Agriculture), www. frNv. orb. it/fa/saruquz/darbure_suzinun/inajinooc_gavunin/1359. htin 
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confiscation . 
6" The controversy over agrarian reform went on for years. Some of 
the seized lands were retained by the peasants, others were returned to their 
owners by the courts. The fate of agrarian reform remained unclear until 1983 
when the Parliament approved a moderate law observing, to a fair extent, the 
reservations of the landlords and the religious leaders. 69 The distribution of land 
partially resolved the problem of landlessness on the part of the poor peasants 
whereby, according to official reports, around one million hectares of land were 
distributed among eligible families. 70 The World Bank described it as a moderate 
step in the right direction, but not sufficient to sort out the agrarian problem. '' 
In general, the centralist policies of the post-revolutionary government, 
particularly its favouring of the less advantaged and rural areas, have resulted in 
some tangible improvements, at least in the short term. Iran's human 
development rating, according to UN human development reports, rose from 0.57 
in 1980 to 0.61 in 1985 and 0.65 in 1990.72 The UNHD rating index measures 
each country's average achievement in three basic areas of human development: 
a long and healthy life, education and a decent standard of living. The rating of 
income equality on the basis of the Gini coefficient model gives another 
indication of the said improvement. According to official statistics, Gini rate has 
dropped from 0.512 in 1979 to 0.437 in 1989. This model supposes a five-layer 
pyramid of incomes where, in the ideal situation, each group should receive a 
share of the entire income of the society corresponding to its relative size. Since 
that is not the case in the real world, it calculates the rate of equality by 
comparing the distance between the actual share of income retained by each of 
the five layers with the presupposed ideal point, i. e. 20 percent. The rating ranges 
from zero (equal) to one (unequal). A society with a fair income distribution 
`'X Vagc'iat-ha vi Qazavat-ha, a book by an anonymous assistant of Ayatollah Montazeri in defense 
of his position, c. edition, retrieved on July 2004 from: 
www. klont,,, iz. ci'i. w.,; /Far. si/N-., igci, itihtmi/0010. htnlOO79 
`'`' For some details on the related controversy, see Baktiari, Bahman, ParliamcntaryPolitics in 
Rcvo/utionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics, (University Press of Florida, 
1996),., pp. 84-92 
'" Faraztnand, op. cit., p. 213. 
71 The World Bank, Islamic Republic of Iran: An Agricultural Policy Note, Report No. 29428-1R, 
(Jun., 22,2004). p. 5 
72 UN IIDR 2004, http: //hdr. undp. org/statistics/data/indic/indic_I0_I_I. htinl 
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would be in the range of 0.4. In the case of Iran, during the first post- 
revolutionary decade, the share of the 40 per cent with a low income rose from 
12 to 14.05 percent of the total income, the 40 per cent with a middle income 
from 30 to 37.42 percent, while the income of the richest fifth dropped from 58 
to 48.53 percent. 73 
Public Participation in Politics 
Political participation is the principal feature of democratic political systems. 
Nie and Verba define it as the `legal activities by private citizens which are more 
or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or 
actions they take' . 
74 The degree of participation is to be assessed against the rate 
and scope of the government actions that articulate the expressed will of the 
citizens. Political participation takes different fonns, the most notable of which 
is voting in periodic and freely contested elections. 75 In addition to its 
instrumental definition, `electoral participation is conceptualised as a form of 
symbolic action which lends generalised support to the political system'. 76 
After the emergence of the Islamic Republic, elections were held periodically and 
attracted wide participation, indicating that the regime was fairly stable and 
popular. 77 Yet, it is hardly deemed a democratic system. The reason is obvious: 
despite the instrumental and symbolic significance of elections, this does not 
suffice by itself to deliver a democratic system. First, elections have to be 
grounded in a conceptual basis appropriate to democracy; that is, the people 
being the sovereign and source of authority. Second, for elections to manifest the 
will of the people, rulers have to facilitate the legal and political environment so 
as to ensure equal opportunity for all citizens to take part in a fair and free 
contest. 
'1 Rusti, M., & Ramazini, M.. 'Barrasi Vaz'iat-c Tavzi' Darämad dar Iran', Elte/a'at Siisi 
Egtcsädi. no. 177-178, (May-Jun., 2002) 250-263, p. 257. The figures are based on the statistics 
of the Centre for Statistics of Iran, but disputed by other sources. Compare with Rafi'pour, 
Tavsc'ah va Tazadd, pp. 177-9. 
"Cited in Robinson, Mark, 'Democracy, Participation, and Public Policy: The Politics of 
Institutional Design', in Robinson, and White (eds. ), The Democratic Developmenta/State: 
Politics and Institutional Design, (Oxford, 1999), p. 156. 
'5 Robinson, ibid., p. 157. 
76 Topf, Richard, 'Electoral Participation', in Fuchs, and Klingemann (eds. ), Citizensand the 
State, (Oxford, 1995), p. 29. 
77 Kainrava, op. cit., p. 112. 
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The history of political participation in post-revolutionary Iran shows that the 
electoral process has evidently failed to meet the said criteria. This does not 
mean that the elections were forged; it means precisely that the plurality of 
opinions and the different segments of Iranian society were not given an equal 
opportunity to express themselves through the elections. Thus, the outputs of the 
elections might have expressed some of the various interests in Iranian society, a 
small or a large proportion, but definitely not all of them. 
In each of the elections held throughout the twenty-five years that elapsed from 
the Islamic revolution, there was political conflict over the rules of access and 
participation. In the legislative election of 2004, nearly all the non-conservative 
candidates were excluded from the contest, which was just a repetition of what 
happened in 2000,1996,1992 elections. The recurrent conflicts, I argue, imply 
an inherent misconception of the notions of `people' and `political participation' 
in the revolutionary paradigm. The theoretical ground of the said misconception 
will be discussed in the next chapter. The following pages will illustrate the 
context within which the idea of participation emerged and took its current 
shape. 
After the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-6, the Majlis became a symbol of 
the public yearning for a representative government78 and, at the same time, the 
medium through which the secular rule is legitimised. During the Pahlavi regime, 
both religious and secular forces would have been ready to take part in the 
political process had the regime limited itself to the boundaries of the 
Constitution. In his Kashfal-Asrar, Ayatollah Khomeini indicated that the Shah 
could have his rule legitimised in exchange for the restoration of the 
Constitution, notably Article 2 which provided for a clerical body to monitor 
compliance of laws with religious principles. 79 
Given the exalted position of the Majlis in Iranian culture, it was taken for 
granted that an elected Majlis would be at the centre of the political process in 
the new regime. Makärem Shiräzi, a conservative scholar, while holding that 
there is no reference to the electoral process in the Sh1'i school of 
'" Menasheri. Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran. p. 68. 
"' Martin, Vanessa, Creating an Islamic State. - Khomeini and the Making ofa New Iran, (New 
York, 2003) pp. 105-6. 
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jurisprudence, 80 acknowledges its validity on a rather instrumental basis. 
According to this view, public participation is accepted for it serves 
to counter the accusation of tyranny or dictatorship ... 
In 
addition, by holding elections, people's support and trust can be 
secured and the temptations of the evils and enemies of the 
Islamic government would be beaten back. 81 
Other than the said reservation, it is obvious that the post-revolution elite were 
in agreement that the new political system should involve broad political 
participation. It appears thus that the issue was dealt with on a practical rather 
than a theoretical basis. In other words, the course of the revolution and its 
immediate outcome left no other choice. Here are three possible explanations: 
First: given that the regime was born out of a popular revolution, the role of the 
people was impossible to deny. The masses not only brought down the former 
regime, but also took over the government and created an order of their choice to 
administrate day-to-day affairs long before the new regime stood on its feet. 82 
Second: despite the old regime falling apart, the revolutionary leadership did not 
have all the threads of power in its hands. A sense of insecurity was heightened 
by the emergence of separatist movements in the provinces bordering the 
western frontiers, and suspicions over a possible intervention by the army, or 
probably a plot by the United States, similar to the one which brought down the 
national government of Musaddiq in 1953. In an atmosphere full of suspicion and 
fear, the revolutionary elite had no real force upon which to rely, other than the 
ordinary people who gave it faithful support. 13 
Third: it was natural for a new regime to try to introduce a better form of 
government than the ousted one. Pahlavi rule was associated with many 
unpopular policies, the most notable of which was its disregard for the 
parliament and public opinion. 84 Thus, it was natural for the new regime to take 
the opposite stance. Fundamentally, Kamrava maintains, the legitimacy of the 
NO Shirizi, Makärim, Buhüth Fiqhiah Aluhcmmah. (Quin. n. d. ), p. 472. 
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new ruling elites `depends on their ability not just to lead revolutions but to 
deliver on the promises they made during the revolutionary struggle'. 85 
There are of course other factors, including the whole-hearted belief by some 
leaders in free and fair public participation regardless of all the contextual 
imperatives. For example, Ayatollah Taleghäni, the second-in-rank leader of the 
revolution was of the idea that the shi rä, or rulership on the basis of collective 
opinion, was the authentic method of rule in Islam. 96 However, the idea of public 
participation was at that period more of an acknowledgement of the state of 
affairs as well as a submission to the urgent need to protect the newly-born 
regime. Ideologically-based reservations might have been mitigated by virtue of 
the fact that the sweeping popularity of the religious leadership provided a kind 
of comfort, which was reflected in the feeling that, at the end of the day, people 
would accept the preferences of their leaders. 97 
The first form of institutionalised political participation at the grass-root level 
was embodied by the neighbourhood councils or Shi rä ye Mahallah and the 
popular committees. Both forms denote groups of action set up in each locality 
and workplace to oversee common interests, as alternatives to the dilapidated 
state apparatus and other organisations. The group's membership was based on 
election, selection by respected members of the locality, or self-designation. x" 
After the new regime had become more securely established, many of these 
groups were integrated into the formal state bureaucracy. Others were put under 
the supervision of the locality's mosque leader, resulting in a considerable 
number of their members leaving because of their disenchantment with the new 
arrangements or being sacked for suspicions about their loyalty. 89 
The process of state consolidation, which continued until 1983, seems to have 
been driven by the idea that the existence of independent popular groups 
necessarily weakens the state and undennines its authority. Ayatollah Khaz`ali, a 
notable cleric, argued that `the government would have worked better if there 
115 Kamrava. op. cit., p. 75 
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were no parties contesting it'. 90 Other than the local groups, which were less 
concerned with politics on the national level, the political parties, the interest 
groups and the independent media have seen the same fate. The clampdown on 
independent groups between 1981 and 1988 was excused by the need to 
consolidate the internal front during the period of war. 
9' In other words, factional 
politics were associated with the weakening or fragmentation of society. 
Generally speaking, Shia clergy do not view political parties as proper agencies 
for representing people or generating legitimacy, and when they have to do so, 
the party must be supervised by a tnujtahid92 In this case, the supervising 
mujtahid validates the collective opinion of the party. 93 This belief appears to 
have originated in the scepticism of the religious seminaries about the role of 
modern forms of socialisation in the broader sense. Ayatollah Haimi plainly 
expresses his concern that the patronage of modern groups could undermine the 
religious establishment. Their assertion of factional loyalty serves to lure their 
members away from the religious exemplar (inane` tagrd). 
94 This sentiment was 
not limited to groups that hold purely modernist tendencies. The former 
president Hashemi Rafsanjani tells us that the Islamic Republic Party, too, was 
disliked by many Friday Prayer leaders who thought it would undcnnine 
communal unity. 95 Further more, Ayatollah Khomeini was widely known to have 
been unhappy with party politics. 96 In general, Sh 'a clergy are more familiar 
with customary groupings and direct methods of communicating with ordinary 
people which take the form of prescription rather than deliberation. The lack of 
empathy between the clergy and modern groups might explain why most of the 
influential Iranian parties such as Nchzat Azädi, Mojahedin-c Khalq, Mojahcdin 
Engheläb, Kargozaran and Mosharekat had only a few junior clerics among their 
members or none at all. 
Since 2003, there appears to have been an increasing tendency among the 
conservatives to adopt modern forms of political activity, notably through 
political parties. This has probably been motivated by the successes of the 
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reformist groups in mobilising the new generations on the one hand, and the 
decrease in the popularity of the clergy on the other. However, this tendency 
goes hand in hand with the emphasis on collective action through the para- 
military organisation of `Basij' which is regarded by the conservatives as the 
authentic alternative that, according to Rafsanjani, can `fill the vacuum of real 
political parties in Iran'. ` 7 The idea of Basij (literally `mobility') was initially 
proposed by Khomeini who called upon educated Iranians to help root out the 
poverty and deprivation of rural areas, a movement that took the form of Jehad-e 
Sazandegi (the Jihad of Reconstruction) and Nchzat-e Sawäd-Ainozi (the 
Movement for Literacy). The same idea was emphasised in the wake of the Iraqi 
attack on the western boarders, when Khomeini urged Iranians to form the 
`Army of Twenty Million' or Basij Mostaz'fin. The organisation continued after 
the war under the umbrella of the Revolutionary Guard. It is currently used as a 
means of civil defense against a possible assault by outside powers as well as 
internal counter-revolutionaries. There is considerable evidence that the 
organisation is actually used by the conservatives against their political rivals. 
The Fault-Line Emerges 
For Brinton, all revolutions take a similar course of development: moderates take 
over but, very soon, they give in to the radicals until, eventually, the fever of 
revolution settles down commencing a Thcrmidorian phase, y" a period 
characterised by retreat from revolutionary strategies towards more conventional 
patterns of politicisation. The Islamic Republic was a political system that was 
constructed without a preplanned strategy. Its political ideology took shape 
through interaction with the imperatives of the political environment of the post- 
revolutionary period. Even the Constitution was a reflection of the immediate 
emotions and aspirations which exploded in the course of the Revolution, rather 
than being something which had thoroughly considered the changing 
requirements of society in the long-term. For Renäni, this is the main reason for 
the intrinsic contradictions within the Constitution. `9 The discrepancy between 
the idealistic aspirations of the revolutionary paradigm and the actual 
circumstances have been felt for a while, but came to the fore, notably on the 
economic level, at the final stage of the eight-year war with Iraq. According to 
Q7 Rafsanjani, Hashcmi, cited in Baztab, Jan., 18,2003. 
Kamrava. op. cit., p. 61. 
"`' Rcnani, op. cit. 
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Zanjäni, the finance minister, in 1986 there was a common feeling that the 
Islamic regime was no longer able to bear the burden of the war: `I told the prime 
minister that we had only two options: either we stop the war or carry on the 
path of Im im Husayn and sacrifice the regime itself . '00 Zanjäni claims that that 
idea was common among the elite, but concealed during formal meetings: 
In private, most of the ministers were showing a serious desire to 
end the war. But, in the official meetings of the cabinet, they 
pretended to be firn and determined to carry on with the war; 
they often injected Quranic verses, traditions of the infallible 
imams, and epic poems in their speeches. "" 
Eventually, Ayatollah Khomeini accepted a retreat from the path of Imam 
Ilusayn, not only because he was convinced that Iran could not win the war, but 
because `the survival of the Islamic regime itself was perhaps at stake'. 102 That 
retreat was just the starting point in a chain of events labelled by Ehteshami as 
the Thermidorian phase of the Islamic Revolution. 103 
The final two years of the war involved many setbacks for Iranians. On the 
military front, the attempts to push into Iraqi territory which apparently were 
intended to impose a favourable ceasefire agreement on the Iraqis failed to make 
any significant impact. '" In 1988, the Iraqis escalated their campaign to 
demoralise the Iranian public by directing 160 SCUD-B missiles into Tehran and 
other cities. The aerial bombardment of civil and economic facilities also 
intensified, using, in some cases, chemical weapons against both civilian and 
military targets on the northern front. The escalation of the `war on the cities' 
went side by side with international pressures on Iran, including an increasing 
presence of American warships in the Persian Gulf. 105 US interference reached a 
climax when one of its warships shot down an Iranian passenger plane claiming 
the lives of 290 civilians in July 1988, prompting Iran to accept a ceasefire based 
on the UN 598 resolution. '"6 For Khomeini, that was a deeply painful retreat, 
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`halting this just war is like drinking poison, death would have been easier to 
bear'. 107 
On the economic front, the war had a very negative impact and the livelihood of 
the entire nation became gradually dependent on state expenditure which came 
mainly from oil exports. Some estimates put the direct damages caused by the 
eight-year war at US $600 billion and the total cost at US $1 trillion. '" The 
decline in the oil market, alongside the disruption of oil production by military 
operations, cost Iran $36 billion in oil revenues (based on the nominal levels of 
production and price of 1977). ""9 
Iran's acceptance of the UN's Security Council resolution 598 had a variety of 
implications, both political and ideological. It was seen as a submission to a 
pattern of international relations that the Islamic Republic never recognised as 
legitimate. In the revolutionary paradigm, the Islamic Republic was perceived as 
a prelude to the universal domination of Imam Mahdi, the Lord of the Time, 
rather than an ordinary nation state. The revolution was meant to start from a 
base-country, (min a/-Qura), and inspire disinherited people all over the 
Muslim world. ' 10 After the war, the Iranian elite projected an image of the state 
as something ordinary, concerned with the national interests of its people first 
and foremost. Later, a prominent religious leader put that deviation from the 
professed ideology in plain words: 
The Islamic state is not responsible for refonning the world unless 
the Lord of the Time (Imam al-Zaindn) appears. The government 
has to focus on construction, the urbanisation of the country and 
the well-being of its own people. ' 11 
The dismissal of Ayatollah Montazen, the fagih-designat e, in March 1989 was 
another major setback for the revolutionary paradigm. Montazen is known as a 
man of religion, knowledge, courage and an advocate of the lower classes. He 
was also an outspoken critic of the government's treatment of the opposition, 
117 Mukhtari, M., 'Tasvib-c Qat'nämch 598 va Asnad-c un dar Sazman-e Mclal', Farsncws, Sep., 
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especially of political prisoners. 112 His dismissal came shortly after he called for 
a `review' of the Islamic regime 113 indicating the changing tendencies among the 
elite. This event gave the public a taste of the rivalry among their leaders, but 
fundamentally dispelled the image of the ruling elite being modest, pious and 
lenient. These features were officially sanctioned as the distinctive 
characteristics of the religious rulers who were once described by Ayatollah 
Bchcshfi, as `the people of service and not the seekers of power'. 1 4 
Obviously, the elite's deviation from the revolutionary aspirations would not 
have taken place if the regime had been well and progressing. This deviation was 
regarded by some authors as a return to the pragmatic approach to local and 
global issues. The tendency was helped, according to Katouzian, by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the universal decline of totalitarian beliefs and 
centralist policies also had some effect on the Iranian elites. 115 
The said pragmatism came to be institutionalised through a major amendment of 
the religious-idealistic form of leadership furnished by the Constitution. Shortly 
after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989, Iranians voted on a revised 
version of the Constitution aiming at: 
1- giving state imperatives a priority over religious ones. The state 
leadership was separated from the religious seminaries. In the 
amended Constitution, the administrative and political skills were 
given primacy over the religious scholarship in the qualification for 
the office of wilayat al-fagih. 
2- establishing the conventional identification of `public interest' as the 
basis for determining the applicability of religious teachings. 
According to the previously-sanctioned traditional jurisprudence, 
interests are identified by the mujtahid with reference to religious 
criteria. 
The transfer of wiläyat al-fagih to the then president Khamenei was relatively 
smooth. By putting the above changes into effect, the elite was able to exclude 
many contenders for the office most of whom excel Khamenei in respect of 
11' Abdo, Gencive, 'Re-Thinking the Islamic Republic: A 'Conversation' with Ayatollah Hossein 
'Ali Montazcri', The Middle East Journal, vol. 53, no. 4, (Autumn 1999). 
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religious qualities. 116 The elite's choice was to ignore doctrinal considerations 
and focus on practical ones, whereby the regime came to enter its second decade 
in the hands of the pragmatist faction. 
One of the major contributers to the new phase was the then Majlis speaker, `Ali 
Akbar Bahramäni, known as Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani was born in 1934 to 
a major pistachio nut producer in Rafsanjan, Kerman, 670 miles southeast of 
Tehran. From the early days of the Islamic Revolution Rafsanjani showed 
incomparable flexibility in dealing with changing circumstances, and by so 
doing, he retained a role which was always crucial and decisive. 117 His published 
diaries, speeches and interviews reveal an image of a pragmatic and practical 
politician, preoccupied with action rather than ideology or aspirations. 
Rafsanjani portrays himself as a dutiful politician whose major concern is the 
continuity of the Islamic regime. Rafsanjani, who once defined the compliance 
with Islam fcgahati,, or the jurisprudential perception of Islam, as the line of 
demarcation between the `Line of the Iman' and the other Islamic factions, 18 
was not reluctant to admit, in due time, that that jurisprudence was not in line 
with what a modern state requires. In a personal testimony on the legislative 
process during his time as speaker of the Majlis (1980-1989), Rafsanjani says: 
Our legislative work in the Majlis was a real difficulty due to the 
wide gap between the jurisprudential injunctions and the `ulama's 
opinions and the realities of public life. We wanted to formulate 
the laws necessary to promote the public interest and to ensure 
that the state was moving within the religious framework. Yet 
that endeavor was often hindered by the lack of any religious 
framework which was relevant to the issue in question, or because 
the available opinions were by no means appropriate to the 
obvious and actual exigencies of the society. 
In many cases, we were afraid of violating the religious limits and 
the views of some `ulama, and that made us reluctant to proceed 
with some cases that we have identified as being of common 
interest. For instance, we debated and passed the Labour Code, 
then some of its parts appeared to be incompatible with certain 
religious rules. The same problem occurred when the Majlis 
passed the Tax Code, the Criminal Code, and codes concerning 
cooperatives, land acquisition, private schools, and so on. 
Whenever an important issue was dealt with by the Majlis, there 
was a quarrel over the compatibility of its related laws with 
1 16 Buchta, Wilfried, Who Rules /ran? (Washington DC, 2000), p. 52. 
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certain injunctions or views of the `ulamä. If such contradictions 
and problems remained unsolved, there would be no significant 
progress towards the Islamisation of the laws or the management 
of the country. 119 
Rafsanjäni's conception of reform has been a point of contention. In fact, he does 
not conceal his belief that economic prosperity outweighs the importance of 
political reforms. At times he puts this in pragmatic terms by arguing that 
political reforms should develop slowly to avoid possible conflicts with 
traditional forces. Often he puts his views in a theoretical framework and argues 
that democratisation must be preceded by substantial improvement in the 
people's livelihood to relax the lower class's anxiety which has previously given 
rise to interventionist tendencies. 
Rafsanjani believes that the state is to be the dynamo and risk taker. His 
major concern, according to Wright, is to `fashion a durable state as the basis of 
authority and to make its survival less dependent on the credintials, personality 
or clout of the Supreme Leader'. 120 Concerning the economy, he believes in the 
role of the private sector and foreign assistance, on both the financial and 
technical levels. '2' Rafsanjani asserts that the concept of social justice which was 
conceived by the revolutionary paradigm in the form of direct redistribution did 
not prove viable. Alternatively he holds that only through a systematic and 
gradual process aiming to enhance economic output, will the Iranian economy 
develop an egalitarian character and ensure a fair distribution of resources 
throughout the nation. '22 His desire for foreign assistance prompted him to bury 
the principle of exporting the revolution and to try to repair Iran's poor 
relationship with the outside world. 123 Iran's support for Kuwait's sovereignty 
against the Iraqi invasion in 1990 served to relax its relations with the Arab Gulf 
states and lent credibility to its self-portrayal as a stabilising power in the 
region. '24 
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The post-war economic reforms were inevitable. The official statistics gave 
alarming indications. Compared with the aspiration in the early 1980s towards a 
strong and self-sufficient economy, the GNP in the fiscal year 1988-89 was still 
6% less than it was in 1978-79 (based on 1982/3 prices). 125 Alongside the decline 
of real per capita income, manufacturing output dropped sharply: in 1990, the 
210 industrial units held by the National Industries Organization were running at 
54% of their nominal capacity. 126 The decline in production of the car industry 
was even worse, the output averages of 1988 ranged from 13 to 30 per cent of 
1979 rates. 127 
With the implementation of Rafsanjäni's Siisat-c Ta`di/(Policy of Adjustment), 
the economy started to show signs of revival. From 1989 to 1992, the GNP had an 
annual growth of 7 percent, compared to an annual average of less than one 
percent in the preceding decade. 128 Public services saw a similar improvement: 
by 1998 electricity reached 14 million homes, 40 per cent more than in 1991. 
Telephone lines increased from 2.45 million in 1991 to 6.69 million in 1996.129 
The rate of unemployment had dropped below 10 percent by the end 1994. The 
output in agriculture and industry made a good increase and non-oil exports 
reached $4 billion in 1993.130 Nevertheless, a major program to privatise 400 
firms in ten years did not go smoothly because of the pressures both from the 
traditional-right and left wings, as well as employees. 131 
Rafsanjäni's reform policy should be viewed within the frame of limits 
pertaining to his own personality, immediate concerns and actual powers at his 
disposal. This policy was above all meant to address the problems of the 
economy. Nevertheless, it could not have been advanced without parallel 
improvements in state-society relations in general, due particularly to the 
context within which the reform program took place, namely the conclusion of 
the war and the departure of Ayatollah Khomeini. The eight-year rule of 
Rafsanjini saw an increasing tendency to relax the rigid controls over individual 
and social activities. This is seen as a by-product of economic reform rather than 
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a deliberate policy. However, it had its impact on society at large. Rafsanjard's 
emphasis on technocracy gave rise to modern, academic-oriented managers and 
professionals most of whom had liberal propensities. Broadly, the Policy of 
Adjustment is seen as a project designed to redirect the Islamic Republic in both 
political and economic respects. As for Rafi'pour, that project has involved: 
1- changing the society from a closed to an open one. 
2- relaxing traditional-religious norms. 
3- enhancing the role of professionals, and replacing the old patterns of 
the first revolutionary decade with modern ones. 
4- reducing state control over the market and economy. 132 
The relaxed atmosphere made a good impact on cultural life, whereby the 
number of periodicals rose from 99 in 1986 to 662, including thirty-four dailies, 
in 1996. The number of books published in the same period rose from 3,812 to 
14,459.133 The economic revival and relative political openness had contradictory 
effects. On the one hand, the traditionalists were alarmed by the decline in 
people's observance of traditional-religious norms. These developments also 
provoked workers' fear of possible loss of their jobs in privatised firms. t34 But, 
on the other hand, the reform policies exposed the many advantages of the 
newly-adopted model of a free market. The latter trend continued to gather 
momentum in the following years. By the end of Rafsanjäni's mandate in 1997, 
the process of refonn appeared irreversible. A considerable proportion of both the 
elite and the public came to the conclusion that the Islamic regime could no 
longer carry on with the revolutionary paradigm if it was to survive in the 
changing world. The tangible achievements of the reforms effectively proved 
that the free market model, albeit with some adjustments, was the only way to 
secure a better livelihood for the population and prosperity for the Islamic model. 
Meanwhile, the above devclopmcnts have set in motion the process of 
paradigmatic change. The openness has effectively served to legitimise the 
debate over the revolutionary paradigm. Public debate of an issue elevates it 
from an individual or partial disenchantment to a national issue. In traditional 
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and politically-closed societies, people keep away from the controversial issues 
for fear of suppression, or out of the conviction that the rulers are not willing to 
listen. Public contribution to the course of democratisation is most likely when 
restrictions are limited, for it indicates that the rulers welcome the change or that 
they arc not strong enough to suppress the movement for change. 
Paradigm replacement is a unidirectional process. 135 Once the established 
paradigm fails to address the anomalies which have arisen within it, the process 
of change cannot be reversed. The timing of a paradigm shift depends on a 
variety of factors, including the significance of the anomalies, the flexibility of 
the establishment in handling discontent, and crucially, the availability of an 
alternative paradigm capable of invoking a wide appeal. Both internal and 
external factors contribute to the paradigm's appeal. On the internal level, it 
depends on the credibility of its advocates, as well as the numbers within society 
that feel alienated under the old paradigm. On the other hand, the new paradigm 
would be likely to have a stronger appeal if it accentuated a scherne of demands 
at the local level that were identical to rising trends at the international level. 
The clearest indication of the emergence of the new paradigm appeared during 
the legislative elections of 1996, where the pragmatic-liberal candidates of the 
Kargozarän party had a surprising success despite the immense efforts by the 
conservatives to block their way to the Majlis. The conservatives wanted to trade 
on the explosive rates of inflation (56 per cent in 1994) and the soaring of the 
consumer prices (96 per cent in 1993) which had resulted from the removal of the 
price control system in 1993, in order to lure the electorate away from those 
regarded as liberals. To the surprise of all factions, the party responsible for those 
unpleasant policies attracted a considerable number of votes, indicating that the 
people were actually yearning for change and ready to bear its cost. 
The left wing seems to have absorbed that lesson very profoundly. After that, its 
language changed substantially and the language of democracy and liberalism 
became the hegemonic theme in its publications and public meetings. A few 
months ahead of the 1997 presidential elections, the anti-conservative groups 
united their forces to promote Muhammad Khatami and his reformist agenda. 
The rise of Khatami to the presidency of the Islamic Republic is to be viewed as 
the turning point at which the new paradigm started to establish itself in the 
1 35 Kuhn, op. cit., p. 206. 
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political theatre. At that juncture, the new paradigm was still vague, yet clearly 
different from the old one in various respects. 
The New Paradigm 
The conservatives did not underestimate the implications of the reformist 
rise to power. Their resistance took various forms, from violent assaults on the 
persons and meetings, including assassination at the early stage, to the excessive 
use of the courts at later stages. After 1997, many reformist figures were arrested 
and their publications closed. The hardline-dominated Judiciary shut down 
thirteen publications in 2000, and forty-four in the following year. ' 36 A total of 
85 papers including forty-one dailies had been closed by 2003,137 including all the 
publications of the major reformist parties. 
The refonnist emphasis on the sovereignty of the law has effectively 
forced the conservatives to distance themselves from mob-like politics and 
particularly to denounce the actions of such minor groups as Ansdr-e Hizbo//äh 
which used to justify its disruptive actions on the basis of protecting religion and 
the revolution. 138 It has to be noted here that the supreme leader, Ayatollah 
Khamenei, has never shown any support for such actions, in public at least. 
Nevertheless, many of his close allies, some of whom hold official posts, and 
other notables in the religious seminaries, including Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, 
did not hesitate to support the use of violence against the reformists and other 
liberal politicians. At any rate, the tendency of the conservatives to rely on the 
law, albeit in an extremely excessive fashion, served to expose the gap that was 
growing between the two paradigms. It has also worsened the split over the 
reform process in both the state institutions and society. 
13" Samii, A. W., 'Sisyphus' Newsstand: the Iranian Press under Khatami', Xf R/A, vol. 5, no. 3 
(Scp., 2001). E. edition: http: //ineria. idc. ac. il/journal! 2001/issuc3/jv5n3al. html 
137 Reporters without Borders (organisation). 'Iran Annual Report 2003', 
www. Tsf. org/article. php3? id_articlc=5392&var 
- 
Techerchc=iran 
13" For some information on the group, see Murtaji, H., Jenah-hic Siäsi dar Iran Emrooz, p. 163. 
Also: Shadlo, A., Ettc/a'iti darbäre}geh Ahzib va Jcnäh-hiyc Sl si /ran Emrooz. p. 179. On its 
violent propensities and relations with the other conservative factions, see Iran, Dec., 23 and 
24,2003 (interview with M. Namaki). Also: ISNA, May, 27,2003. Also: ILNA, Dec., 6,2003 
(www. i ina. ir/showncws. asp? code=56176&code I= 1). 
99 
In Chapter II it was argued that the rise of the Islamic Republic put an 
end to the state-society split which emanated from the antipathy between the 
state and religion. In the following phase, a new division arose between two 
versions of religion and consequently two models of rule: one which was 
authoritarian, grounded in traditions and one which was democratic affiliated to 
modernity. Both versions have strong support from the state and society. 
Nevertheless, the authoritarian paradigm has the lead in the state system while 
the other has the lead in the society. Since 1997, most of the opinion polls have 
shown that the reformists enjoy a widening appeal among the public 
notwithstanding their recent setbacks and the overwhelming control of the mass 
media by the rival faction. 139 During their eight-year rule, the reformists made 
enormous efforts through the parliament and the government to improve the 
political environment and the state-society relations. They succeeded in some 
respects and failed in others. The viability of the paradigm should consider the 
framework it had set for itself. In this regard, President Khatami defined his 
goals in terms of comprehensive and sustainable development. 
14" He explained 
this mission in a fashion closely similar to the concept of `human development' 
which was redefined and propagated by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). According to this concept, the aim of political development is 
defined as that which creates a social environment conducive to democracy, or an 
`enabling environment' in order to broaden human choices. 
'4' 
Given this sense, the main emphasis is put on the structural and institutional 
changes which serve to enhance the role of the people. To this extent, the 
reformist paradigm could be credited with some appreciable achievements, 
including: 
13' See for example the results of the opinion poll regarding the legislative elections (Jan., 2004). 
The official website of the Constitutional Council. 
(www. irisn. coin/akhbar/1392/13821029/13821029_irisn 00005. htm). Other polls conducted by 
a conservative faction in March and April 2005 regarding the possible voting in the eminent 
presidential elections, gave the reformist candidate 16,6 percent while the support of the 
conservative candidates have ranged from 13.8 to 5.9 percent. The polls were contributed to by 
nearly 55000 internet users inside Iran. Baztab, Apr. 14,2005, 
www. baztab. coin/news/23294. php 
140 Khatami, M., Tavse'ah Siisi, p. 41. 
141 United Nations & IRI Plan and Budget Org., Human Development Report of the Islamic 
Republic of/ran, 199?, p. 132. 
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Expanding the Scope of Political Participation: 
Local Councils: The first local election was held in February 1999 as a 
part of the reformist principle of democracy at the grass-root level. According to 
Articles 100-106 of the Constitution, regional and local affairs are to be 
administered by locally-elected councils. An executive bill was passed by the 
Majlis in 1982 but remained suspended because the ruling elite feared that such a 
huge process could not be manageable. '42 In the first election, 328,826 male and 
7276 female candidates contested 236,138 council seats. The women made a 
relatively remarkable gain of 300 seats. 143 Local councils are seen as a means to 
breaking the monopoly on power by the centrally-based elite. They also provide a 
practical framework for helping the local and emerging elites to get acquainted 
with political skills and tactics, thus preparing them to pursue political careers at 
the national level. As for minorities, small communal and ethnic groups, the local 
elections provided an opportunity for partaking in the political process although 
their actual strength did not help them to contest at the national level. 
Political and Interest Groups Although the Party Bill was put into effect 
after 1988, only a few groups took advantage by applying for fonnal permission. 
Until the mid-1990s the political scene was fairly inactive due to the sense of 
uncertainty regarding the ruling elite's real intentions in the post-Khomeini 
period. The emergence of the reformists in 1997 unleashed a fresh spirit inciting 
most Iranians to believe that tangible change could be made by employing the 
power of public opinion. Official statistics show that until May 1997, six 
political parties and twenty-nine professional and interest organisations were 
recognised by the government. The figures rose sharply to 114 parties and 171 
1"2 Iran, Jan.. 20,2003. 
14 On the 1999 local elections and their implications, sec Tajbakhsh, Kian, 'Political 
Decentralization and the Creation of Local Government in Iran', Social Rcscarch, vol. 67, no. 
2, (Summer 2000), pp. 377-404. For a statistical account on women's participation, see 
'Women's Participation in Local Councils' in Namazi, Baqucr (cd. ), Iranian NGO. +: Situation 
Analysis, (2000), c. edition: 
www. iranngos. org/reports/Sit uationAnalysis/009_l OWoinenPart. htin 
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interest groups during the period of 1997-2004 among which thirty-five 
organisat ions belonged to religious minorities. 
144 
The non-governmental organisations saw the same fortune under the 
reformist rule; according to Fakhr al-Sadat Mohtashemi, the Assistant Minister 
of Internal Affairs for Women, women NGOs in 2003 numbered around 600145 
out of a total of 2500 operating in Iran. In 1997 the number of women NGOs was 
estimated at 75.146 These figures do not include community-based organisations 
(CBOs) which are far higher than these figures and fall into a different 
categorisation. 147 The total number of NGOs and CBOs is estimated at 20,000.1; ' 
In respect of youth organisations, the school-based associations pose the largest 
organised activity in the country. The Union of the Islamic Pupils Associations 
consists of 8000 groups operating in the middle and high schools. According to 
one report, the central committee of the Union includes 60,000 members, 
representing 460,000 pupils in 9500 schools. 149 The university-based 
organisations are estimated by the Higher Education Minister to number 2500, 
representing 20 per cent of all university students. 150 
Media and Publications The rise of a faith in the power of public opinion 
and the desire to take part in the political process have been reflected in the 
media which has made vigorous advances under reformist rule, as applications 
for new periodicals have increased, according to the Minister for Islamic 
Guidance, from 591 in 1997 to 2622 in 2003. By the end of 2003, the private 
144 /ran, Aug., 22,2004, citing 'Ali Bageri, GM of political affairs in the Internal Ministry. 
145 Emrooz, Jul., 8,2003. 
146 Shargh, Nov.. 17,2003. 
147 Namazi, op. cit., www. iranngos. org/reports/SituationAnalysis/003Suininary. htin 
148 Iran NGO Resource Center (Hamyaran), 
www. hainyaran. org/projs_act ivs/ngo_cominunity_bui lding. htin 
149 /RNA, Feb., 6,2003, and JLNA, Jul., 9,2004, 
http: //www. iina. ir/shownews. asp? codc=l 11738&codc 1=3 
15" Cited in , l/OSNAD. www. inosnad. coinNcws/telexu. litin (accessed Jan., 22,2005) 
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sector was granted 1931 permissions, representing 80 per cent of all the 
periodicals of the country. 151 
Economic Reforms 
Khatami's government carried on the reform program of the preceding 
government, but with more emphasis on its political implications and effects on 
the course of democratisation. In his 2004 budget speech before the Majlis, 
Khatarni defined the function of reform as being to 
redirect the closed, centralised, uncompetitive and state- 
controlled economy towards one led by the private sector, 
ensuring a pivotal role for the people, and actively interacting 
with the international market. 152 
To advance this mission, Khatami's government had to deal with the 
same hurdles that brought the reform program of the previous government nearly 
to a halt. It seems, however, that the overall improvement of the economy has 
helped with the continuation of liberalising policies, despite the constant 
pressures on low-income groups. The government secured renewed support from 
the business community by allowing it to ally with foreign contractors to execute 
some of the major projects in the oil sector, factory building, dams and other 
infrastructural projects. The previous government had taken a twofold course: it 
pursued the course of privatisation but concurrently tolerated the expansion of 
the public sector. This process took the form of founding second and third 
generations of state-owned companies to execute national and infrastructural 
projects. According to Hashmiän, the deputy minister of finance, the first 
generation included 176 fines, the second generation includes nearly 500 firms, 
and the third generation consisted of more than 1000 firms in which the state 
holds more than a 50 percent share. ' 53 
After 2002 at least, Khatarni's government came to the conclusion that a 
full-scale shift towards a market economy could not be achieved without dealing 
decisively with the legal and cultural barriers inherent in the revolutionary 
'51 ISNA, Nov., 3,2004. www. isna. ir/news/NcwsPrint. asp? id=451749. 
152 Iran, Jan., 10,2005. 
153 Hainshahr% Sep., 14,2002. 
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paradigm, notably the constitutional favouring of the public sector and the 
perception that profit and foreign investments are linked to exploitation. Article 
44 of the Constitution states that: 
All large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major 
minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams, and large- 
scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and 
telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the 
like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the state 
Along the same lines, Article 81 forbids the foreign investments which 
involve concessions granted by the government in any sector of the economy 
including commerce, industry, agriculture, service, and mineral extraction. 
Article 82 stipulates the consent of the parliament upon the employment of 
foreign experts. 
The efforts of the reformist government succeeded in breaking the legal 
deadlock by passing a new law to encourage and support foreign investment, 
despite the opposition of the Constitutional Council. 154 Other laws permitting 
the establishment of private banks, insurance, and large industrial firms were also 
passed. The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (2005-2010) envisages a major 
transformation of the economy by expanding the program of privatisation and 
allowing foreign and private firms to enter sectors that hitherto have been 
monopolised by the state, including telecommunications, public transport, 
mining, heavy industry, oil and chemicals and power stations. The plan was 
passed by the predominately-reformist sixth Majlis but rejected by the 
Constitutional Council. The council made 112 objections, most of which relate 
to Article 44. Thirty-six objections relate to Article 85, which forbids the 
delegation of state powers to individuals or institutions outside the system. 'ss 
The newly-elected seventh Majlis, which is dominated by the conservatives, 
supported the position of the Constitutional Council. It seems, however, that the 
plan will go on as formulated by the government since it fulfils the objectives 
154 `The Law for Attracting and Supporting Foreign Investment' was passed by the Parliament in 
March 2002, but rejected by the Council for the Maintenance of the Constitution. In May the 
Expediency Council rebuked the fonner council's arguments and endorsed the law. Sec: 
www. g,; i. ir/? Iang=fa&p=26-06 
'55 For details, see Iran, Aug., 4,2004. 
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included in the twenty-year vision which was adopted by the Expediency Council 
and endorsed by the supreme leader in October 2004 as the basis for the state 
policy until 2025. 
The above reservations were already addressed by the Expediency 
Council, which introduced in December a new elaboration on Article 44 of the 
Constitution, paving the way for the privatisation of most of the public sector, 
including the so-called `mother industries' and large-scale businesses. The ruling 
aims, according to Mohsen Rezä'ie, the Council secretary general, to shift 
predominance in the economy from the public to the private sector and `to 
facilitate the implementation of the twenty-year plan'. ' 56 No other institution 
can revoke the rulings of the Expediency Council. Given the new consensus 
among the ruling elite on the course of refonn, the program of privatisation 
seems to have gathered momentum; according to the chief of the privatisation 
office, 221 companies were to be sold through the Stock Exchange by March 
2005, up from 52 sold in the previous fiscal year (March 2003-March 2004). 157 
With the revision of Article 44 and the likely endorsement of the fourth 
development plan, Iran seems to have put an end to the long-running controversy 
over the nature of its economic system. This step has effectively drawn the final 
line under the ideology of social justice through state controlling of the market 
which was adopted and experienced without success for more than twenty years. 
Conclusion 
The chapter tried to analyse the rise of the reformist trend and its 
implications for the political system. It takes the theory of paradigm shift 
proposed by the American philosopher Thomas Kuhn to explain the political 
development in the Islamic Republic. The discussion shows that the anomalies 
which instigated the breakdown of the revolutionary paradigm lie in its very 
foundation, notably the lack of a sophisticated ideology and the heterogeneity of 
'5" IRIBiVcwc, Dec., 11,2004. www. iribncws. ir/Full_cn. asp'? ncws_id=183904&n=14 
157 Sharsh. Aug., 9,2004. 
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the ruling elite in the early post-revolutionary period. The two factors 
contributed to the rise of an interventionist state. This system has proved 
incapable of addressing the problems of the country, particularly during the time 
of war and when faced with international pressures. The chapter examined the 
application of the revolutionary concept of justice in the economic and political 
spheres. 
The conclusion of the war with Iraq and the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1989 provided the opportunity for the pragmatic segment of the 
elite to redirect the Islamic system towards a more realistic path. This 
development which took the form of the Policy of Adjustment, although 
concerned with the economy first and foremost, exposed the discrepancy 
between the regime's ideals and the actual practice, thus setting in motion the 
elements of a more fundamental change encompassing the political, economic 
and social spheres. The effects of the change have materialised in the rise of the 
reformist faction which holds conceptions of religion and government which are 
fundamentally incompatible with revolutionary ones. While the revolutionary 
paradigm is grounded mainly in religious and national traditions, the reformist 
one is closer to the model of liberal democracy. 
The actual experience of the Reformists shows that their achievement on 
the political level has been limited in comparison to their significant 
achievements on the structural and institutional levels. Under reformist rule, the 
scope of political participation was expanded through the restoration of the local 
government system and the enhancement of the presence of civil society, 
political parties and an independent media. A breakthrough was made by 
achieving a consensus among the ruling elite to shift predominance in the 
economy from the public to the private sector. This was particularly affirmed by 
a new elaboration on the Constitution, removing all barriers which hitherto had 
hindered economic liberalisation. 
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Chapter IV 
The Conservative Vision of the State 
In chapter II, it was shown that Ayatollah Khomeini's discourse has 
combined modern and traditional notions. His tendency was to bring together all 
the factions who accept his particular conception of Shi'isr and religious 
authority. This broad coalition, once named Khatt-e Imam (the Line of the 
Imam), or Nirouhy-e Maktabl (Devout Forces), has dominated the post- 
revolutionary state. After Khomeini died in 1989, each of the modernist and 
traditionalist trends sought to develop its initial premise into a distinct political 
ideology. From a cultural point of view, the conservative faction represents the 
traditional Islamic trend, while the modern one is represented by the reformists. 
It expands on Khomeini's doctrine of wiläyat al-fagih in respect of the role of 
clergy but distances itself from the modern notions combined in his discourse. 
Being nurtured within the traditional spectrum, the conservative trend 
enjoys a deep-seated position in Iranian society. Hajari, a veteran revolutionary 
figure, takes it for the `original' trend of Iranian society. He argues that "every 
one of us bears some elements of conservatism. In Iran, religiosity and 
nationalism arc closely associated with conservatism or bear conservative 
implications". ' The faction had the opportunity to articulate its political 
ideology only after the rise of the Islamic Republic. Only recently have such 
notions as republicanism, elections, general will, accountability, and so on, 
become common in the trend's literature, thanks to Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
opened the flood-gates and made it possible to rethink many of the notions that 
hitherto were unquestionable if not completely ignored. 
The core of my argument suggests that the engaging of Shi'i political 
doctrine in the actual exercise of power will serve its evolution. In the first 
chapter, I have discussed the course of the doctrine's evolution up to the 1979 
I Iajad. hlohscn. 'Mugaddamah bar Sinkh-shcnasi Rast dar Iran', interview, Chashm-3nthz Iran. 
Vol. 9, (June 2001), 59-66, p. 59. 
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Islamic Revolution, which resulted in the emergence of the theory of wiläyat al- 
fagih. Since then, many unforeseen issues have arisen and challenged the 
professed doctrine. In the following pages, I am going to show how these issues 
have been addressed by the advocates of the established paradigm. 
Like every discourse, the conservatives' points of view are conditioned by 
the particular paradigm in which they are grounded. A fair judgment about them 
should consider the main features of that paradigm. My comparison between the 
conservative and liberal views aims at a better understanding rather than 
judgment. However, one might not escape the possible slip into judgment. 
I will rely mainly on the works of the notable conservative figures. The 
various works of Misbäh Yazd and M. Jawäd Lärijäni, whose discussion of 
political issues is conditioned by traditional SW ii jurisprudence, represent 
mainstream conservatism. The two are probably the most influential theorists 
within the trend. 
Ayatollah Muhammad Tagi Misbäl) Yazdi is an outspoken cleric and a 
close adviser to the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah `Ali Khamenei). Threads of 
ancient Greek philosophical views regarding political roles and actions arc 
common in his and his disciples' works. Muhammad Jawäd Lärijäni, a Western- 
educated intellectual, is the assistant to the Chief Justice for international 
relations. He is also the founder and director of the Institute for Studies in 
Theoretical Physics and Mathematics (IPM), a respected institution in Iran. Most 
of L. rijäni's writings are dedicated to explaining his proposal of "the self- 
legitimated government", a political doctrine presented as an alternative to 
liberalism. Among the conservative thinkers, Larijäni seems most familiar with 
the liberal discourse. He introduces his proposals in the form of a comparison 
with liberalism; his critique of the latter is not, however, coherent or compelling. 
Both Yazdi and Larijäni advocate what they deem to be a distinct course of 
political evolution appropriate to the religious perspective and distinct from the 
model of liberal democracy. 
I will also cite other conservative thinkers whose works bring a fresh 
perspective to the trend's discourse. `Amid Zanjüni's Figh-c Shasi (Political 
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Jurisprudence) (1998) offers a detailed account of the normative principles 
underpinning the 1980 constitution of the Islamic Republic. He provides for a 
better understanding of the correspondence between Islamic political values and 
modern constitutionalism. Sädiq Hagiqat's TaLvzi`e Qudrat dar Figh Shia 
(Power Distribution in Shi i Jurisprudence) (2002) provides a good analysis of 
the idea of power distribution from a jurisprudential perspective. The book 
introduces the opinions of a considerable number of Shia scholars in this 
respect. 'Abbas Qacmmagämi's Qudrat wa Mashrou`iat (Power and Legitimacy) 
(2000) represents a new approach to the nature of religious authority, its sources, 
and the role of the fagih in relation to the elected institutions of the state. 
The conservative faction is distinguished within the broader traditional 
Shi'ism for being politically active and by its tendency to `change in order to 
conserve'. Traditional Shi'isrn is historically known for being apathetic and 
sceptical about all kinds of change. The faction was designated as being 
conservative initially by its leftist rivals. 2 Gradually, this cane to be a common 
designation and occasionally used by the camp itself. Nevertheless, the camp 
prefers to be known as iici lgard (advocates of the principles) or arzeshi (value- 
centring) to signify its commitment to the fundamental principles of the religion 
in comparison to its reformist rivals who are accused of liberalism. 3 
According to Heywood, five central themes are common to the trends of 
conservatism, namely: tradition, human imperfection, organic society, authority 
and property. 4 These definitions are applicable to Iranian conservatism within 
certain limits, but not to the modern conservative trend (or `the modern right' as 
it is commonly known) which shows certain similarities to the reformists in some 
respects. 
Probably the most distinctive characteristic of the Iranian conservatives 
is their high regard for the traditional pattern of socialisation. For them, social 
norms and institutions have an element of sanctity, not because they arc 
2 Shari'atmadaii, H., Kayhan. Aug., 21,2004, p. 2. www. kayhanncws. ir/930531/2. htin. 
' Belinoud. M., 'Mushkel-c nämgozäri Gurouha dar Daroun Jumhouii Islämi', BBC, (Farsi service) 
Apr.. 4,2004. www. bbc. co. uk/persian/iran/030317 
_a-inb-iran-factions. 
shtml. 
4 Heywood, Andrew, Political Ideologies, (New York 1999), p. 69. 
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themselves religiously sanctified, but because they are seen as necessary for 
preserving the religious pattern of behaviour. Issues like dress code, patterns of 
leisure and the criticism of traditions are among their salient concerns. During 
the 1990s the conservative-dominated parliament ousted two ministers of culture 
simply because they were regarded as too lax with the growing liberalism in the 
local media. 
The Conservative Doctrine of Power 
The conservative faction upholds the established Shi i doctrine of power 
as the major foundation of the Islamic regime and the source of its legitimacy. In 
Kadivar's account, four intellectual factors have contributed to the making of the 
doctrine of power in traditional Shi'ism, namely: 1) The doctrine of designated 
imamate inherent in Shi'1 theology; 2) Plato's idea of the philosopher-king; 3) 
the idea of absolute authority acquired by the perfect man in Ibn al-`Arabi's 
gnostic writings, and 4) the Persian wisdom of kingship. 5 In the following pages, 
I will shed some light on the above factors, for they form the background for the 
majority of views common in conservative discourse, after which I will turn to 
discuss how these views arc translated into political positions: 
1) As shown in chapter 1, the aspiration for divine justice in Shi`ism was 
closely linked to the notion of a divinely-designated imamate, according to 
which the possibility of a legitimate government is contingent upon one of the 
Twelve Imams assuming power. The Shi'i doctrine of imamate was developed to 
substantiate the right of `Ali ibn Abi Tälib and his decendents to succeed the 
Prophet as the leaders of the Muslim community. Despite the fierce disputes over 
the superiority of the imams in terms of their leadership qualities, the focus of 
the doctrine has been that the Twelve Imams are designated by God. The 
attachment of charisma, whether personal or divinely-ordained, to the leader 
was, according to Montgomery Watt, a dominant idea in the Shi i thought. 6 To 
this extent, the notions of justice and legitimacy came to be symbolised by the 
5 Kadivar, Mohsen, Daghdaghah-hyc Hukcirnat-c Dini, p. 165. 
6 Montgomery Watt, William, The Significance of Early Stage of Imami Shi'ism', in Kcddie, N., 
(cd. ) Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven. 1993) p. 21. 
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person of the infallible ima n. It follows that authority is either legitimate, i. e. 
headed by the imäin, or ghasb (usurped), which stands for all other authorities. 
7 
The major concern remained attached to the ruler, whereas the state as an 
independent institution has not attracted much attention among SW N scholarly 
circles until recently. 
In the later debates, the state came to be perceived as a conventional 
institution and legitimacy was linked to its performance. This new perception 
reflected a general tendency among tenth century Muslim scholars to handle the 
puzzling situation raised by the Buyid Shi`i warlords who took over the court of 
the caliphate in Baghdad. In this case the de facto authority of the usurper was 
acknowledged on an ethical basis, i. e to avert public disorder or fitnah. R This 
tendency has been common among Shia scholars, and gained more currency 
with the rise of the Safavids in 1501. Nevertheless, the ideal type of legitimate 
state remained, at least theoretically, the one supervised by the imam or his 
deputy, i. e. the qualified mujtahid. 
2) In Plato's Republic, society comprises three layers corresponding to 
three levels of the individual's soul, namely: the common people, the soldiers and 
the guardians. Socrates gives an illustration of the statesman as a specialist who 
practices an art upon a community of non-specialists. 9 The possession of 
knowledge is regarded as the fundamental source of authority. It follows that a 
wise ruler might rule without being fettered by the law. '(' Plato maintains that an 
ideal city is to be ruled by a philosopher-king entrusted with the title of 
guardian. " The philosopher is distinguished by his acquaintance with justice, 
beauty, truth and the real knowledge of things. 12 According to Lambton, Shi i 
circles became familiar with the notion of the philosopher-king through the 
works of Kulayni and Ibn Babawayh, the two influential Sh 'a scholars of the 
' Yazdi. Misbäh, Neg h-c Gozarä be li'iIiiyat-c Fagih,, (Quin 1999) p. 53. 
Shalaq, Alfadl. Al-Ummah wa al-Dawlah, p. 52. 
Skcmp, J. B., Plato's Statesnan, (London 1997), p. 40. 
Stern, Paul, 'The Rule of Wisdom and the Rule of Law in Plato's Statesman', The American 
Political Science Review, vol. 91, issue 2 (June 1997) 264-276, pp. 267-9. 
Plato, The Republic. translated by Desmond Lee, (London 2003), p. 192. 
12 Plato, ibid.. p. 199. 
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tenth century. In her view, the theory of power that they proposed had bridged 
the gap between the political thought developed by the earlier Islamic scholars 
and the Greek philosophical traditions. 13 
The link between knowledge and authority has profoundly influenced 
Shia scholars. In the theoretical grounding of the exemplar's authority, the only 
principle agreed upon is the idea that the uninformed individual is logically 
obliged to refer to (and indeed obey) the advice of the informed. '4 The same 
argument was employed to establish the superiority of infallible imams over 
other rulcrs. 1 5 Garawian, a notable cleric, acknowledges the Greek origin of the 
notion, but argues that it seems very close to Islamic principles: `knowledge, 
wisdom, and science have a self-evident authority over their antitheses'. In this 
sense, it is argued, authoritarianism is not unethical if supported by scientific proof: 
Under an Islamic government, there must be a bit of 
authoritarianism, however justified - in other words, an authoritarian 
government based on logic and scientific proof. I believe that wilayat 
al-faqih represents such a type of government. 16 
The idea of the superiority of the learned (in the social and political 
senses) has a wide currency among Muslim thinkers, including Sunni scholars. 
For instance, Tabari (d. 923), a famous jurist and commentator on the Holy 
Qur'an, applies the Quranic notion of wAli al-`amr(=the guardian/ruler) to the 
qualified scholar, who has a greater right to be obeyed than the king. 
" 
Conversely, it is not strange to anticipate scholars who deny the association of 
rulcrship with knowledge in the jurisprudential sense. Esfahani, an influential 
Shia scholar (d. 1942), rejects the idea as extreme and argues that: 
The jurisprudent is qualified to theorise and interpret, whereas [the 
position of] rulcrship requires highly developed skills in public 
administration, organising the defense of the nation and so on. It is 
far from reasonable to entrust that job to the fagih pcrsc. " 
1` Cited in Akhavi, S., Religion and Politics in Contemporary /ran, (Albany 1990), p. 9. 
14 41ontazcri, I lusayn 'Ali, Dirasit r M/dyat al-Fagih. (Beirut 1988) vol. 2, p. 102. 
15 Esfahan, Muhammad H., H shiat a/-A4ak; isib, vol. I, p. 214. 
16 Cited in Sa'eed Hajjariän, Jwnhouriat, (Tehran. 2000) p. 786. 
" Tabari, Ibn Jarir, June' a/-Bayin, (Beirut 1995) vol. 5. p. 206. 
IX Esfahäni, op. cit., p. 215. 
Esfahini's argument is very similar to the one advanced by Steinberger, 
who challenged the idea of the philosopher-king as paradoxical and logically 
inconsistent. In his view, the philosopher is concerned with the formulation of 
ideas, whereas the guardian's role is more technical and concerned with 
achieving previously-established ends. 19 
3) Muhammad J. Lärijänt, the outspoken conservative theorist, maintains 
that the religious state is distinguished by the kind of objectives it seeks to 
achieve. For him, state objectives are defined according to the religious concept 
of `the purpose of life' namely, human perfection. 2(' The notion can be traced 
back to ancient Greek philosophy. It was embraced by many Muslim thinkers, 
notably Muhyiddin Ibn `Arabi, the mystic and philosopher of the thirteenth 
century. I-Icre I will use the account of Jane Clark who has made a thorough 
comparison between the notion of `the perfect man' according to Aristotle (d. 
322 BC) and Ibn `Arabi (d. 1240). The Greek philosopher holds that the intellect 
is the highest faculty of the human spirit. The intellect develops from 
potentiality into actuality when it functions. For Aristotle, man has to perfect 
himself by acquiring virtue, i. e. preferring and cultivating the good and good 
qualities. Knowledge, philosophy in particular, is the means by which virtue 
comes about. For Ibn `Arabi, divine revelation rather than reason is the first 
source for knowledge. Man can qualify for the reception of divinely ordained 
knowledge through purification and full submission to God. Should the self 
become pure, God will reveal himself and his knowledge in the heart whereby 
man reaches the state of perfection. In Ibn `Arabi's account, the heart is the point 
where all human faculties, including imagination, reason and sensory perception 
inter-relate and conjointly operate. When such a process is fully realised, man 
reaches his final state of perfection whereby the purpose of creation is fulfilled. ' 
The same approach was adopted by Zayn al-Din al-'XiiIi (known as `the Second 
Steinberger, Peter, 'Ruling: Guardians and Philosopher-Kings', The American Political Science 
Review, vol. 83, issue4 (Dec. 1999), 1207-1225: pp. 1207,1213. 
Lärijäni, M., Naqd Din-ddri va Modemisrn. (Tehran 1997), pp. 60-I. 
21 Clark, Jane, `Fulfilling our Potential: Ibn 'Arabi's Understanding of Man in a Contemporary 
Context', The Journal of'the Muhyiddin Ihn Arabi Society, vol. 30, (Autumn 2001). 
www . ibnarabisociety. orglclark. 
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Martyr'), an influential scholar of the sixteenth century (d. 1557). 22 In general, 
the notion of `the perfect man' was upheld by a considerable number of 
theologians and philosophers in Iran including Sadr al-Din Shiräzº, Haydar Amuli 
and Faiz Kashäni. 23 As Shiräzi put it, God wanted man to be his representative 
on earth. Thus, the pursuit of perfection is the highest level of obedience to God. 
Should man reach perfection, he would qualify for the exalted position of God's 
agency (the caliph ofGoo. 24 
For Larijäni, the Islamic state is about `righteousness' which is realised 
through the addressing of the first and most crucial quest of man's life, i. e. 
perfection. The state is seen as worthy only if it undertakes that responsibility, 
otherwise it is not. 25 
4) According to Ridwan al-Sayyid, a Lebanese historian, the Covenant of 
Ardashir, a testament by Ardashir 1, the founder of the Sassanian Empire (AD 
212-24 1) was, probably, the most influential source of political theory among the 
Muslim scholars of the tenth century. One of its phrases, which explains the 
religion-state relation, was quoted forty-six times in different books written 
during that period. In this phrase, Ardashir suggested that `kingship and religion 
are twin brothers; religion is the foundation of kingship and kingship the 
protector of religion. Whatever lacks a protector perishes and whatever lacks a 
foundation is destroyed,. 26 Arjomand shares the same view with regard to the 
common tendency among Shia scholars. 27 His conclusion, however, does not 
apply as far as the contemporary Sh1'a jurists are considered. 2 
22 Al-'Amili, Zayn al-Din (the Second Martyr), Rasric/al-Shahid a/-Thani, (Quin 1989), vol. 2, 
pp. 139-143. 
21 Wa'czi, 'All. 'Wiläyat-c Mutlaga az Didgäh lbn 'Arabi va Moir Haidar Atnoli", Ma'refat 
quarterly, no. 49, (Dec. 2001). www. hawzah. net/Pcr/Magazine/inr/049/inrO4915. htin. 
Jalüü, Golamrezä, 'Nazarich Insin-c Kamil az 'Erfan Ibn 'Arabi ta'Erfän Imam Khomeini", 
Haitizah, no. 94-95. www. hawzah. nct/Pcr/Magazine/HO/094/HoO9412. htm. 
'` Lärijänt, op. cit., p. 61. 
26 Al-Sayyid, Ridwän, A/-Jarna'ah wa al-ltfujtama' wa al-Dawlah, (Beirut 1997), p. 396. 
27 Arjomand. S., The Shadow of God and the Hidden /mim, (Chicago 1994), p. 96. 
1 Arjomand suggests that, in Shi'ism, political and religious authority are clearly differentiated 
from each other to the extent that kingship could be legitimised only as temporal rule. This 
idea was applicable, however reservedly, until the late 1970s. From then on, Shi'i scholars 
113 
Both the notions of the philosopher-king and the religion-kingship 
interdependence were apparently introduced into religious Shi'a circles through 
various works from the tenth century and after. However, they seem to have 
gained wider currency after they were elaborated in Akhläq-e Nayiri an ethical- 
philosophical treatise by Nasir al-llin Tüsi, a highly respected Shia theologian 
(d. 1274). In this treatise, Tüsi suggests that an ideal political system would likely 
comprise three factors: divine law, a just king and an efficient administration of 
public resources. 29 The king is the essence of the political system, both in Plato's 
philosophy and Ardashir's testaments. The latter focuses on the king's role in 
respect of public order, whereas in Plato the point of focus is the king's wisdom. 
The Social System 
The point of discussion here is about the fundamental principles 
underpinning the political propositions of the conservative camp. Such issues as 
citizenship, public liberties, authority, and so on are conceptualised by this camp 
or the other with reference to its particular perception of socialisation and the 
way it ought to be. Each political ideology is grounded on a set of normative 
justifications, explaining, on the one hand, the state of affairs, and on the other 
hand the values to be realised through individual and collective actions. The 
conservative conception of socialisation is assessed here in comparison with its 
liberal counterpart, for this study assumes the progress towards democracy as the 
criterion against which the evolution of political thought in Iran is examined. 
Following the traditions of Thomas Hobbes, the social system is defined 
by the liberal theorists in terms of a social contract. 30 Before the state emerged, 
Hobbes suggests, individuals lived in a `state of nature' characterised by constant 
and harmful conflicts incited by individuals' intrinsic desire to possess and 
control. The individual is illustrated by Hobbes as possessive, self interested and 
self-sufficient. Prompted by their rationality, individuals willingly came to bring 
carne to link legitimacy to the fagih rulership. See Sachcdina. A., The Just Rulerin Twvelver 
Shi'ism, ( New York 1988) p. 26 . 
Cited in Arjomand, op. cit. 
Held, David, 'Central Perspectives on the Modern State', in McLennan, Hall, and Held 
(ed. ). The Idea of Modern State. (London 1984). p. 32. 
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about the institution of the state as a mediating body assigned to protect them 
and solve their conflicts . 
31 Thereafter, Hall suggests, the idea of `government 
with consent' stood at the centre of the modern conception of the state. In liberal 
theory, this was conceived wholly in individualistic terms. 32 Individualism 
asserts the priority of the individual over society, whereby the interests of the 
individual are best served by allowing him maximum freedom and responsibility 
to act on his own behalf. Accordingly, society is conceived as a collection of self- 
sufficient individuals whose progress will inevitably serve the welfare of the 
society. Politically, individualistic liberalism embodies an opposition to all kinds 
of external control. Hence it tends to restrict the application of the state's 
powers in the public sphere, namely, the maintenance of law and order and the 
handling of the conflicts of individuals' interests. 33 
Liberalism presumes that all values are man-centred and all individuals 
are morally equal. For the individualist liberals, the normative priority of the 
individual is conceived in two ways. First: all moral obligations and social 
arrangements stand in need of justification to the individual. Second: morality is 
conceived in a universalistic sense; morals acquire authority if they are accepted 
by all individuals. 34 Individualism thus came to be a central principle in the 
liberal discourse. As asserted by Geise: 
Any secular political theory must assume that the individual , or 
as Kant would have it, all rational beings see their actions as 
potentially meaningful and cvaluable, and that, as a consequence, 
rational self-direction, autonomy, and mutual respect constitute 
appropriate features of life within a good polity. 35 
Individualism, however, is a point of controversy, particularly with 
respect to the issue of morality, between two broad groups of liberals: those who 
31 Mansfield, Harvey, 'Self-Interest Rightly Understood', Political Theor.; vol. 23, no. 1, (Feb., 
1995), 49-66, p. 52. 
Hall. Stuart, 'The State in Question', in McLennan, Hall, and Held. op. cit., p. 24. 
13 Hall, John, Liberalism. - Politics, Ideology and the Market . (University of 
North Carolina Press, 
1999)p. 195. 
34 Carse, Alisa, 'The Liberal Individual: A Metaphisical or Moral Embarraament? ', Nods, vol. 28, 
no. 2 (June, 1994) 184-209, p. 185. 
35 Geisc, J. P., 'In Defence of Liberalism', The lVestem Political Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 3 (Sep., 
1991) 583-604, p. 593. 
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advocate the normative priority of the individual to the extreme, and the 
communitarians who argue for the moral requirements being justified on the 
basis of common welfare or the collective good of the scociety. 36 The latter trend 
also rejects the association of morality with individually-defined material 
interests. For Kant, "the only true categorical morality transcends empirical or 
material interests. Only so is morality free, and beauty, too, gives free 
satisfaction because it pleases without engaging interest". 37 
The conservative discourse dismisses the contractual nature of society as 
well as the independent identity of the individual. However, this topic has not 
been studied in detail by religious scholars. The available studies are few and 
highly biased. Misbäh Yazdi's AI-Mujtami' wa'a/-Tirlkh (1994) provides no 
precise conclusion on individualism or otherwise communitarianism. The bulk of 
the book is dedicated to illustrating his objections to both trends and promising a 
better Islamic alternative; but the result is that he has no coherent proposal. 3i` His 
argument, nevertheless, seems close to the perception held by the paternalistic 
trend of European conservatism which deals with the issue in a rather pragmatic 
fashion, i. e. emphasising `what works'. 39 It also mirrors the argument advanced 
by Larijäni, which suggests that the state-society relation revolves around the 
state's competence, i. e. its being a problem-solver. 40 
Larijäni dismisses the anthropological assumptions, namely the idea of 
`the state of nature' that led to the social contract in Hobbes's theory, as well as 
the definition of polity in terms of a contract and offers an alternative definition: 
"polity is a functional grouping tied up by a shared rationality... The essence of 
socialization is a collective action whose direction and objectives arc determined 
"' Carse, Alisa, op. cit., pp. 195-6. 
" Mansfield, Harvey, op. cit., p. 54. 
'" Yazd, Misbäh, AI-Mtjtamä` wa äI-Tarlkh nein Wejhat Nazaral-Quriln a/-Karhn(Tehran 
1994), translated by M. Khagani. 
39 Heywood, op. cit., p. 93. 
40 Lärijäni, op. cit., p. 75. 
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by a common rationality". 41 Lärijäni's definition mirrors to some extent John 
Locke's view of the state of nature and the pre-political society. 42 
Lärijäni argues that society existed before the individual, in the sense that 
the individual could not identify himself outside the society. Individuals join 
society out of their need for the benefits provided through social life. They make 
a voluntary decision involving an informed acceptance of a common rationality 
and its implications. 43 This conception implies that individual rights are not 
natural, as suggested by Hobbes. Rather, they are determined by the particular 
structure of the society and conditioned by its rationality. By the same token, the 
state does not represent the interests of individual citizens but the collective 
interests of the society. This argument is evidently identical to the European 
conservative conception of the state-society relation, where the society is 
conceived as an organic order that emerges naturally and out of the collective 
need of individuals for security and familiarity rather than as a contract. 44 
Larijäni faults the liberal conception of rationality as well as what he 
takes as an artificial association between rationality and the social contract. In 
his words: 
Liberalism restricts the rationality of action to its being calculable 
and in line with the witnessed realities... In this precept, the 
actor's intention and the meaning expressed through the action are 
completely ignored... 
Action becomes meaningful only if attached to the actor's 
identifying himself with the surrounding world, in the sense that 
he and his attitude arc not detached from responsibility towards 
the world he lives in... The biggest mistake of liberalism lies in its 
ignoring the attachment of man to his world... What an appalling 
41 Lärijäni, ibid, p. 192. 
12 Sec J. Locke, (1690) The Second Treatise of Civil Government, Ch. 1l, retrieved from 
www. constitution. org/jl/2ndtrO2. htin. Somers makes a similar argument to support her theory 
of civil society. She highlights Locke's idea of the pre-political society, especially its claimed 
capacity to be a self-organised, harmonious and fully functioning commercial community 
independent of the administrative state. Somers, M4., 'Narrating and Naturalizing Civil Society 
and Citizenship Theory: The Place of Political Culture and the Public Sphere', Sociological 
Thcorj, vol. 13, no. 3 (Nov., 1995) 229-274, p. 249. 
11 Larijäni, M. J., 'Islam: Dawlat-e Qadi n va Jadid', //uküinnt-c Is/m7,, (Summer 2000) no. 16. c. 
edition, www. nczam. org/persian/inagazine/0l6/03. htin. 
44 1 leywood, op. cit., p. 75. 
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confusion takes place that man is identified as rational if he 
acquires a kind of technical competence but his essence is 
ignored. 45 
Along the same lines, Yazdi faults Hobbes' idea of the self-sufficient 
individual, for it fails to apprehend the right course of the relationship between 
man and his world. He argues that there is a range of requirements for life that lie 
beyond the psychological and intellectual capacity of the individual. The 
individual is usually preoccupied by his immediate and calculable needs which 
arc regarded inferior to the moral and ontological ones. 46 According to Lärijänº, a 
social contract cannot always claim rationality. Simply because people are prone 
to error, they may agree on correct ends as well as incorrect or irrational ones. 
The latter cannot be deemed rational. 47 The idea expressed here links rationality 
to the action itself and not the actor. 
The major objective of the social order according to liberalism is the 
management of its members' conflicting interests, while in Islamic philosophy, 
Lärijäni holds, the major objective of socialisation is to help the evolution of all 
community members towards the highest degree possible of human perfection. 
This particular objective, the type of actions designed to reach it and the set of 
principles supporting them are all constituents of a collective rationality or 
shared belief. According to this perception, the conservative discourse 
distinguishes itself from the liberal by defining interests and actions in both 
moral and material terms. 4h It asserts also that moral questions are not left to the 
individual, since morality is derived from religion. Upon the basis of shared 
belief, the social identity is formed, good and bad are identified, and the structure 
of rights and duties is formulated. 49 
The conservative perception of identity and action reflects, to some 
extent, the communitarian idea of individual-self, rather than the individualistic 
45 Larijäni. Nagd... pp. 141-2. 
v Yazdi. M., Nazirich Siisi /slim, (Qum, 2001) p. 150. 
"Lärijäni, Nagd.., p. 150. 
;Y Larijäni, M., 'Isläm va Democracy', Ma'rclat, no. 12, (Spring 1995) e. edition, 
www. hawzah. net/Pcr/Magazine/inr/012/mrO 1204. htin. 
;" Larijäni. M., 'Hukümat-c Islärni va Marz-hic Siäsi', Hukarmat-clskiinl no. 2, (Winter 1996). c. 
edition, www. hawzah. nct/Per/Magazine/he/002/04. 
htin. 
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idea. The latter conception is criticised, for the individual-self is embedded in a 
community and identified within shared self-understandings which frame 
community life. As Sandel puts it, liberals have effectively devalued the good by 
leaving its definition open to the calculations of self-interested individuals. By 
comparison, there exists the prospect that all individuals might work for a 
morally worthy common good. 50 
Politically, that conservative conception of the individual-society relation 
is translated into the rejection of the social contract as the basis for the state- 
society relation. Asifi, another conservative scholar, suggests three implications 
of the social contract which contradict Islamic teachings: 1) The theory denies 
that anyone is superior to another (in the sense that he possesses a natural right 
of authority); 2) It acknowledges the individual right of self-determination; 3) It 
gives the individual the ultimate right to transfer the above right to whom he 
likes. The three principles, he contends, are not compatible with Islam, since, in 
the Holy Qur'an, God is superior to all humans; He is the only one to determine 
the fate of his creatures and finally, authority is determined by His teachings and 
not by man. 51 
On the other hand, the idea of the individual's natural rights is rejected as 
insufficient to foster a participatory society, as Larijäni argues. 52 Alternatively, 
he offers the idea of `duty' as the basis for socialisation. According to this 
perception, the member of the political community is obliged to remain 
politically active throughout his life. 53 He may elect his representative or be 
elected. In both cases he fulfils a social duty. On the same basis, public office is 
defined in terms of liability, rather than privilege. The implication of such a 
formulation is that the individual's political right is not the point at issue, but his 
duty, and thus his capacity to undertake responsibility, i. e. to serve others, at 
different levels. 
Sandel (1994), cited in Daryl Glaser, 'Nonnative Theory', in Marsh and Stoker (ed. ). Theory 
and Methods in Political Science (London 1995) p. 27. 
Asifi, M., 'Written Interview', 'U/t m-c Hadith. Retrieved on Feb., 9,2004, from 
http: //www. hadith. net/pcrsian/products/inagazi nc/oluin-f/07/002. htin. 
52 Larijäni, Naqd, op. cit., p. 192. 
53 Lärijsni, ibid., p. 69. 
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Citizenship 
The idea of citizenship signifies a set of constitutional rights enjoyed by 
the individuals before any allegiance to their state. Its modem concept was first 
developed during the American and French Revolutions. Its preference is for the 
term `citizen' over the older tern of `subject', which signifies an inferior status 
of a subordinate individual prepared to obey others unquestioningly. 54 Aristotle 
defines the citizen as the one who can `hold office'. This concept is fundamental 
to modern constitutionalism since it captures much of the idea of mutual 
responsibility between the state and individuals. 55 
The conservative perspective on citizenship is derived from the 
traditional Islamic concept of ra`lyyah (literally: `flock') which denotes a 
relationship between superior and inferior based on reciprocal caring and support. 
The oldest prescription of this kind of relation is the tradition attributed to 
Prophet Muhammad in which all members of the society were described as 
guardians or shepherds (rä`) responsible for those under their charge (ra'yyah). 
Another basic value is the Qur'änic concept of natural equality where all human 
beings arc seen as equal by birth (Holy Qur'an, 49: 13). The two concepts could 
have provided a coherent framework for the mutual rights and duties of the ruler 
and the ruled. Nevertheless, the historical evolution of the traditional Muslim 
state took a different direction whereby rights, especially in the political sense, 
were conferred on the rulers only, while ordinary people were commonly 
conceived as subjects. At certain conjunctures, some scholars have even gone 
further to regard the ruler as a sign of divine grace and the people's obedience as 
a thankful gesture to their Creator. s' Generally speaking, the concept of 
citizenship as a basis for certain political rights came to be part of the religious 
language only recently. Thereby, its connotations are not as extensively 
elaborated as in the Western tradition. 
54 For a brief discussion on the topic, sec Held, David, Modc/s of Democracy (Cambridge. 1997), 
p. 7S 
55 Scruton, R.. A Dictionary of Political Thought, (London, 1996), p. 71. 
56 Majlisi, M., cited in Nasin, M.. Dastour-c Shahriarin, (Tehran 1994), p. 21. 
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For Shi'ism in particular, political thought has evolved within the 
jurisprudential framework. Therefore, many of the normative values and concepts 
with political bearings have taken a jurisprudential form, 57 where the individual 
is perceived as a member of religious community, a believer or dutiful person 
(dindär) rather than a citizen. 59 Society is perceived by the traditional clergy as 
having a structure consisting of two layers: the infortned elite (khässah) and the 
general, uninformed people (`äinmah). 59 The informed elite comprises the holders 
of noble (i. e. religious) and ordinary knowledge. 60 One of the earliest - and 
widely cited - classifications of people, is found in the tradition attributed to the 
first imam, `Ali ibn Abi Tälib, in which people are divided into three categories: 
"the divinely-inspired scholar ( `slim rabbani), the disciple pursuing the course of 
salvation and the ignorant mobs (hamaj ru`d) who follow every pretender". 61 
This tradition, according to Sadr, was meant to describe people's attitude 
towards acquiring knowledge, 62 but it was widely taken as a nonnative 
classification of society's members, with the religious knowledge as the criterion 
to determine the social, and hence, political status of individuals. 63 Generally 
speaking, the clerical view of the general public is rather pessimistic, for there is 
a large body of authoritative statements, both sacred texts and scholarly writings 
attributing to general people ignorance and selfishness. This is one of the 
paradoxical tendencies within the Shia clergy, at least a considerable segment of 
them: they depend heavily on the general public for support but do not regard 
them as credible and rational. 
57 See, for example, the arguments of Fadlullah Noun: 'Hurmat-c Mashroutah, in Zargari-Naj; id. 
Ra. c c/Mashroutiat, (Tehran 1995), p. 160. 
`' Qacmmagämi, 'Abbas, Qudrat va Mashro'iat. (Tehran 2000) p. 112. 
5" Khamcnci 
, 'Ali. Ebrat-hic 'Ashüth: `Aw m va Khattiac. A speech to military commanders, 
(Tehran, June 9,1996 ) 
www. andishcgom. coin/HTM/lmain"/`2OHosean/HTM/Ebratha/htin/l. htin. accessed on Apr., 
13,2003. 
eu Al-Amili. Jamal al-Din, Ma'ilem al-Din, (Qum, n. d. ) p. 22. 
61 Sharif al-Radhi, Nahj a/-Ba/äghah, (Beirut, 1977), vol. 3, p. 186. 
42 Sadr, M. B., Mugaddamit Eal-Tafsiral-, Vfawdo'ci fi'l-Qur in, p. 195. c. edition, 
www. rafed. net/ftp/books/inogadainat. zip 
61 See for example Rohani, Ayatollah M. Sadiq, Nczim-e Hukumat dar /s/äm, article S. c. edition, 
retrieved on Apr., 13,2003, from: www. imainrohani. coin/farisi/kotob/hokoinat/01. htm#a09. 
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The question of constitutional rights came to be a very controversial issue 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s through the conservative faction's attempts to 
enforce its own conception of citizenship as the criterion for access to public 
office. In a community of believers, they argued, the axis of socialization was 
the shared belief rather than mutual interest. 64 Being a citizen does not 
sufficiently provide for political privilege or particular rights, Yazdi asserts. The 
right to occupy public office, especially those with a wide influence, should be 
determined by the acquisition of moral competence rather than natural or 
constitutional rights. He argues that: 
It is commonly understood that although citizens are, in principle, 
equal, their rights as well as access to the positions and privileges 
arc not as such... We believe that these rights should be 
originated in God's permission. Those who live in liberal societies 
or democratic societies, where God's teachings are not followed, 
say that only the public opinion is to be observed, but we say that, 
in addition to public opinion, God's permission has to be sought. 
There has to be no view, demand, or right contradicting God's 
permission and God's law. 65 
This assertion is natural, since political office is a `trust', says Lankaräni. 
It is to be held only by those who prove both capable and trusted. 66 Although the 
Islamic Republic constitution acknowledges relatively equal rights for the 
Iranians, 67 the traditional clerics were never happy with the idea of equal 
opportunity. Since the early 1980s, there have been constant attempts to redefine 
the constitutional criteria of political rights to match the idea of `trust' in strictly 
religious terms. 
The application of the above ideas has fuelled constant debates of which 
the most recent was the political crisis brought about by the Council of 
Guardians' disqualification of two thirds of the candidates for the legislative 
election of 2004. During the 1980s, the traditional clerics wanted to apply the 
64 Tagavi, M., 'Sokhani dar Mafhom Jäme'ah Dini', Figh Ah/-c-Bait, (Summer 1996). c. edition 
www. islamicfcgh. org/inagazines/Fcgh7f/taghav. htin. Accessed on Apr., 14,2003. 
`'` Yazdi, Misbäh, Nazarieh... , p. 31 I. 
`'`' Lankaräni, M., Theory 'Ada/at dar Htikwnat-c /slimi va wi/iyat-c Fagih, 
www. lankarani. org/persian/najlchi/teori. htinl. Accessed on Apr., 14,2004 
67 Zanjani, 'A., Figh Siäsi, (Tehran, 1999) vol. I, p. 566. 
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principle of `trust' as a universal criterion whereby all the applicants for state 
jobs had to prove religiosity and strict loyalty to the ruling clergy. The plans 
were opposed by Ayatollah Khomeini who ordered the dissolution of the 
committees assigned to investigate applicants. 69 In recent years, the issue has 
surfaced again over the right to stand for elected office. In 1995, the Council of 
Guardians of the Constitution was invested with the authority to investigate and 
determine the eligibility of the candidates for presidency, parliament and the 
Council of Experts. This power, known as Neurat-c E. stesvibi (literally: 
discretionary supervision) came to be the focus of contention in the political 
fray. 69 According to the Council, the qualities to be possessed by the 
parliamentary candidate include among others: a practical commitment to Islam, 
evident loyalty to the supreme leader, a good reputation, trustworthiness and 
reliability. It was also stated that merely being a Muslim is not a sufficient 
qualification since the parliament is assigned to guard the religion and provide 
for the promotion of ethics and virtues in the society which, in turn, requires 
perfect religiosity. Allegiance to the constitution is not sufficient either, for it 
will allow in the parliament members of illegal political groups. 70 In 2004, the 
majority of the reformist candidates were barred from standing for the general 
elections, simply because their loyalty to wiläyat al-fagih was not acknowledged 
as sincere. Among the names that appeared in the list of disqualifications there 
were 550 current and former MPs, ex-ministers and clergy members. In brief, 
citizenship in the conservative perspective does not provide for particular rights. 
The equality of citizens is acknowledged but the constitutional rights to equal 
access to public office are governed by other principles, notably the office being 
identified in terms of trust. 
614 On Khomeini's 8-article communique of December 1992, and the related declarations, see 
Mchrizi, M., ' Dawlat-c Dini va Harem Khusüsi', Hukriinal-e /. dätnT no. 12, (Summer 1999), e. 
edition. www. nezain. orb/persian/inagazine/012/04. htin. 
On the political implications of the arbitrary supervision, see Payindn, Iiabibullah, 'Nezärat-c 
Estesvabi Mugayer Huqüq Mellat', in Nezzrat-c Estcv bi, compiled and published by 
Daftar-c 
Tahkim Wahdat (Tehran 1999) p. 199. 
70 See the arguments put forward by the Council for the Guardianship of the Constitution against 
the amended bill of election passed by the parliament. /SABA, Apr.. I, 2003. 
123 
Legitimacy and the Rule of Law 
The question of legitimacy is concerned with two main issues: public 
consent and the legality of the government. In respect of the former, both the 
conservatives and reformists are agreed that the ruler should not impose himself 
upon the people without their consent. However, the nature of the consent and 
its legal implications are matters of dispute. 
Unlike the liberal democratic theories, political legitimacy in the 
traditional Shi i paradigm is not grounded in public consent. Authority is 
grounded in the relation between the Creator and the created. In this sense, 
legitimacy is defined in terms of righteousness (/1agqaniat), i. e. compliance with 
the divine revelation. 7' Central to the conservative perception of legitimacy is 
the Aristotelian concept of praxis or `virtuous action'. In Aristotle's philosophy, 
praxis denotes action which is itself the end, compared with poiesis or 
production, the type of action that is done for the sake of other things. 72 Larijäni 
employs the same formulation as the basis for legitimising political action and as 
an alternative to the recourse to legal framework or public consent. He suggests 
that "virtuous actions arc themselves legitimate whether they comply with 
certain laws or not". '} 
In respect of the rule of law, the major issue that draws attention is the 
constitutional limits on rule. The two notions are among the notable 
characteristics of the modern democratic state. Power limits are closely linked to 
legitimacy. 74 It is realised in mainly two ways: 1) the state's function has to be 
systematic, predictable and subject to pre-defined limits; 2) public office has to 
71 Yazdii, Nqz h-c.. , p. 54. 
72 Freeland, S., 'Aristotelian Actions', Nobs, vol. 19, no. 3. (Scp., 1985). 397-414, p. 397. 
Aristotle's concept of action has been criticised by Ackrill, for it explains nothing about 
'action' as it explains responsibility for motives, and the physiology of action. In addition, his 
morally-based distinction between action and production is incoherent. John Ackrilt, 'Aristotle 
on Action', , Hind, New Series, vol. 87, issue 348, (Oct., 1987) pp. 595-601. 
73 Larijäni, op. cit., p. 65. 
74 Bcctham, D.. The Legitimation of Power. (London 1991), pp. 35-6. 
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be defined impersonally in terms of roles, powers and functions. 75 Without the 
sovereignty of law, rulers cannot be held to account. 
Both notions are acknowledged by the conservative camp in the broad 
sense. Nevertheless, like many other notions, they are conceived and dealt with 
on different bases, and thus different scopes of applicability. Here I will focus on 
the applicability of the two notions to the authority of the supreme religious 
leader, since it is the core argument among the contesting factions in Iran. 
The key principle underlying the fagih's authority suggests that his main 
function is to interpret the religious laws needed by the society. The guidance of 
the fagih has a measure of sanctity since it expresses the Will of God. 76 Thus it 
might not be restricted to the definite boundaries of man-made laws. This is, 
however, acknowledged as far as the legislative role of fagih is concerned. Being 
it state leader, the fagih has to have the limits of his power justified on different 
bases. 77 
Apparently, until late 1987, the authority of the ruling fagih was 
commonly apprehended as being limited to the boundaries of the constitution. As 
the then President Khamenei told the congregation of Friday prayer in January 
1988, the supreme leader could not rule if the issue at question involves a 
possible violation of the constitution . 
7" A few days later, Ayatollah Khomeini 
blamed him for what he described as the failure to grasp the real significance of 
religious leadership. In this written statement, Khomeini asserted that the leader 
could unquestionably take whatever measures he sees as necessary to ensure the 
interests of country and religion; the leader can suspend minor religious 
obligations, laws and contracts, including legitimate contracts with the nation. '` 
Khomeini's statement caused a significant shift in the perception of the 
fagih's authority. From then on, it came to be described as `absolute' and was 
75 Hall. S., 'The State in Question', in McLennan, Hall and Held (cd. ) op. cit., p. 19. 
76 Narägi, Ahmad, 'Aw ed aJ-Ayynvn, (Quin 1989), p. 189. 
77 7_anj5ni. op. cit., p. 256. 
7% Khamcnei 
. 'Ali. 'Speech to the congregation of 
Friday Prayer' (Tehran, Jan., I, 1988). 
'`' Khomeini, Sahifeh Nür, (Tehran, 2004), vol. 20, p. 170. 
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added to the constitution in the 1989 amendment (article 57). K° Ayatollah 
Mo'men, a conservative notable, maintains that the powers of the fagih are 
determined by religious teachings and not the legal framework. 8' The fagih is 
authorised to change all kinds of laws, including the constitution, without 
seeking authorisation from any other institution. x2 In recent years, many of the 
liberalising policies of the reformist parliament were repeatedly blocked by 
recourse to the above argument. 83 In 2000, the Expediency Council ruled that the 
parliament was not authorised to check the institutions under the leader's 
supervision. 84 
So, how do the conservatives sec the value of the constitutional emphasis 
on legality and power limits? 
According to article 110 of the constitution, the supreme leader is 
invested with a wide range of essential and decisive powers. They include the 
formulation of macro-policies of the state, general mobilisation in the case of 
war, the supreme command of the armed forces, the nomination of high ranking 
officials, and so on. For the conservatives, these are just some examples - and 
not all - of the powers falling within the category of absolute authority invested 
in the ruling fayih. 85 In Lärijäni's account, the observation of the law by the 
religious leader is defined in terms of competence rather than legitimacy. Laws 
and rules are better seen as guide-lines whereby the following of pre-defined 
rules will more likely result in better outcomes. S6 The argument is based on the 
principle of praxis discussed above, whereby virtuous action is seen as self- 
"" For an account of the 1989 amendments, see Sadrä, 'Alireza, 'Barrasi Mugäyeseh-ei Qanün 
Asasi', Hük&mat-c /s/im!, no. 7, (Spring 1997) c. edition, 
www. nezain. org/pcrsian/inagazine/007/07. htin 
"' Momen, M., cited in Hagiqat, S., Tawzi'e Qm/rat, (Tehran 2002) p. 272. 
Yazdi, Misbilh., interview, Qudsdaily, (May 12,2001). 
x` 'Bunbast-c Qanün Tahgiq va Tafahus va Pishnahadh-ic Namiiycndegän Majlis" HamshahrZ 
(Tehran. July 2,2001). A number of the bills rejected on the above basis was published by 
Nourüz on 10,11,12,13. and 20 June 2002. 
"' liashemiän, Husayn, `Zarorat-e Tahgiq va Tafahus Mlajlis dar Urcour Keshwar", Hamshahri, 
June 26,2000. The Council amended the above rule in 2001 and the parliament was authorised 
to carry out the checks with the leader's approval. Hamshahri August 12,2001. 
xs Yazdi, Nc. y h-e,. p. 118. 
Lärijäni, op. cit. p. 78. 
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justifying and in no need of legitimisation from an external source. As suggested 
by Flagiqat, rules must not restrict the action intended to achieve legitimate 
objectives. 
87 
Republicanism and the Role of the People 
The assertion of a republican regime instigated by the Islamic revolution 
was unprecedented in the Shi i religious tradition. It has raised many questions 
concerning its implications, notably the attribution of sovereignty to the people. 
Since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, many of these questions have emerged 
as parts of the ongoing debates among the rival factions in Iranian politics. 
The first hint of conservative scepticism about republicanism emerged in 
April 1997, when Mo'talefeh, the major right wing party, approached the 
Expediency Council, the advisory body of the supreme leader, asking it to define 
the course through which the Islamic Republic would evolve into `the Islamic 
Just State'. "" The proposal has never been taken seriously, neither by the 
political factions nor by the leader. Nevertheless, it highlighted the idea that the 
republic is seen as a transitional stage between the secular monarchy and what is 
supposed to be a full Islamic state. 89 In the view of Misbah Yazdi, the republic is 
a form rather than principle: 
The republic should not be thought of as a standard form of 
government after which we are obliged to shape our regime... The 
vote for republicanism by the Muslim people of Iran was, in fact, 
more a rejection of the monarchy than an endorsement of a 
particular alternative. 90 
On his part, Garaweian, claims that Ayatollah Khomeini accepted the 
idea of a republic unwillingly and was never a republican. 91 
x' Hagiqat, op. cit. p. 272. 
XS Shorna, the weekly organ of Mo'talcfch, no. 7, (April, 10,1997). cited in Hajjariän, op. cit., p. 
302 
"' Kadivar, Muhsen, flz kümat-c Wilici, chapter 12, c. edition. 
www. kadivar. coin/Htin/Farsi/Books/BookO3/Chapl2. htin. 
Yazdi, Misbüh, Hukümat va Mashro'iat', Kitib-c iVagd no. 7, (Summer 1998), c. edition, 
http: //www. hawzah. net/Per/Magazine/KN/007/knOO703. htin. 
Garawei in, M.. Kayhan Farhangi vol. 156. (September 1999). Cited in Hajjarian, op. cit., p. 
786. 
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The reservations about republicanism stern from its major ingredient, i. e. 
the central role of the people. The points of concern here are the grounding of 
authority in public consent and the legislative role of the people's 
representatives. According to article 107 of the 1980 constitution, the supreme 
leader is selected by the Council of Experts whose members are elected by the 
people. The hint implied in this article is that public consent is the basis upon 
which the authority of the leader is granted and legitimised. 92 
The formation of the Council of Experts seems to have been a 
compromise to settle the traditionalist-modernist differences over the source of 
authority. It reflects, on the other hand, the elitist tendency inherent in Islamic 
traditions. In the Sunni schools, for instance, the ruler is selected by a group of 
higher elite. This is named as A1i1 al-hall wa al-'Aqd (literally: `the people who 
loosen and bind'), an informal body supposedly representing the various social 
forces. The structure of this body and the nature of its role remained open to 
different interpretations. 93 The idea of Ah! al-hall wa'/-`Aqd was developed by 
the constitution of the Islamic Republic into a formal body assigned to select the 
leader and monitor his performance (articles 107,111). 
For the conservative clergy, the process of election does not involve a 
conferment of authority, neither by the public upon their representatives nor by 
the latter upon the selected leader, since the people, says Yazdi, have never been 
in possession of power in order to be capable of conveying it onto the ruler. 
94 The 
role of experts, as defined by Ayatollah Mishkin, the incumbent head of the 
council, is to `discover' the candidate favoured by God, rather than conveying on 
him an authority entrusted by the people. 95 Makarem Shiräzi insists that the idea 
of election is absolutely alien to the traditions of Shi'ism: "there is not even a 
small hint of the notion in the works of Shia scholars". 96 
Arustd. M., 'Majlis Khobragän az Didgäh-e Nazarich Wilayat-c Fagih', Hukzin, at-c /s/i'77 no. 
R, (Summer 1999), c. edition, www. nezain. org/persian/magazine/008/04. 
htm. 
Juwaini, Abu al-Ma'äli, Giith a/-Una-m, (Alexandria 1979) pp. 79-99. 
94 Yazd;, op. cit. 
`'' Mishkin, 'Ali, Inauguratory speech before the Council of Experts. ' (Tehran, Mar., 20,2001) 
06 Shiräzi, Makärim, Buhrith Fiqhiyah Muhemmah. (Quin. n. d. ), p. 472. 
128 
There could be different reasons lying behind the attempted relegation of 
the political role of the people: 
First: in the doctrine of imamate, the authority emanates from above; 
absolute authority is transferred from God to the Prophet in the legislative sense, 
and through him to the imams and fagihs. 97 Therefore, as argued by Amoli, 
power is not the people's business. The legal status of the people is to observe 
the rules outlined by the legislator, and not to initiate them. 98 Although he 
dismisses the linkage between the authority of the leader and the public will, 
Amol holds that popular participation can be considered at some time in the 
future, provided the people have proved to have a strict adherence to religious 
values and jurist's rulership. He accepts the people's participation in the 
decision-making on the various affairs of the state other than that of the 
nomination of the supreme leader. Amoli admits, however, that such a perception 
is far from the one common in Western thought. " 
Second: in traditional Islam, legislation is seen as an exclusive 
prerogative of the `ulama' in their capacity as interpreters of the holy texts. I(K) 
The idea that parliament is a legislative institution has been one of the most 
controversial issues among the Islamists. The 1906 constitution had assigned a 
clerical body to ensure that parliamentary bills complied with religious 
principles. The solution was adopted by the 1980 constitution. I have already 
noted in chapter two that Ayatollah Khomeini redefined the parliament's role in 
terms of identifying the public interest. There is a considerable segment of Shia 
`ulama' who acknowledge the conventional nature of public interest and its 
identification on the basis of common rationality (bina a/-`oqa/ai. 101 
Nevertheless, the idea does not seem to have been accepted by the traditional 
`" Khomeini, Ayatollah. Kitib a/-Bay'. (Quin 1995) vol. 2. p. 461. 
`'h Amoli. Ayatollah Jawadi, Bir; imün-e Wahl va Rahbari, (Tehran 1999) p. 177. 
Amoli, Ayatollah Jawadi, quoted in Rcsi/at. (Mar., 31,1999). 
Sachedina, op. cit., p. 25. 
On the application of common rationality in Shi'i jurisprudence, sec Fadli, A. Durous r Uui/ 
Figh a/-/mämiyah, (Beirut, 1999). p. 117. Hakim offers a comparative account of the role of 
the local convention ('ur}) in defining the frame within which the religious rules apply. Hakim, 
M.. Al-Usül a! -'Anisnah li'I-Figh al-Mugaran. (Beirut 1979), p. 417. 
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clerics in the conservative faction. This is probably due to the political bearing of 
the idea, namely, that the parliament is to be regarded as a centre for authority, 
independent from the clerical leadership. 
Finally: that belief could be the fruit of the elitist tendency common 
among the Muslim clergy, according to which the general public was seen as 
ignorant and incapable of a rational determination of its interests. Thus the 
people need to have a guardian (wAJi) to guide them and protect their 
interests. 102 According to Mishkin, the nomination of the leader is the task of 
the senior `ulama', because the people are not capable of identifying the qualified 
leader on their own. 1113 
Although the people were denied the prerogative of being the source for 
authority, elections are recognised by the constitution as the means through 
which political offices are filled. Apparently, the conservatives were not in a 
position to absolutely deny elections. Such an approach would be tantamount to 
the renouncement of the regime's legitimacy. Alternatively, they focused on the 
introduction of a different explanation for the legal nature of elections. In this 
regard, one finds three accounts: 
1) Public consent is defined as the process by which people recognise the 
authority of the potentially-rightful leader. It is more of a proof (`a/ämmit) of, 
rather than a source or cause (`c/lah) of his authority. The people are obliged to 
discover the legitimate leader and recognise his authority. '° This implies that, at 
any time, there is only one potential legitimate leader and society is obliged to 
identify him and help him to assume office. 105 
2) Ayatollah Hhir't explains public consent in technical terms whereby all 
qualified mujtahids are seen as potentially legitimate rulers, yet only one can 
assume power at a time. Public opinion is needed therefore to make a preference 
among equal candidates. This does not, however, entail any confcnncnt of 
111' See for example Ayatollah Golbibäni, Al-//cd5yah c/a man lahual-l1'iliyah. (Quitt 1963), p. 
39. 
10' Mishkin, op. cit. 
(Qum 1988) pp. 16-20. I'µ Amofi, Jawiicfi. tVil i1at-c Fa9ih. 
1115 - Arusta. op. cit. 
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authority from the electors upon the elected person. It is more an expressing of 
support and encouragement. 106 The crux of this account suggests that none of the 
candidates is the God-designated leader unless his authority is recognised by the 
majority of people. Nevertheless, the people's role in generating authority is not 
the point of focus in this account. It addresses mainly the possible conflict 
between many mujtahids competing for power. 
3) Qäemmagämi suggests that legitimacy comprises religious and civil 
elements. The office of supreme leader (wiläyat al-fagih) is distinguished from 
the person of its holder on the one hand, and from other state offices on the 
other. The office is legitimised on a religious basis, whereas the powers of its 
holder are entrusted and remain contingent upon the constitutional principles, 
namely the public's consent. 1D7 
The latter account assumes that state institutions, other than the office of 
fagih, are grounded in the will of the nation. The role of the fagih in this regard is 
supervisory rather than administrative. 108 In comparison, the first two accounts 
hold that state action derives its legitimacy from the ruling fagih. The various 
branches of the state are seen as the arms of the supreme leader. The role of the 
people is limited to supporting the legitimate leader. This support is conceived in 
terms of state competence, since it helps to enhance state performance and 
national unity. Public preferences might thus be considered by the leader, but 
without him being compelled or constrained to follow their desires. ")) 
The Conservative's Frame of Reference 
The contesting Iranian camps represent two distinctive styles of 
religiosity and thinking. Each is influenced by a particular interpretation of the 
original sources of the religion and its basic values. In the following pages, I will 
discuss the ideological source of the conservative political standpoints. The 
reformist one will be discussed in the next chapter. 
"w Häiri, Kazim, Wi/äyat al-Anis r 'Aspal-Ghaybah. (Qum 1994). p. 164. 
Qäcmmagämi. op. cit., pp. 147-9. 
Qacmmagämi, ibid., p. 145. 
'' Larijäni. op. cit. p. 68. 
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The conservative ideology is based on a combination of three principles: 
o religion is an all-encompassing way of life, 
o the established jurisprudence is the method for interpreting its 
basic teachings into practical rules, and 
o the `ulama are the only authoritative representative and 
interpreter of religion. 
Politics, like all other aspects of life, is seen as a religious affair. The 
conservative discourse focuses on religious life and the religious state rather than 
`the role of religion' which might connote the sense of `degree'. The values 
expressed through political activity and the standards observed should be defined 
in religious terms and sought within the religious system of values. '"" Islam is it 
system of beliefs concerning human existence and should be realised through 
day-to-day behaviour. Muslim individuals have to pay full obedience to God as 
He is the creator and the absolute ruler of the III universe. II 
The said obedience is realised in following His commands as conveyed 
through trusted experts, i. e. the religious scholars. The following of experts in 
each discipline is a rational obligation. 112 Their views are to be observed for they 
reflect the essence of the religion. In the words of Ma'refat, the historical 
association of the clergy with the disciplines pertaining to religion has elevated 
their language to the impeccable expression of Quranic themes. 113 
This notion came to be known as the Islamn-e fagahäti (the jurisprudential 
perception of Islaun), and was seen as the major element distinguishing the 
conservative camp from the other factions in Iranian politics. 14 
Qiemmagimt, op. cit., pp. 71-5. 
Yazdii. Misbäh, Qalamro-e Din, Kanoone Gofiaman, (Qum, 2001). Retrieved on May., 3.2003 
from: www. andishcgoin. coin/htin/kanun/24/K24. HTNi. 
112 Shiriz'i, op. cit. pp. 392-396. 
113 INfa'refat, M. H., 'Pluralism Dini dar Botch Naqd'. Andishah Hanzah, no. 16. (Spring 1999) c. 
edition, www. al-shia. com/html/far/books/roo7linagalat_marefat/poloralisin/ploral0l. htm. 
114 In his diaries of 1980, the former president Hashemi Rafsanjäni puts the jurisprudential 
perception of Islam as the major point of disagreement between his camp (the so-called 'line of 
the Imam') and the liberals (e. g., Nehzat Azädi) ; 'they do not accept this fiqh and we sec it as 
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Fiqh Suanati 
The idea that there are different interpretive readings of the religion has 
been understood for centuries, but it came to be an issue in Iran only in the late 
1960s. There are two broad tendencies with regard to religion and religiosity. 
One tendency emphasises what is deemed as the ethos of the religion, such as its 
spirituality, ethics, knowledge and, to a lesser extent, its legal system. It is 
usually held by the commentators of Qur'an, philosophers, Gnostics and non- 
clerical intellectuals. It has remained a minor trend even though it has had 
popular influence. The major tendency has been the jurisprudential one which 
perceives Islam as a legal system and emphasises the idea of duty as the 
fundamental basis of the relationship between God and man, while paying less 
attention to the concerns of the former trend. 
The first tendency has enjoyed a substantial rise since the mid-1970s, and 
benefitted from Ayatollah Khomeini's critique of the narrow views of the 
traditional jurists. However, the latter remained dominant in the religious 
seminaries and in the late 1980s regained more territory. Khomeini's criticism 
was meant to encourage the vitality and creativity within the traditional trend 
rather than endorse its critics. The jurisprudential interpretation of Islam draws a 
clear-cut line between what is deemed as matters of knowledge and matters of 
practice and asserts that what concerns individuals is the second category. 
Thereby it became an established attitude among the claimants of the exemplary 
office (marji`yyhih) to commence their work by publishing a risilah `ama/iyyah 
(treatise of practice). The risalah `amaliyyah sums up the rules endorsed by the 
exemplar concerning the various religious duties. It also represents the link 
between him and his followers. 
Apparently, the teen of fiqh sunnat7(traditional jurisprudence) was first 
employed by Ayatollah Khomeini in September 1981.1'-' According to Mal}amid, 
figh sunnati denotes "the methodology of interpretation evolved and employed 
by the great Shi'a scholars for more than ten centuries, and documented in their 
the only basis available to run the Islamic state' Rafsanjani, 'Ubdraz Buhrän (Tehran 1999) p. 
60. 
15 Khomeini. Sahlfeh, op. cit., vol. 15, p. 150 
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major textbooks". 116 In 1983, Khomeini expressed his favour of the 
methodology of Jawähin as well as dynamic jurisprudence (figh pt7ya): 
In respect of methodology, I believe in fiqh sunnatt and Jawähifi's 
style of interpretation. Such a style is correct and the compliance 
with it is an obligation. It does not follow, however, that the 
Islamic jurisprudence is not dynamic (püya); time and place are 
determining factors for an efficient interpretation. Religious rules 
and regulations should be understood in the light of actual 
realities. Each system forms a particular net of social, political, 
and economic relations which make the subject of the ruling 
essentially different... A competent jurisprudent must be aware of 
the changing nature of his world. "7 
The methodology of Jawähcii is attributed to Muhammad Hassan at- 
Najafi, (known later as Jawaheti), the Shia leader of the nineteenth century (d. 
1847). He was famous for his frequent references to the rational and conventional 
definitions of public interest as the framework for the derivation and 
implementation of religious rules. 118 His studies are also distinguished for their 
concern with the issues posed in the public sphere, rather than being limited to 
individual affairs, as was common among earlier scholars. This, according to 
Fakhr, is the reason for Khomeini's favouring of Jawähin. 
' 19 The common 
tendency in the religious seminaries to study topics and rules in the abstract was 
often criticised by Khomeini. 120 
The notion of dynamic jurisprudence (fiqh piiya) was once upheld by the 
leftist faction of the clergy as the antithesis of fiqh sunnati, embraced by the 
traditional clergy. 121 With time, however, the lack of a precise definition of the 
notion has made it open to different conceptions, among which the most 
influential is the one espoused by the pragmatic faction of the conservatives 
116 Mahämid, 'Figh Mustalah Hawzah dar Duniiyc Emrooz'. Hüzrir. vol. 34. (Spring 2001) c. 
edition, www. hawzah. net/Per'Magazine/hz/034/hzO3425. htin. 
117 Khomeini, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 31. 
11" Ma'refat, M., 'Fiqh Jawahiri va Vijegihie unn'. Andfshah Hawzah. (Summer 1997) e. edition, 
www. balagh. nct/persian/feqh/maqalat/koliyat/23. htin. 
119 Fakhr, A., "Awimil-e Püyä-ic Fiqh'. Qabasat, no. 15-16. (Spring 2000). 
www. hawzah. net/Per/Magazine/QA/015/qaOl 5 13. htm. 
12" Rczäic, M.. 'Decdgäh-c Darbärah Tathir 'Unsur-e Zaire n va Makan dar ljtihäd', Hzi r, no. 
15, (Spring 1996). www. hawzah. nct/Per/Magazine/HZ/0I5Ihr0I508. htm. 
121 Shah Alain, 'Conservatives, Liberals and the Struggle over Iranian Politics', Strategic 
Analysis, vol. 24, no. 3, (June 2000). www. ciaonct. orgloij/sa/sa_junOOa1sOl. htnil. 
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which identifies the notion of dynamic fiqh with the interpretation of the 
religious rules in the light of the state's requirements. This conception 
contradicts the traditional one which calls for the state's adaptation to the 
jurisprudential frameworks, and the reformist one that asserts the need for a 
completely new jurisprudence. 
The application of jurisprudence to constitutional and political affairs has 
been, since 1979 at least, a controversial issue. The majority of grand ayatollahs, 
including Khomeini, have acknowledged the need to improve its methodology 
and broaden its scope. The context within which Khomeini employed the term 
`figh sunnati' implies that he meant to disqualify the intellectual interpretation 
of Islam and to emphasise the clerical one. He strongly rejected the calls for a 
`completely new jurisprudence' proposed by some modernist clerics and 
intellectuals, and described such a tendency as a "starting point for the 
destruction of the religious seminaries". 122 In the speeches where he emphasised 
the notion, Khomeini criticised the intellectuals' tendency to disregard the 
leading role of the clergy, or to claim for themselves a role in the leadership of 
the religious community in opposition to the role of the clergy. This is a major 
theme in Khomeini's thought and political practice. In brief, the notion of figh 
sunnati denotes the established Shi i jurisprudential methodology. Nonetheless, 
for Ayatollah Khomeini, jurisprudence can appropriately address the challenges 
of the modern life and state only if the `ulamä familiarise themselves with actual 
conditions of the world surrounding them and develop their methodology to suit 
the new conceptions and realities. 
The major implications of the jurisprudential version of Islam include 
that: 
I- Political philosophy, as well as political theory, has to be adapted to 
the jurisprudential framework; jurisprudence has the capacity to foster both. '23 
122 Khomeini, op. cit., vol. 20, p. 102 
123 Zanjäni, A., `Nizätn Siasi Islam', interview, Huktnnat-elslinzZ no. I, (Autumn 1996). e. 
edition. www. nezain. org/persian/inagazine/00I/02. htm. 
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2- The implementation of religious teachings is the major objective of the 
state. Given the sufficiency of religion to address all types of problems posed in 
social life, the state is obliged to formulate its policies and programs in 
accordance with religious criteria. Power relations and the public interest are 
defined in religious terms and in accordance with religious standards. 124 
3- Public demands are legitimised, hence undertaken by the state, on the 
basis of their being identified by the religious ruler as `common interests' rather 
than an expression of the public will. The idea is justified on the basis that the 
Islamic government is bound to undertake right actions only. Taking action in 
itself constitutes its value and thus its justification. Some actions are in 
themselves good, others are bad. Being desired or otherwise detested by the 
public does not change their nature. The ruler is eligible to select the acceptable 
demands of the people because he holds the best knowledge of good and evil. '25 
The idea that interests are defined in religious terms has been a matter of wide 
debate. Some conservative figures came to make a distinction between 
`discerning' and `determining' of interests. In this view, society was said to have 
the capacity to undertake the former whereas the latter was to be reserved for the 
fagih. ''ý' The suggestion is based on the argument that religious rules might 
constitute interests which were not disclosed for the ordinary believer (ina iIch 
kharya), thus they should be taken for granted as they came from God. 
'27 
Conclusion 
The conservative faction emerged within the traditional spectrum of 
Iranian society and expressed its concerns. Its political manifestation was 
prompted by the challenges of the administration of the state and modem ideas 
unleashed by the rival factions during the post-revolutionary epoch. The 
124 Shan'atmadär. N., 'Kariyic Fiqh Süis', 'UIüm-c Siäsi, no. 14. (Autumn 2001). c. edition, 
www. hawzali. iict/Per/Magazinc/OS/0 14/os0I 403. htm. 
''- Momen. M1., 'Din va.. *vtusharakat-c Siäsi', 'UI«m-c Siäs7, no. 7, (Winter 1999). c. edition, 
www. hawzah. net/Per/Magazine/OS/007/os00702. htin. 
'-" Qäcmmagämi, op. cit. p. 367. 
127Amini. Ayatollah. 'Roykard-c Hukümat-c 'Alavi', in Amini, 1., Hukcnnat-c AIavi" Bunianha va 
Chalesha. Chapter 1. c. edition, www. nczani. ori,, /pcnian/book, /hukoomate- 
e_alaý i_bunyan_ha_va_chatc: h_ha/02. htm. 
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conservative ideology expands on the established Shi i paradigm of authority 
which is made up of four components: 1) the doctrine of designated imamate; 2) 
Plato's notion of the philosopher-king; 3) the association of absolute authority 
with the perfect man, from Ibn al-`Arabi's gnosticism, and 4) the Persian wisdom 
of kingship. 
Unlike the liberal notion of individualism, the conservatives place more 
emphasis on the community. The individual-society relation is not based on a 
"social contract" but perceived as natural and stemming from the individual need 
for social life. Society is defined as a functional grouping bound together by a 
shared belief which conditions the identity of its members and their roles. In such 
a system, the focus is placed on duty rather than right. The objective for which 
the system functions is to maximise the collective interest of the members. The 
interests are defined in both material and moral terms with the latter given 
superiority. 
The conservative discourse acknowledges the equality of all human 
beings by nature. However, political rights, particularly access to public office, 
rest on moral competence and strict adherence to the clerical leadership. Political 
legitimacy and the rule of law are recognised by the faction in the broad sense. 
Their applicability, however, is conditioned by other principles. Aristotle's 
notion of praxis or idea of the action which is itself the end is adopted as the 
synonym of legitimate action. According to this precept, action is legitimised if 
it is seen as right, i. e. there is no need for public consent for it to be carried out. 
The righteousness of an action is secured upon its compliance with the religious 
rules as identified by the religious leader. By the same token, the perfonnance of 
a right action is not restricted by law. Thus the authority of the religious leader is 
seen as absolute and not bound by constitutional limits. 
The faction's scepticism about republicanism steins fron the latter's 
major implication, namely, the central role of the people in governance. In the 
conservative discourse, authority is not based on public consent, neither does the 
state represent the nation's will. The highest authority is held by the religious 
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leader who is nominated by the senior clerics. The role of the people is to 
acknowledge and support his rule. 
The conservative ideology is based on a particular interpretive reading of 
religion called figh sunnati (jurisprudential perception of the religion). According 
to this perception, religion is taken as an all-inclusive ideology encompassing all 
the aspects of life. The state is seen as responsible for implementing the 
religious rules and ensuring the citizens' observance of religious teachings. The 
`ulamä retain a central role, for they are the authoritative spokesmen for the 
religion. 
The evolution of the conservatives' political ideology during the post- 
revolutionary period was more of a reaction to the challenges posed by the 
secularising function of the state and the modern notions unleashed in society. 
Being a reactive movement, the conservative faction has dealt with theoretical 
challenges from the platform of defending the continuity of religious tradition, 
rather than initiating a new vision. This position has constrained the faction's 
argumentation within the framework developed by its rivals. In other words, the 
course of the argument over state, religion, modernisation, etc., is led by the 
reformist factions. In the short and medium terms, this particular course of 
debate will help to articulate the faction's views. But, over the long term, it will 
exhaust its theoretical resources, since it will have helped to establish its rivals' 
principles as the centre of debate on the national level. In my opinion, this 
possibility represents a key point in the analysis of the future developments of 
the conservative-reformist debate. 
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Chapter V 
The Reformist View of the State 
This chapter discusses the principal elements of the political discourse of 
the Iranian reformist camp and the religious principles upon which they are 
grounded. It offers a brief introduction to the influential theorists of the trend. 
Then it explains the rise of the discourse and its relation to the pre-revolutionary 
discourse on the religious reformation. Through the discussion of its conception 
of republicanism, legitimacy and democracy, I try to locate the discourse within 
modern political thought. The discussion of its conception of the role of religion 
in politics reveals the boundaries differentiating the trend from the established 
religious paradigm. 
The emergence of the reformist trend signified the rise of liberal 
tendencies in Iranian society during the 1990s. ' Two factors can be seen behind 
this development: the socio-economic changes during the first post-revolutionary 
decade and the revival of intellectual activity, together with the emergence of a 
new self-awareness, notably among the young generation. 
The Socio-economic Background: 
As a demonstration of the Islamic revolution belonging to the less 
advantaged class (inostaz`afn), the post-revolutionary government has made 
huge efforts to improve the country's infrastructure, focusing mainly on the 
countryside. The wide variety of developing programs were carried out by both 
the government and the voluntary organization of Jihid-c Sazandaöi (the Jihad of 
Reconstruction) and Nehzat-e Sawid-Amozi (the Movement for Literacy). In 
addition to the ideological motives, the government's focus on the countryside 
aimed to enhance the food production in order to counter the shortage in foreign 
For an empirical assessment of the transformation of values during the early 1990s. see 
Rafi'pour, Faramerz, Tavse'ah va Tazadd, (Tehran 1998). Also: A. 'Abdi and M. Goudarzi, 
Tahavu/ät-c Farhangi dar Iran. (Tehran 1999). Both studies are based on field researches. 
qualitative and quantitative interviews. 
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income during the war with Iraq and the economic embargo by the United States. 
The development programs have included the building of a huge network of 
roads, communication systems, electricity, and primary schools. These programs 
have had a direct effect on the society's culture and served to connect the 
countryside population to the main path of the political and economic processes 
of the country after decades of isolation. `Abdi specifies three embodiments of 
the said development in the realm of politics. The first is the elevation of the 
level of education of the population in general. This is seen in the growth of the 
percentage of students at the middle and higher levels of education, as well as in 
the overall expansion of literacy. The second embodiment is the decline of 
clerical influence over the population, to the benefit of the independent media 
and other modern means of communication. And finally, the change of the 
lifestyle of the countryside communities, which have gradually become open to 
trends familiar in urban areas. 2 
Between 1976 and 1996, the literacy rate among Iranians aged six years 
and over has risen from 47.5 percent to 80 percent, including 70 percent of the 
countryside inhabitants. In 1976, roughly 18 percent of the women in the rural 
areas and 64 percent in the urban areas were literate. In 1992, the figures had 
risen to 62 percent in the rural areas while in 1996, the urban women literacy was 
estimated at 82 percent. Similarly, the number of students in all levels of 
education rose from 7.25 million in 1979 to 19.32 million in 1996, of which 1.2 
million were at university. 3 Rezäie focuses on the change of status among 
employees. During the same period, the number of self-employed workers rose 
from 182,300 to 528,000. The other indicator is the elevation of women's 
employment status. Despite a decrease of two percent of working women (from 
16 percent down to 14 percent), the percentage of women occupying executive 
and professional posts rose to 38 percent. ' The flourishing of education on the 
national level is seen by almost all development theorists as a major stimulus for 
2 'Abdi, A., 'Hastah Namarci Entekhabät Akhir', in Rczäic and 'Abdi Entckhäb-c No« (Tehran 
1999). pp. 97-102 
1 The statistics are compiled from the Statistical Centre of Iran (www. sci. org. ir), High Council 
for Cultural Revolution (www. iranculture. org), and 'Abdi., ibid. 
4 Rczdie. 'Nimch-pur Livan', in 'Abdi and Rezäie, op. cit., pp. 113-5 
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social change, in the sense of attitudes, worldviews and political orientations. It 
helps to bring about a new self-awareness reflected directly in the willingness to 
participate in public affairs. The electoral behaviour in the 1997 presidential 
election provides strong support for this assumption. The voting of the peripheral 
regions and countryside was similar to that of the major cities, which are usually 
regarded as more politicised. 5 Piran, a professor of sociology at Tehran 
University, holds that the significant role of the youth in that election indicates 
the emergence of students as a major reference group in Iranian society. Bearing 
in mind the increased tendency on the part of the rural population to follow the 
urban lifestyle, the two factors have led to the modernist discourse expanding 
rapidly and its representatives winning the widest appeal at the expense of the 
pro-tradition camp. 6 
The Role of the Intellectuals 
Boroujerdi ascribes the rise of the reformist discourse to the arrival of a 
new generation of Islamist thinkers on the Iranian intellectual scene. 7 The tern 
`intellectual' denotes "someone for whom ideas, science, art and culture are so 
important as to determine not only the aim of everyday life but also the roots of 
political thought and action". " When it comes to the politics of development, 
Shits broadens the definition to include all those whose education or profession 
belongs to the modem world. In this view, the social position of the intellectual 
is emphasised as being contrary to the pro-tradition segment of society; thus he 
assigns the attribute to "all persons with an advanced modem education". 
9 The 
term `religious intellectuals' (roshanfikr deeni) denotes the group of thinkers 
whose worldview is conditioned by the basic principles of religion. Based upon 
5 Menasheri, op. cit., p. 96 
6 Piran. P.. 'Sch Sathc Tahfil Vaqe'ah', in 'Abdi and Rczäic, op. cit.. p. 34 
Borotycrdi, Mchrzad, 'Can Islam be Secularized', in Esfandiari, Berton and Farhi (eds. ). 
Intellectual Chant and the New Generation of/ranian Intellectuals, (Washington, 2000), p. 
13. e. edition, retrieved on Jun., 2,2004 from: 
http: //faculty. maxwell. syr. eduhnborouje/Continuities. htinl 
y of Political Thought (London 1996), p. 265. Scruton, R., A Dictionar 
"Shils, E., 'The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States'. World Politics, vol. 
12, no. 3. (Apr., 1960), 329-368, p. 332. 
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historical experience, `Alavitabär places the group between the traditional clergy 
and the secularist thinkers. He identifies the religious intellectual trend with 
three distinctive preoccupations: 't) 
1- Developing a rational interpretation of religion and religious 
principles. 
2- Criticising the current social system, its institutions, relations 
and attitudes. 
3- Emphasising the values of liberty, equality and progress as 
prerequisites for the social organisation. 
Vahdat explains the advancement of the intellectual discourse in Iran 
within the frame of an identity revival. The process involves a bifurcation of the 
ambivalent self-identity that characterised the Islamic discourse of the 1960s and 
1970s. It is argued that the philosophical approaches of the three main architects 
of the revolutionary discourse: `Ali Shari`ati, Ayatollah Khomeini and Murtazä 
Mutahari have shared a characteristic ambivalence towards subjectivity, 
resulting in their political views promoting unclear conceptions of citizenship. 
While none of the three denies human subjectivity, they do not regard it as 
independent either, but contingent upon God's subjectivity, as it is expressed in 
the monotheistic society (jame`ah tavhidi). The construction of such a society 
is viewed by the three scholars as the main objective of the Islamic revolution. 
With the course of bifurcation, the conservatives have leaned towards the 
traditional position in which a religious-based subjectivity embodies the 
negation of citizenship and its related political rights. By contrast, the rcfonnist 
discourse has developed in line with the modern notion of individual subjectivity 
and its political embodiment as universal citizenship. " 
For Bashiriyeh, the above development demonstrates the transformation 
of the Iranian political culture, which eventually helped individuality to emerge 
as the basis for independent self-awareness. Since the revolution, he argues, the 
dominant group has made intensive efforts to restructure the national identity of 
'Alavitabär, 'Alireza. Rawshanfkri, Dindiri, il-fardomsaliri, (Tehran 2000). pp. 25-26. 
Vahdat, 'Post-Rcvoiutionary Islamic Discourses on Modernity in Iran: Expansion and 
Contraction of Human Subjectivity', /ntcrnationalJourna/ofAlidd/c East Studics vol. 35 - 
issue 4 (Nov., 2003). 599-631, pp. 602-3 
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the Iranians. The ideal citizen has been described as one ready to give up or 
degrade his sense of belonging to all social institutions other than the one offered 
by the official ideology. 12 The identity of the Islamic Republic has been 
introduced as absolute, solid and perfect, while other identities including those 
that are national, ethnic and culturally-based have been regarded as inferior or 
contradictory to Islam. 13 In addition to satisfying ideological objectives, this 
course has been designed to unify the sources of power in the hands of the state. 
Thus, the first post-revolutionary decade saw the political theatre purified of any 
institution which might symbolise or mobilise different identities. The political 
parties, professional associations, as well as the independent press, were 
weakened or even dismantled and the public sphere was freed for the officially- 
sanctioned identity to flourish. 
From the early 1990s there was a reverse cycle aided by both internal and 
international developments. It was characterised by a decline in the ideological 
components of individual self-awareness and a reciprocal growth of 
individualism in the liberal sense. 14 Thus, the inclination towards individualism 
and generally the tendency to embrace notions pertaining to liberal democracy 
arc not phenomena limited to the intellectual elite. This was rather a common 
tendency shared among all the groups of society that, at a certain point of time, 
felt alienated. " Furthermore, it could be said that it is the change in the hearts 
and minds of the people that made the environment conducive to intellectuals 
voicing their claims. This argument can be supported by the fact that the 
landslide victory of Khatami in 1997 was no less a surprise for his supporters 
than for their rivals. 16 The idea indicated by this event is that the people were 
more ready for change than the reformist elite. 
12 Bashiriyeh, H., 'Zawäl-c Haviat-c Siäsi', Iran (May, 16,2004). 
13 On the state policy to restructure the national identity through education, see Shorish, M., 'The 
Islamic Revolution and Education in Iran', Comparative Education Review. (Feb., 1988) pp. 
58-75 retrieved (Jun., 2003) from: www. ed. uiuc. edutEPS/people/Shorish_lslatnic_Ed. htinl 
14 Bashiriych, op. cit. 
1' Jalaipour, Hamid, Dawlat-e Penhän, (Tehran, 2000), p. 295. 
16 Ansäri. 'Ali, Iran, /slam and Dctnocrac}, (London, 2000). p. 112. 
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Prior to the Islamic revolution, intellectual discourse within the religious 
sphere was pioneered by the founders of Nehzat-e Azädi-e Iran (the Movement 
for the Liberation of Iran), notably Ayatollah Mahmoud Talegäni, Mahdi 
Bazargän, and Yadulläh Sahäbi, all of whom were active supporters of the former 
Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq and his National Front during the 1950s. 
Since its earliest stage, the major objective of this trend has been to reconcile 
Islam with modernity. Apparently the immediate aim was to defend religion 
against the rising secular trends unleashed by the modernising policies of the 
Pahlavi regime. The trend thus had to distinguish itself from the traditional 
clergy, both in its discursive language and its anticipated audience. 17 It reached a 
climax with `Alº Shari`ati who dedicated himself to reinterpreting Shl'i history, 
traditions and thought in a fashion directly contradicting the established 
paradigm espoused by the clergy. This has inevitably led to his discourse taking 
an anti-clerical character. M 
During the 1960s and 1970s the intellectual discourse was influential 
mainly among the urban middle class in general and university students in 
particular. It has been noted in chapter II that the majority of pre-revolutionary 
supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini consisted of educated laymen and young 
clerics with modernist, mainly leftist, tendencies. The trend developed its 
reformist character after it was alienated from the state in the late 1980s. After 
an interval of passivity, it returned to the political fray through the means of 
independent media. The common theme among the four reformist periodicals 
published between May 1990 and October 1991 has been the criticism of the 
official ideology of hegemony, notably traditional fiqh. The four publications 
were shut down, after a while, by the hard-line dominated judiciary. '9 Their 
relatively short life, however, made public the variety of contesting opinions in 
the community, in contrast to the image displayed by the ruling elite illustrating 
1' Arjomand, S., The Turban for Crown, (New York 1989), p. 92. 
1.4 Akhavi, S.. Religion and Politics in Contemporary /ran (Albany, 1980), p. 143. 
Bayinwas published as a monthly magazine by 'Ali Akbar Mohtashcmi in May 1990 and 
closed in February 1992. It was published again as a daily paler, and closed in June 2000. Hadi 
Khamenei's Jehin-e /s/am has been in circulation during 1994. Sa/äm was published by Mosavi 
Khoainiha from February 1991 to July 1999. Kiyin was shut down in January 2001. 
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a uniform society, fully adhered to the official discourse. The daily Salim and 
the monthly journal Kiydn pioneered the new discourse. The former served as 
the political voice of the emerging reformist trend while the latter voiced its 
intellectual principles and concerns. Kiyän was published in October 1991 by a 
group of young thinkers who, a few months earlier, were forced out of the state- 
owned Kayhan Farhangi. In addition to its journalistic role, Kiyän served as a 
centre for communication and debate among non-conservative intellectuals. 
Through the Kiyän Circle, a weekly gathering of writers and supporters, it 
brought together a relatively large number (sometimes up to 107) of academic 
researchers, professional writers and political activists from different walks of 
life. The Circle has provided the reformist publications and groups which 
appeared in the 1990s with a considerable number of their writers, new ideas and 
informed activists. 20 This explains why Kiyin has been regarded by some 
analysts as a milestone in the history of Iran's cultural press. 21 In addition to 
Kiyän, Jalaipour mentions two other circles through which the reformist 
discourse has taken shape, namely the Centre for Strategic Research based in the 
office of President Rafsanjani, and the 2500 member-group of postgraduates sent 
to the Western universities through Rafsanjäni's initiative to renovate the 
academia and state administration in the early 1990s. 22 
Main Figures and Themes in the Reformist Movement 
The reformist trend has among its activists a relatively large number of 
intellectuals and professional writers. The trend benefits also from its 
acquaintance with the broader intellectual and academic community of the 
country. Many of the names appearing in reformist publications belong to 
political figures and scholars of different tendencies, including the modern right 
wing, the secular nationalists and the liberals. Among the many theorists and 
analysts advocating the reformist manifesto, there are a few who have a special 
20 For some details on the circle, sec: Qouchäni, Muhammad, PedarKhondah va Chap-h5yc 
Javin. (Tehran 2000), pp. 72-79. 
21 Haidari, M. 'Matbo'at Siisi az 57 to 90', Iran (May, 27,2002) 
22 Jalaipour, H., Pas az Dovum-e Khordid, (Tehran 1999) p. 292. 
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appeal to the members and supporters of the trend. Here I will introduce three of 
them, each representing a distinct tendency within the reformist camp: Abdol- 
Ka6m Soroush, an academic figure, Muhammad Khatami, a cleric, and Sa`eed 
I. Iajjarian, a political activist. Later in the chapter, I will introduce Mujtahid 
Shabestari, the outspoken critic of the established school of jurisprudence. The 
three thinkers share the same principles held by the reformist movement, but 
they differ in regard to their areas of interest and the audience that they appeal 
to. Soroush, for instance, focuses on the value of justice, which he deems as 
having the highest value and as the essence of human ethics. He has dedicated 
his Aklilägh-e Khodäyzin (Morals of the Gods) to show how basic moral values 
and virtues are linked to justice. 23 Khatami is more concerned with the practical 
means to curb authoritarianism. Thus he focuses on accountability, the rule of 
law, and the constitutional framework of political action. In comparison, 
Hajjarian emphasises the modernisation of the political system, including such 
ideas as rationalisation, the representation of various interests, the division of 
labour, and so forth. Soroush tries to establish his arguments outside the 
particular limits of the political system, supporting the idea that the current 
system is transitional. Whereas both Khatami and Hajjarian hold that the Islamic 
Republic is potentially capable of developing a democratic character, and thus 
they focus on the dynamics of development from within the system and its 
institutions. To sum up, Soroush seeks to establish a democratic discourse 
outside the prevalent system while the other two are more concerned with the 
process of democratisation within the Islamic system itself. 
Abdol-Karim Soroush, the pen name of Hussayn Häj Faraj Dabbägh, was 
born in 1945. He studied chemistry in Tehran and London, where, in the late 
1970s, he switched to study philosophy. After the revolution, he taught 
philosophy in Tehran University and served in the Council for Cultural 
Revolution, before moving to full- time research and lecturing in 1995. Since his 
early career as an author, Soroush has attracted much attention; nevertheless, the 
peak of controversy over his opinions occurred after he published a series of 
2' Soroush, Abdol-Karlin, Akh/ gh-c Khodäyün. (Tehran 2001) 
146 
articles on the relative nature of religious teachings. The articles entitled Qabz 
va Bast Theoric Shari'at (literally, The Theoretical Contraction and 
Expansion of Shari'a') have marked the shift of Soroush's focus from criticising 
Marxism and the religious traditions in general, to the criticism of the traditional 
fiqh and clerical culture in particular. 24 The thesis focuses on the evolutionary 
nature of religious knowledge and the contextual limitations of the sacred texts 
aiming to draw a clear line between religion and religious knowledge. It argues 
that the latter is acquired through scientific means, thus it is subject to the same 
rules that are applied to other disciplines. It is profane, subjective and 
changeable, with no supremacy over any other disciplines, let alone having 
sanctity or immunity from criticism. According to this account, the perception of 
religion, the formulation of its practical rules and the way man exercises what he 
believes in are all based on subjective and contextual understandings of religion. 
Thus what is introduced by religious scholars as the Will of God is nothing but 
their own perception of Divine Will. 25 Soroush's methodology and his discourse 
in general are deeply influenced by Karl Popper's philosophy of knowledge. 26 He 
often uses Popper's notions of science being probabilistic and of falsifiability as 
the criterion to distinguish science from pseudo-science. The main target of 
Soroush's critiques, however, has been the claim of authority based on absolute 
knowledge, holiness and human perfection, as they inevitably lead to 
authoritarianism. 27 In addition to Qabz va Bast, Soroush has published 
numerous books and articles most of which have been provocative. 
28 
Sa'ced Hajjariän is regarded as the chief strategist of the reformist 
camp. 29 While Soroush's main focus has been the religious character of the 
'° 'Qabz va Bast' was first published in Kayh: in Farhangi, a respected cultural monthly jounial 
with reformist tendencies (April, 1988). A compilation of the articles was published in the 
following year under the same title. 
25 Soroush, A.. Qabz ºa Bast Theoric Shari 'at. 8th edition, (Tehran, 2003), p. IR 1 
25 Vahdat, Farzin, God and Juggernaut. (New York, 2002), p. 203. 
"' Soroush, Abdol-Karim, Bast-c Tajrebah Nabavi, (Tehran 1999) p. 276. 
21 For a list of Soroush's books, see his website: www. drsoroush. com. The site offers also some of 
the articles commenting on his works. 
29 Ansari. Ali, 'Continuous Regime Change from Within'. in Lennon, A., and Eiss, C., Reshaping 
Rogue States. (Cambridge, 2004), p. 274 
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polity, Hajjarian has focused on the process of socio-political change after the 
Islamic revolution: its dynamics and the way it reflects on the culture, behaviour, 
roles and institutions in both the state and society. Following Max Weber's 
traditions, Hajjarian views the rise of the Islamic state as the first step toward 
secularising the institutions that were hitherto regarded as religious or based on 
religious principles. Hajjariän was born in 1953, and served as an intelligence 
officer and deputy minister at the ministry of intelligence. He was among the few 
analysts who predicted the transfonnation of electoral behaviour in the early 
1990s, as a reflection of the structural changes during the post-revolutionary 
period as well as the conclusion of the war with Iraq and the absence of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Thereby, he played a central role in regrouping and 
transforming the ex-leftist groups into the driving force of political reform. 30 
I. lajjarian's opinions are expressed mainly through detailed and well-written 
articles. In fact all of his books are made up of previously-published articles. His 
beautiful yet provocative writing has earned him a large audience. His Sobh-c 
Emrooz was one of the top daily newspapers in terms of circulation before it 
was shut down in April 2000 by the conservatives. 31 His most controversial book 
has been Az Shähed-c Qudsi to Shähed-c Bazaari(Froin the Sacred Witness 
to the Profane Witness). It describes the process of the secularisation of religious 
institutions as a reflection of their involvement in the political process. His 
Jumhouriat: Afsoun-zedäci az Qudrat (Republicanism: Demystification of 
Power) deals with the notion of republicanism as a grounding principle of the 
people's sovereignty and its manifestation through the state institutions and the 
state-society relationship. 
Muhammad Khatarni, the outgoing president of the Islamic Republic, is 
more famous for his personal charisma and moderate behaviour. A cleric and son 
of a local religious leader, Khatami was born in 1943. He served as a Parliament 
30 Compare with Abedin. who argues that the common characteristic among reformist figures has 
been their previous career in the intelligence service. Abctfn, Mahan, The Origins of Iran's 
Reformist Elite', Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 4, (April 2003). 
www. incib. org/articles/0304_iran. htm 
Mahmoudi. F.. 'Mafarre Jadid', Hafnshahri, (Aug.. R, 2002). c. edition 
www. hamshahri. org/hamnews/1391/9 10517/intep. htin 
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member, chief editor of Kayhän newspaper, minister of information and the 
director of the National Library. His interest in literature, epistemology and the 
sociology of religion has earned him a prominent position among the intellectual 
clite. 32 Probably the harassment he has experienced at the hands of the 
conservatives throughout his political career has prompted him to develop a keen 
interest in the religion-power relation. His Ayen va Andisheh dar Dim-e 
Khod-kämegi (Religion and Intellect Trapped in Tyranny) offers a detailed 
account of the way political thought in Islam has evolved under the influence of 
autocratic rulers. Its main goal is to address such questions as: why Islamic 
traditions lack the normative structure to foster a democratic discourse. 
Other than the above three, there are numerous thinkers whose opinions 
have enriched the refonnist discourse including Mobsen Kadivar33, `Alirezä 
`Alavitabhr, Akbar Ganfi, and finally Hossein Bashiriych, whose sociological 
analyses are acquiring influence among the Reformists, notwithstanding his 
secular orientation. 
The Reformists favour a model of government similar to the one common 
in Western liberal literature, where the state is conceived as a contractual 
institution representing the various interests of its citizens. In this regard, the 
Reformists arc fairly aware that such a conception cannot be grounded in the 
established religious paradigm. According to Shabcstan: 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic introduced to religious 
thought a number of novel notions, including: the rights of the nation, 
the sovereignty of the nation, [... ] freedoms, the separation of powers 
and so on. The religious scholars' endorsement of these notions is also 
unprecedented in the religious community. The concept of `nation' is 
also new and has no reference in the religious traditions [... ] The truth 
is that since there is no definite form of government in the Quran and 
the traditions of the Prophet, the door is open for the Muslims to 
"- For some details on Khatami's career, see Menasheri, David, Post-ReºFolutionary Politics in 
Iran, (London, 2001) pp. 90-93 
For an informed comparison between Soroush. Shabestari and Kadivar and its significance to 
the Iranian context, sec: Sadri, M. 'Sacral Defense of Secularism: The Political Theologies of 
Soroush, Shabcstari, and Kadivar', in lntcrnational Journal ofPolitic,, Culture and Society, 
vol. 15. no. 2. (Winter 2001), pp. 257-270. 
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integrate such concepts into their political and social culture. 34 
The Reformists argue that the religious framework is not the right place 
to conceptualise the issue of state authority. 35 State and politics are better 
thought of within the framework of political philosophy whereby, Ganji argues, 
principles and institutions are determined on the basis of rational ends and 
common sense. 36 I will discuss the reformist conception of religion and its role 
later in the chapter. The following pages will discuss their major political views, 
including republicanism, legitimacy and democracy. 
Republicanism: the Question of Sovereignty 
As far as the nature of authority is concerned, a republican government is 
distinguished by its concern with the interest of the public. Thus Coker holds 
that `it is not necessarily connected with any particular form, but it most 
naturally associates with the representative form'. 37 Elson quotes an American 
writer from the nineteenth century defining the republic as the type of 
government in which `the supreme power is entrusted by the people to councils, 
composed of members chosen for a limited time'. 38 In Plato's philosophy, the 
ideal republic combines three groups corresponding to the three components of 
human soul: the appetite, the spirit, and knowledge. The appetite is associated 
with the sphere of private interests, thus it is represented by the commercial 
class. The spirit mirrors the public sphere and is represented by the executives 
and soldiers, and finally knowledge is associated with authority and is 
represented by the lawmakers or the philosopher- kings. In comparison, Aristotle 
has focused on power distribution; for him, power can be held by one, or few 
persons, or be distributed among many. Historically, the distinction between a 
republic and a monarchy rests on the basis of whether political obligation is a 
74 Shabestari, M., Naqdi bar Qarait-c Rawni az Din, (Tehran, 2000). p. 186. 
` Shabcstari, ibid., p. 192. 
Ganji, Akbar, Talagqi Faschisti az Dccn wtia Hukürnat, (Tehran 1999), p. 34. 
37 Cokcr. Francis. Readings in Political Philosophy, (New York, 1939), p. 694. 
Elson. Ruth M., Guardians of Tradition: American Schoolbooks ofthe Nineteenth Century, 
(Lincoln, NE, 1964), p. 286. 
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matter of consent or of obedience. 39 James Madison, the American politician and 
theorist, emphasises the methods by which the various interests are fairly 
represented in the state. Thus he asserts the public's control over the rulers, the 
general election of people's representatives and the separation of authorities in 
order to enable them to be reciprocally checked and controlled. 4° 
Republicanism represents a key element in the reformist discourse. It is 
also a controversial issue in Iranian politics. The quarrel over the republican 
character of the Islamic regime revolves mainly around the question of 
sovereignty. Those who presume that sovereignty is exclusively God's are more 
in favour of the rule by the few, namely the religious elite who possess the 
knowledge of God's teachings, whereas the advocates of the people's 
sovereignty prefer an open and participatory political system. As noted in 
chapter IV, the conservatives have been reluctant to accept republicanism due to 
its main connotation, i. e. the sovereignty of the people. This reluctance 
resembles a common tendency among the Islamists outside Iran, where the 
sovereignty of people is seen as contradictory to the sovereignty of God. 4 Just 
recently some scholars came to differentiate between two distinct connotations 
of sovereignty. Political authority (in the strict sense of powers relating to the 
executive branch of the state, as distinct from both the legislative and judiciary) 
has been acknowledged as residing with the people while legislation is to be 
restricted to the framework laid out by the religious scholars. Accordingly, 
elections are accepted as a proper method to choose state officials as well as 
legislators. Nevertheless, the elected officials have no right to legislate or 
execute any decision beyond the limits of Shari'a. As held by Zanjdni, `in it 
monotheistic legal system, the Will of God is the ultimate source of rules and 
W Scruton. op. cit.. p. 476. 
°D Held, David, Mode/s of Democracy, (Cambridge 1997), pp. 90-93. 
41 Apparently the argument over the contradiction between the sovereignty of God and that of 
man was brought to light by Abu- al-A'la al-Mawdüdi. the Indian scholar. See: Mawd5di, A., 
`Political Theory of Islam', in J. Donohue and J., Esposito, Islam in Transition. (New York, 
1992) 252-260, p. 258. The notion gained more influence after it was adopted by Sayyid Qutb, 
the theorist of the Muslim Brotherhood. See: Qutb. S., A/a Man fiat-Tariq. (Cairo. n. d. ) p. 
62. 
For an on-line English translation of the book. see 
x%-\ýýv-. i-nasmn. org/Books/Syed_Qutb/, Milestones/index. htni. 
151 
laws. It is also the basis upon which citizens give obedience and observe the 
law'. 42 
Compared to the conservative view, the Reformists emphasise the idea of 
representation as the essence of authority. Therefore, a republic is defined as a 
particular type of power relation with distinctive criteria and principles including 
that: 
o It is a social contract comprising reciprocal rights and duties 
whereby the rulers are responsible before the people. 
o State functions are limited to the public sphere where interests 
are shared by all society members; the will of the nation is the 
source for authority, and the common good is the objective to be 
pursued by the state. 
o The polity members are equal and citizenship is the basis 
underpinning the state-society relation. All citizens have the right 
to share in the making of decisions concerning their future, the 
way they are governed and the system through which their 
common interests are handled. The sum of individual rights 
makes up the national sovereignty. 43 
The Reformists assert that the political system set up by the Islamic 
Revolution is a legitimate contract sanctioned on the basis of religious principles 
and formulated in the 1980 constitution. Legitimate contracts involve a mutual, 
plainly-expressed consent, as well as equal rights for the contracting parties 
44 
l ajjarian relics heavily on article 56 of the Constitution which implies that the 
supposed sovereignty of God is effectively invested in the people: 
Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it 
is He Who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one 
can deprive man of this divine right, nor subordinate it to the vested 
interests of a particular individual or group. The people are to 
exercise this divine right in the manner specified in the following 
articles. 
The same idea is held by Ayatollah Montazcn, who chaired the Council 
of Experts, the board assigned to draw the Constitution45 and it mirrors, to some 
''- Zanjini, A. `Amid., Figh Siäs1, (Tehran, 1998). vol. I, p. 50. 
41 Hajjariän. Sa-eed, Jumhouriat: Afsoun-zedaci az Quclrat, (Tehran 2000) p. 754. 
" Hajjariän, ibid., p. 190 
45 Montazeri, liusayn A., Niz m al-Hukm ral-/slim. section 5, chapter 3, (Quin 2004) c. edition: 
retrieved in 
Jul., 20,2004, from www. ºnontazeri. ws/Farsi/Nezain4itini/0006. htm0017 
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extent, the division of state authority into civil and religious categories, as 
illustrated by Qaemmagämi, the conservative author, and noted in chapter IV. It 
contradicts, however, the mainstream conservative assertion that the public 
interest and the powers of the supreme leader are pre-defined by the religion. 
Political Legitimacy 
Although the constitution of the Islamic Republic regards the popular 
will as a major source for legitimacy, and indeed, the constitution itself was 
endorsed through a referendum, the post-revolutionary leadership has been, to a 
large extent, of a charismatic nature, at least until the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1989.46 Charisma can secure the legitimacy of the political system, 
although not without limitations. By its very nature, charisma is inextricably 
linked to the persons whose achievements are regarded as exceptional at a certain 
historical juncture. Thus, its legitimising function is rather limited to the lifetime 
of the charismatic leader and the particular circumstances that signified his 
achievement. With the passage of time, charisma endures a process of 
routinisation with which it ceases to function as a legitimising agent. 47 Ibrahim 
Yazdi, the leader of Nehzat-c Azddi Iran, uses this argument to conclude that 
the Islamic Republic is faced with a legitimacy crisis brought about by the poor 
performance of Khomeini's successors and their lack of charisma. He cites the 
1997 presidential election as an example, when the establishment's candidate 
endured a humiliating defeat. lie argues that the voting there was more `against' 
than `for'. -"' Some moderate figures in the conservative camp admit the existence 
of a legitimacy crisis. For instance, Hassan Rohänº, the secretary general of the 
National Security Council describes it as the major challenge facing the Islamic 
regime nowadays. 49 
y`' Bashiriyeh, Hossein. Jamc'ah Madani wa Tawsc'ah Si si dar/ran. (Tehran 1999), p. 103 
" Schweitzer, Arthur, 'Theory and Political Charisma', Comparative Studies in Sociely and 
History. vol. 16, no. 2. (Mar., 1974), 150-191, p. 159 
°" Yazdi, Ibrähiin, Sch Jmnhouri, (Tehran 2001) pp. 101-2. 
4" Rohani, Hassan, 'Darämadi bar Mashro'iat wa Karämadi', Rahhurd, no 18, (Winter 2001). 6- 
36, p. 27. 
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Generally speaking, the reformist camp is in agreement that the 
traditional principles underpinning the political system of the Islamic Republic 
are hindering its evolution. If it is to cope with the challenges of the changing 
world, it has to be legitimised on a legal-rational basis, namely the observation of 
the law and respecting the will of the peoplc. 50 This argument is consistent with 
the camp's conception of sovereignty, according to which political legitimacy, 
and hence the religious character of the state, are linked to the popular consent. 
In this regard, two trends can be traced among the Reformists: The first 
trend is represented mainly by the senior clerics, notably Ayatollah Montazeri 
and Shnci, which emphasises the religious character of the state, but regards the 
society as the bearer of religious truth. Thus, Montazeri asserts that the absolute 
authority of God is invested in the people who pass it through to the rulers by the 
means of their expressed consent. 51 The Prophet and Infallible Imams are no 
exception. Their political authority too was sanctioned through contracts (bdi `a) 
52 with the people.. Montazcri suggests that the state can be identified as Islamic 
as far as its policies conform to the religious norms. 53 Ayatollah Yousef Snnc`i, 
another figure within this trend, is concerned particularly with the excessive use 
of religion to claim permanent authority. He argues for the political role of the 
clergy to be restricted to the monitoring of the state's compliance with religious 
rules and the defending of the people against any state arbitrariness. Sane i 
ridicules the idea of people being irrational or in need of a guardian. For him, the 
religious character of the state does not necessarily entail authority for the 
clergy. There is a clear line distinguishing the legitimacy of an action from the 
authority of the actor. This principle is applied even for actions that are 
unequivocally legitimate, such as the congregational prayer. In his words: 
A cleric cannot even lead the religious congregation in prayer against 
the will of the congregation, let alone assuming political leadership 
See Yazefi. op. cit. Also Khatami. Taivscah Shi,, "i, (Tehran 2000) p. 43, and Soroush. Fcrbah-tar 
az Idco%'y. (Tehran 1999) p. 282. 
Montazeri. H.. Dirasät fi Wiliyat al-Fagih, (Beirut 1999). vol. I. p. 493. 
52Montazcri. ibid. p. 527. 
53Montazcri. IVilüyat-c Fagih wa Qanoon-c Asasi, chapter 3 (Quin 1999) e. edition. retrieved in 
Oct., 2003. from: www. montazeri. com/html/books/akhar/vclayat/vclaya0l. htrnl#link2. 
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[... ] the role of jurisprudence and its students is to offer the rules. 
The identification of how these rules are tobe applied, in other words 
the identification of the interests of the people, rests with the people 
[... ] The people have proved capable of identifying and solving 
drastic issues, defending the country, and preserving the dignity of 
the religion [... ] Those who deem the people or their majority as 
ignorant are mistaken. The people are rational and [their will is] a 
proper reference for the legitimacy of ruling [... ] We [the clergy] 
should act to protect and guide the people not to be their guardians. 
Guidance means to show the right way, not to repress and impose or 
excessively interfere in people's affairs. The idea that the people do 
not know what is good and bad for them is absolutely against both 
reason and religious traditions. 54 
The second trend is represented by the Islamist intellectuals and some 
junior clerics who dismiss any divine character of power, and hold that Islam has 
no political system of its own. ss Though Islam sanctions a set of norms to be 
realised by the polity, the Islamic state is just like any other state, conventional, 
led by fallible people and evolves through the normal process of accountability, 
responsibility and the experiencing of wrong and right. 56 For this view, 
`legitimacy is originated in justice. Being religious or not is not a criterion for 
the legitimacy of the government'. 57 
The first trend is not new to the Shi i seminaries; it can be traced back to 
the early twentieth century at least. During the Constitutional Revolution (1905- 
6), a number of eminent scholars challenged the tendency to link the legitimacy 
of the state to the perfect ruler. As `Allama Na'ini wrote in 1908: 
A perfect man satisfying the requirements illustrated in the Shi`i 
traditions, is impossible to find [... ] Even if one is found, the so- 
called internal perfection is not a sure means of restraining him or his 
state from developing into a tyranny. 5 
Alternatively, Na'ini holds that justice is achievable only by integrating 
society into political matters. Thus he illustrates a political system involving 
representation, a written constitution, definite limits on power and civil liberties 
'' Sane'i, Yousif. 'Speech in Faizia School, Quin'. ISNA (Jun., 2,2003) 
55 Shabestari, Nagdi., p. 150. 
"'Ashkoari, Hassan., Kherad darZiafat-c Din, (Tehran 1999). pp. 110-I 12. 
`'7 Soroush, Rnzdäni va Rawshanfikri va Dindari, (Tehran 2000), p. 69. 
Na'ini, 'Allima, 'Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanziih al-; vlillah', in T. Alsaif, Zidd al-I.. ctebdad, 
(Beirut 1999) p. 254. 
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to ensure accountability. 59 For Na'ini and his colleagues, people are rational 
enough to determine their own good. He compares the political system to a 
jointly-owned firn and regards it as the kingdom of the people. 60 This trend 
remained minor and isolated in the Sh19 seminaries. Nevertheless, nowadays it 
seems to be gaining more currency among the religious seminaries both inside 
and outside Iran. 61 
In addition, the Reformists assert legality as the second pillar of 
legitimacy. The sovereignty of law has been one of the central themes in the 
writings and speeches of the reformist figures. In a challenging speech before the 
Council of Experts dominated by traditional clerics, Khatami declared: 
I have repeatedly said, and I particularly told the supreme leader that 
the Constitution is the highest institution of our regime. Wiläyat al- 
fagih is significant for it has been signified by the Constitution. 
Outside the Constitution, wilayat al-faqºh is just a theory like the 
many other theories of jurisprudence. 62 
The reformist emphasis on the observation of the Constitution concerns 
mainly the constitutional limits on power. Contrary to the conservative position, 
Montazcri renounces the idea that the ruling fagih possesses an absolute 
authority and maintains that society has the indisputable right to impose 
stipulations upon which the fagih is entrusted with the state's power. It might be 
embedded in the constitution or in the form of a political agenda specifying the 
terms of rulership and political commitments. 63 Apparently, the latter idea 
59Na'ini, ibid., pp. 301-27. 
60 Na'ini, ibid., p. 285. Compare with Mcsbah Yazdi, who regards the Islamic state as 'the 
kingdom of God': M. Yazd"i, Nrzarich 
Siäsi Is/am, (Quin, 2001), p. 70. 
`'' The position of the Shi i grand exemplar in Iraq is a good example of the said trend. Ayatollah 
Sist: ini has openly dismissed any pre-fixed role for any group, including the clergy, in the Iraqi 
government. In various communiques he insisted that only through election can the 
government secure legitimacy. See: Rory McCarthy. 'The Rise of the Cleric with all the 
Answers', The Guardian (Jan., 16,2004) e. edition: 
www. guardian. co. uk/iraq/Story/0.2763,1124233,00. htini. Another example is the theory of 
Wiläyat a/-Ummah 'a/ä Naf"eha(The Nation's Self-government) advanced by Ay itollah 
Shams al-Din of Lebanon, see: Shams al-Din M., Nizin, a/-Hukrn iva a/-Id rah 11al-Is/am, 
(Beirut 1991) pp. 416-460. 
r'' Khatami, M, Tawse'ah Siäsi, p. 81. 
63 Montazcri, H.. Khatcrät, chapter 10. c. edition, retrieved in April 2004 from : 
www. montazcri. com., 'html/books/khatcrat/KHATER50. htmlink414 
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concerned the temporary and time-limited mandate and the direct election of the 
leader which arose after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Democracy 
With the Islamic revolution, the Iranians had the opportunity to have a 
say in how their country would he run. As suggested by Beetham, revolutions 
usually lead to the expansion of popular involvement in the new political order. 64 
Ten years after the revolution, the popular influence on the Islamic regime 
seemed to have decreased by and large. 65 Certainly the transition from a 
revolutionary situation into a consolidated state changes the balance of power 
and the sources of influence to the advantage of the professionals and elites. The 
extent of potential influence retained by the people depends, however, upon the 
new political system developing an institutionalized exchange of input-output 
between the state and society. The extent of the state's observation of public 
opinion and demands depends on the system being modelled either after a 
democracy or autocracy. 66 On the other hand, the political system's development 
of democratic features is certainly helped, or otherwise hindered, by whether the 
nature of the society's political culture is participatory or parochial. There has to 
be a general conviction that the country's problem can be solved through the 
participation of the people in decision-making and political matters in the 
broader sense. This requires, according to Lerner, `an expansive and adaptive 
self-system, ready to incorporate new roles and to identify personal values with 
public issues. '67 
Despite the familiarity of the Iranians with the notion of political 
participation since, at least, the Constitutional Revolution, many scholars are 
"' Bcetham, David, The Legitimnation of Power, (London 1991). p. 313. 
`6 Bashiriych, op. cit., p. 89. 
`'` Huntington takes public mobilisation as the first sign of modernisation but warns that it also 
develops an ' explosive rise of aspirations' and argues that unless the political system becomes 
efficiently institutionalised, these aspirations can convert into frustration and pave the way for 
the rise of authoritarianism. Huntington, S. 'Political Development and Political Decay'. 
World Politics, vol. 17, issue 3, (Apr.. 1965), 386-430. p. 405 
67 Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society. (New York 1965), p. 51. 
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reluctant to deem the Iranian political culture as participatory. 
68 Zibäkaläm, a 
university professor, ascribes the lack of a democratic ethos in Iran to the 
country's long history of despotism. 69 Katouzian links the said phenomenon, 
until the oil era at least, to the ecological limitations of the country which 
dictated a type of political economy that was not conducive to equitable power 
distribution. He challenges the Marxist-inspired theory of the Asiatic Mode of 
Production, or Oriental Despotism, as irrelevant to the context of Iran. He argues 
that, historically, the state has been able to remain independent from society. 
Iran is a vast and mainly and desert. Production used to be dispersed among 
scattered villages, none of which was able to produce a surplus large enough to 
generate political power. 7° Thus, he argues that `the distinctive characteristic of 
the Iranian state is that it monopolized not just power, but arbitrary power, not 
the absolute power in laying down the law, but the absolute power of exercising 
lawlessness' 
. 
71 Lerner makes a similar argument to explain the lack of a 
participatory political culture in the Iranian society. His account, however, 
focuses on the extremism which is associated with life under the said ecological 
limitations, and emphasises that it is a hindrance to the emergence of a mutual 
understanding or 'empathy'. 72 He defines the latter notion as the capacity to see 
oneself in the other fellow's situation as well as the readiness to incorporate new 
roles and take part within collective actions. 73 
With the emergence of oil as the major source of national income in the 
1940s, the Iranian state acquired a rentier character. According which the state 
not only has remained independent from the society, but the society has come 
gradually to be dependent on the state's expenditure for its livelihood. 
'Given 
69 Morädi, Hassan, Khod-tnadäri Iranian, (Tehran 2001) p. 202. 
`'`' Zibakaläm, Sädiq, Mi Chegounah Mä Shudh n, (Tehran 1996). p. 112. 
"' Katouzian, Homa, 'The Aridiosolatic Society: A Model of Long-Tenn Social and Economic 
Development in Iran'. /ntcmationo/Journal of, t'iddlc East Stm ic.,. vol. 15, no. 2 (May, 1993). 
259-281. p. 270. 
Katouzian, ibid.. p. 265. 
,2 Lerner, op. cit., p. 362. 
7.1 Lerner. ibid., pp. 50-51. 
74 Shambayati. Flootan, 'The Renticr State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Atitonoiny: State 
and Business in Turkey and Iran'. Comparative Politics, vol. 26, no. 3. (Apr., 1994), 307-331, p. 
319. 
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the religiously-justified passivism as discussed in chapter one, and the excessive 
use of security apparatus by the state during most of the twentieth century, 
despotism became by and large the ordinary fashion of politics in Iran. The 
course of democratisation therefore requires much more than drawing up a good 
constitution or establishing a parliament, though these are undoubtedly essential 
for any democratic system. This shows how arduous the course of 
democratisation in Iran is. 
The Reformists have to deal with a wide range of issues: constitutional, 
institutional, cultural and political, none of which is easy. Given the particular 
state of affairs in today's Iran, the cultural issue seems to be the most urgent. 
The question put by Binder in the introduction to his Islamic Liberalism is 
certainly voiced by many people: `Is the discourse of Islamic liberals a fornn of 
false consciousness, an abject submission to the hegemonic discourse of the 
dominant secular Western capitalist, or whether it is practical, rational, and 
emancipatory? '75 For post-revolutionary Iran, the Western and secular 
orientation of democracy has been even more troublesome due to the religious 
character of the regime and its anti-Western orientation. 
Generally speaking, for most of the fifteen years following the 1979 
Revolution, the teen `democracy', indeed most of the Western-oriented terms 
with political connotations, were rarely current in the Iranian mass media as well 
as in the language of the leaders and propagators. As Esposito and Voll rightly 
noted, `for Khomeini, as for some other Islamists, the term "democracy" is often 
associated with the West and thus Western penetration, as well as with a society 
governed by human rather than divine law'. 76 When Khatami launched his 
electoral campaign in 1997, he used the term mardomsaliri-c decni (literally: 
`religious people's sovereignty'), a Farsi equivalent to the term "religion-based 
democracy". Khatami's conciliatory term did not gain a smooth reception in 
traditional circles until recently77 when it came to be employed occasionally by 
7' Binder, Leonard, Islamic Liberalism, (Chicago, 1989). p. 5. 
1' Esposito, J., and Voll. J., Is/ain and Democracy, (Oxford, 1996), p. 64. 
" According to Jalaipour. the conservatives started to use the term 'Islamic democracy' after the 
events of Sep.. 11.2001 in order to differentiate themselves from the radical trend associated 
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some conservative figures as identical to their own conception of religious 
regime, i. e. the representative system supervised by wiläyat al-fagih. 78 Thus the 
use of the terms `democracy' and `religious democracy' remained, at least until 
2002, distinctive characters of the Reformists' political language. 79 
The argument over democratisation in Iran demonstrates three distinct 
areas of interest. The first concerns the functional sense of democracy, namely its 
being a method of public representation and peaceful transfer of power through 
general elections, the separation of powers, universal suffrage, and so on. The 
second concerns its philosophical foundations, namely the sovereignty of the 
people, equality, natural rights, and so on. The third concerns the ideological 
orientations of democracy, namely its origination within Western culture. The 
second area has attracted a good deal of the conservative argument, as shown in 
the previous chapter. Nevertheless, the third area has been the centre of 
contention. In this regard, democracy is seen as a reflection of the historical 
experience of Western communities, so that it embodies their response to the 
particular challenges they have endured. "() As it is nonsense to import problems, 
it is by the same token illogical to import their solutions. 
The major argument put forward by the Reformists to affirm the 
relevance of democracy to the Iranian context is the idea that state tyranny has 
been the major defect in the modern history of Iran. 81 The state manipulation of 
power and resources served to humiliate the people and hinder the course of 
progress. Democracy provides a viable model for changing the balance of power 
so that the society masters its government. "' Shabestari takes the argument 
further and argues that democracy is as necessary for religion as for society. Ile 
emphasises the two components of democracy, namely civil liberties and 
with Bin Laden. Jalaipour, H.. 'Democracy Dini Mohafczc-caranah va Islah-talaban', Yas-c, Vo. 
(Feb.. 5.2004) , p. 2. 
See for example the suggestions made by Ayatollah Khaz'aii, ISNA, Feb 5.2003. 
71' Allab month/y: vol. 22, (Feb., 2002). p. 22. 
Misbäh Yazd, `Hukümat va Mashro'iat', Kitab-e Nagd. no. 7, (Summer 1998). e. edition, 
retrieved from www. hawzah. nct/Pcr/Magazine/KN/007/kn00703. htin 
Khatami, Muhammad, 4-yen va Andishch dar Dim-c Khodkimcgi, (Tehran, 2001) p. 434. 
2 Hajjarian, Jumhouriat. op. cit. 726-8. 
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equality, and contends that only `through the model of liberal democracy can the 
two major objectives of the religion, namely justice and emancipation, be 
realised'. 83 
The Reformists acknowledge the ideological orientations of democracy 
but do not see them as inextricably part of the model. Being of foreign origin 
does not affect its value. For Khatami, democracy is better seen as one of the 
pillars of modernity. '4 In addition to its political components, modernity enjoys a 
considerable interest among Iranians as it symbolises a common desire to restore 
the historical status of Iran as a great nation. Khatami condemns both the 
childish imitation of other models as well as the stubborn rejection of ideas 
merely for being foreign . 
85 In contrast, he urges Iranian intellectuals to study 
critically what he takes as the pillars of modern civilization, which include 
liberalism, individuality, priority of rights and rationality. In this view modernity 
represents a phase in the long history of humanity; it has to be read, criticised 
and dealt with as one of the solutions reached by man in his constant struggle for 
progress and integrity. It is a human achievement bearing advantages and 
disadvantages and not a locked system to be taken all-or-none. "6 Khatami 
therefore argues that for democracy to be established, its principles have to be re- 
grounded in the local cultural web. The localisation of democracy aims to 
maintain its major theme, namely the sovereignty of people, and concurrently to 
enable the people to choose the appropriate methods to put it into action. 
87 For 
him, the localised version of democracy is relevant to Iranian concerns, especially 
the religious character of the nation. 
The Idea of `Religious Democracy' 
The idea of religious democracy was initially proposed by `Abdol-Karim 
Soroush, the reformist thinker, apparently as a counter argument to the 
"} Shabestari, M., 'Mardomsaläri Dini Chist? '. Afatb, vol. 7, (Aug.. 2001). 4-9, p. 4. 
"' Khatami, M., Az Duniä-ye Shahr to Shahr-c Dunia, (Tehran 2000), p. 295. 
ßc5 Khatami, ibid., p. 295. 
«' Khatami, ibid., pp. 271-293 
X' Khatami, Tawsc'ah Siis7, p. 44 
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conservative notion of ideal polity. " The idea began to attract national attention 
after Khatami made it the slogan of his campaign for the 1997 presidential 
election. Soroush's focus was the philosophical basis of democracy and its 
relevance to religion, whereas Khatami's has been the political application of the 
doctrine. The association of democracy with religion has triggered a good deal of 
argument. Many of Khatami's opponents and friends alike saw his proposal as 
rather ambiguous and intrinsically inconsistent. 59 The Reformists acknowledge 
these reservations but argue that with an analytical approach to both religion and 
democracy, the two would show a good capacity for mutual accommodation. 90 
Apart from its religious character, the reformist conception of democracy 
bears little difference from the universal model, especially in respect of its 
functional and philosophical dimensions. `We are arguing over an established 
model, well-defined and widely exercised, rather than a utopia' says Ayatollah 
Shabcstari. 9' This model proposes a set of principles and institutions that aim to 
minimise the faults of political administration through the maximum possible 
engagement of the population in policy-making and reducing the personal 
influence of leaders . 
112 A democratic state is distinguished by an observation of 
public opinion and an absolute respect for human rights. 93 For democracy to 
mature, democratic values should run through every part of public life, including 
the economy, education, media, justice and so on. On the political level however, 
the democratic system has three features at least: 94 
1- A comprehensive, meaningful and periodical contest for power. 
2- Universal participation in the election of leaders and the 
'Alavitabar, op. cit., pp. 124-5. In 1991 Soroush offered his first precise account on the idea. 
especially on the correspondence between religion and democracy. it carne in the fonn of a 
lecture delivered at a seminar on human rights held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An 
edited version of the lecture was later published in his book 'Ferbehtar az ldeology'pp. 273- 
2K3. 
See for instance. Dayhimi, Khashayar, 'Mardomsaläri-e Dint Bed'at dar 'Elm-c Siäsat', Aftah, 
no 22, (Jan., 2003). p. 27 
Khatami, Muhammad, 'Mardomsaläri-c Dini', Tabarestan Sabz. vol. 15, (Sep. 22,2001). pp. 5- 
7. Retrieved from : www. kadivar. coin/litin/farsi/papcrs/paperOO6. htin 
Shabcstan, M., 'Mardomsaläri-c Dini', op. cit., p. 4. 
Soroush, Fcrbeh-tar. op. cit, p. 269. 
'> Soroush, ibid 
, p. 
279. 
94 'Alavitabär, op. cit. 
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determination of political choices. 
3- Social and political freedoms, notably the freedom of expression 
and organisation. 
The notion of civil society occupies a pivotal place in reformist discourse. 
Reformists promote the notion based on both a theoretical and a practical basis. 
On the one hand the robust activity of civil society organisations is regarded as a 
crucial catalyst for the process of democratisation. On the other, the notion is put 
forward as an antithesis to that of huzu-T dar sahneh ('presence on stage') or 
public mobility, which is taken by the conservatives as the real embodiment of 
public participation, but regarded by the Reformists as an example of populism, 
rather than democratic participation. 95 A good part of reformist literature is 
dedicated to condemning populism and its manifestations in local politics. 96 
According to Khatami, populism unfolds through the ruling elite considering 
itself the source of right, or the faultless group and so on. People arc praised by 
the rulers, their active role in politics is welcomed, but they can neither hold 
their rulers to account nor do they have the final say in respect of the polity's 
major concerns. 97 He maintains that for the collective rationality to function in a 
systematic and informed fashion, the political system should be designed 
appropriately to feature such standards as a high level of public participation in 
decision-making, a fair distribution of power and resources, transparency, 
accountability, guaranteed liberties and equal rights for all citizens. 
" For 
Jalaipour, the principal factor that distinguishes democracy from populism and 
crowd politics is the institutional differentiation and distribution of power 
between the state and the society. This is realised by the state acknowledging the 
role of civil society and providing it with legal protection so that it can 
efficiently channel public demands through to state institutions. 99 
" Kadi' ar, Mohsen, Daghdaghah-hyc Hukr/mat-c Dini, (Tehran 2000) p. 261. 
"`' See, for instance, Muhammadi's analysis of Hizbullah as a principal instance of the populist 
conception of political participation in Iranian politics. Muhammadi, Majced, Jan, c'ah Mad.? ni 
Iran. (Tehran, 1999), pp. 101-112 
"' Khatami. 'Mardomsalari-c.. ', op. cit. 
WN Khatami, Tai. cc'ah. op. cit, pp. 47-50. 
°° Jalaipour. H.. Pas az Dovourn Khordi d, op. cit., p. 233. 
163 
Religion and Democracy 
The Reformists' conception of the religion-democracy relationship 
derives from their basic differentiation between the function of religion and that 
of the state. For them, the state is about representing the various interests in the 
social theatre and handling its conflicts. Thus it needs a model of administration 
capable of solving conflicts in a peaceful manner, and that is the model of 
democracy. 10° Religion for its part is mainly about man's existence, ethics and 
attachment to God. The realm of the state is characterised by pragmatism, 
compromise and finally violence. In contrast, religion is a realm of surrender, 
selflessness and voluntary action. Soroush specifies the difference between 
religion and state in that the former is a realm of mystery (rä4 whereas the state 
is a realm of reason and material realities. '"' In brief, religion and state seek 
different objectives as well as different ways of functioning. Democracy, 
therefore, is a method appropriate for the state and not for religion. It is possible 
to seek a reading of religion appropriate for democracy, Hajjariän argues, but 
strictly regarding the function of the state, not the religion itself. Put differently, 
religion can just as much foster a democratic state as it might be used to 
legitimise an authoritarian one. In either case, the central question is about the 
state, and not religion or democracy. '°2 
In this regard, it is argued that Islam has no particular model of 
government, whereas democracy has nothing to do with religion. 1113 In other 
words, democracy is a model of government and not an ideology, thus, it is not 
contradictory to religion but to the other ruling models, namely autocracy and 
oligarchy. Within a democratic system, both religion and the ruling model have a 
distinct role. Religion provides the values, the objectives and norms to be 
realised by the political system. On the other hand democracy, as a model of 
government, defines the methods by which those purposes are fulfilled. Thus it 
Shabestan, Nagdi.., op. cit., p. 108. 
Soroush, Bast-c Tojrebah.., op. cit., p. 361. 
"''- Hajjariän, Az Shähed-e Qudsi to Shähcd-c Baziri, (Tehran 2001) pp. 132-4. 
1113 Shabestari, Nagdi.., op. cit., p. 109. 
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determines the institutions, the process of decision- making and the standards of 
m104 
The religious character of the state is understood to be in two 
forms: "" 
a) The Islamic state is accepted as such by the Muslim society. The state 
is deemed Islamic in reference to the basis that the society is the audience 
addressed by Divine revelation; hence, it is the agency that assigns religious 
value to institutions and actions in the public sphere. 
b) The state is observant of the religious criteria of ruling. Religious 
criteria are defined in accordance with the particular method of interpretation of 
the religion held by the reformist trend. In this regard, it is argued that most of 
the principles concerning rulership, including justice, freedom, equality and so 
on, are religiously-sanctioned but not of religious origin. 
Standing by his theory of the contextual nature of religious knowledge, 
Soroush argues that the observation of religious teachings on the part of the 
government cannot be other than subjective and contextual. '116 Basically, the 
policies and institutions that enact the principles are man-made. Statesmen 
consider how to apply the principles and design the methods to deliver what they 
think is right. Their perception and the methods of enacting the theoretical 
assumptions have inevitable influence on the final output. In this case, human 
reason determines the objectives - and priorities - which are supposed to have 
been meant by the sacred text, the way to have them delivered, and the criteria 
against which the purpose is determined to have been satisfied. This process can 
be carried out in accordance with the judgements made by a few people from the 
higher ranks of the state, or it can be carried out through a systematic recourse to 
the collective rationality of the whole society. In either case, the result is a 
human conception of God's will and not the will of God itself. To this extent, 
the preference for the latter method over the former cannot be questioned. That 
" Khatami, Mardomsaläri-e Dini, op. cit. 
1115 Shabcstari, Nagdi., op. cit., pp. 112-117. 
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process is deemed by the traditional clerics as religious, for it delivers religious 
rules, while the Reformists perceive it in terms of an exploration of the common 
good, whether it is fostered by religious teachings or initiated by society 
members. Thus it is more of a rational technique than a religious process. 
The Reformists' Frame of Reference 
The Constitutional Revolution has opened a prolonged debate on the 
religion-state relation and Islam's capacity to foster a modern way of life. The 
emergence of the Islamic revolution unleashed more questions, many of which 
are still attracting the attention of intellectuals both inside and outside Iran. 
Some of these questions have been already addressed through the discourse of 
the religious reformative trend which paved the way for a new phase in the 
religious thought. 107 
Naturally, the intellectual debates in the post-revolutionary period have 
been highly influenced by the political arrangements which ensued from the 
revolution. The change of the social structure, roles, positions and the political 
rivalry among the post-revolutionary elite have collectively shaped the 
contemporary course of intellectual debate. The refonnist thinkers bear some of 
the universal characteristics of the intellectuals: they are critical of the state of 
affairs and their general tendency is anti-traditionalist and anti-clerical. 
Obviously the harassment they have experienced at the hands of their 
conservative rivals since Ayatollah Khamenei's rise to supreme leadership has 
driven them to be preoccupied with such ideas as hegemony, traditions, 
authoritarianism and the excessive use of right. 10" Thus their discourse has 
focused on such ideas as plurality, modernity, democracy and power limitation. 
These ideas are being applied to both religious and political spheres, simply 
because the centre of controversy has been the issue of authority. In the Islamic 
"" 'Alavitabär, A.. op. cit.. p. 29. For more on the refonnativc role of the intellectuals in regard of 
the religious traditions, see: Shils, E., 'Tradition' Comparative Studies in Society and History: 
vol. 13, no. 2, (Apr., 1971), pp. 122-159. On the contextual determinants of their behaviour, 
sec: Ringer, F., 'The Intellectual Field, Intellectual History, and the Sociology of Knowledge', 
7hcorvand Society. vol. 19, no. 3. (Jun., 1990), pp. 269-294. 
Jos Ansari, (3004), op. cit., p. 274. 
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Republic religious and political authorities are inextricably linked together on 
the constitutional as well as the political and social levels. 
One of the consequences of such debates has been the rethinking of the 
role of ideology as a hindrance to rational thinking, as well as to individual 
emancipation. The term `ideology' explains how values, expectations and 
prescriptions for the organisation of society are structured to produce a 
harmonised system of meanings and explanations about the self and the world. 
McClosky defines ideology as 
systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, that 
justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, 
identify political right and wrong, set forth the interconnections 
(casual and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity. 109 
The concept owes to the Marxist traditions its place in modern 
intellectual debates. From this perspective, ideology is linked to class interests, 
and thus it is commonly seen as a means employed by the dominant classes to 
justify and affirm their hegemony. 11" Despite the focus on domination and 
hegemony, the function of ideology is more justified. It is employed literally by 
every group, including those opposing the sociopolitical order and the alienated, 
since, as suggested by Shils, ideology involves an aggressive alienation from the 
existing society. ''' It is not strange, thus, to see it commonly associated with 
groups of the extreme left or right. 
The Reformists' criticism of ideology aims apparently to undermine the 
universality of the particular paradigm of religiosity espoused by the clerical 
elite. The paradigm is called Islam-c fagahati (the jurisprudential interpretation 
of Islam) and is officially presented as the pure Islam of Prophet Muhammad 
(Islam-nib-c Muhammad as distinguished from the one held by the 
intellectuals, which is deemed by the conservatives to be tainted with liberal or 
Cited in Gerring, J., 'Ideology: A Definitional Analysis', Political Research Quarterly. vol. 50, 
no. 4. (Dec., 1997), 957-994, p. 959. 
'' Gerring, ibid., p. 970. 
111 Gcrring, ibid.. p. 971. 
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socialist Views. 112 For Soroush, indeed most of the reformist thinkers, the glory 
of Islam and its deep influence on man's soul is contingent upon its being 
available equally for every human being. 113 In this account, religion is a direct 
path linking man to his God, with no medium or guide other than his own soul. 
Contrastingly, a religion in power could develop into an ideology of domination. 
Soroush insists that a religion-based ideology is not immune from the common 
symptoms of other ideologies: it conceals reality, degrades reason and hinders 
the free exchange of information and opinions. ' 14 Being a state ideology, religion 
will have its function altered from inspiring the high morals into justifying class 
domination. ' 15 
Soroush's critical position with regard to religious ideology is not limited 
to the ruling clergy. Earlier, he criticised Shari'ati's perception of religion, which 
was modelled after the socialist notion of class struggle. 16 Shari`ati argues for 
Islam, Shi'ism in particular, as an ideology for activism. In the absence of an 
ideology of resistance, Shari`ati argues, Islam would continue to be a utility at 
the disposal of the higher classes, both from the state and the religious 
establishment. ' '7 Retaining his assumption that religious knowledge is 
subjective, relative and temporary in nature, Soroush blames Shari`ati for 
treating his interpretation as the only rightful perception of Islam. In his final 
analysis, Shari`ati's ideology was useful in a certain epoch, but is outdated now, 
thus it is better dealt with as a landmark in the history of the nation and not as a 
continuously valid trend of thought. " 
112 For the major features of the so-called 'pure Islam' from the view point of Ayatollah 
Khamenci, see: 'Islam-nib-c Muhammadi'. retrieved on Jun., 22,2004, from: 
www. hawzah. net/Per/E/do. asp? a=cfcbc. hrin. For a counter account, see Ganji, op. cit., p. 76. 
Soroush, Räzdäni op. cit., p. 124. 
Soroush, ibid., p. 80. 
In comparison, Hajjariän equates state religion with civil religion and argues that the 
emergence of such a version of religion is inescapable in such nations as Iran. Hajjarian, Atz 
Shahcd-e Qudsi, op. cit., p. 151. 
On Shari'ati's thought, see Akhavi, 'Shari'ati's Social Thought', in Keddie, N., Religion and 
Politics in Iran, (New Haven 1993) pp. 125-144. 
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A good deal of Soroush's works are dedicated to defending the role of 
intellectuals in advancing religious thought and social life alike. He argues that 
`No revolution can be sustained if it fails to regenerate its theory and that is the 
job of intellectuals'. ' 19 Intellectuals play an historical role for `they always 
motivated the clergy to regenerate; they are needed today more than before 
because the clergy has engaged with power and become more ready for 
degeneration'. 12" The major defect of clerical knowledge is seen in its adherence 
to the past, which has made it ignorant of the modern realities of society and 
culture: 
We see no significant contribution by the clergy to the debate on 
such questions as rights, freedom, justice, happiness, and the other 
theoretical issues related to modernization [... ] In comparison, the 
intellectuals simultaneously recognise the significance of the 
traditions and modern knowledge, they analyse the traditions in the 
framework of modern notions and practical requirements, and by so 
doing they bridge the present and the past. '21 
The Refonnists' reading of religion is grounded in the principle of the 
plurality of interpretation. Indeed pluralism in respect of religion, culture, as well 
as politics, represents one of the axes of reformist political ideology. Soroush has 
entitled one of his controversial books Sirithx yc Mustagir (Right Paths) as a 
direct challenge to the doctrine of the single right path commonly held among 
Muslims. The Reformists' reading seeks, therefore, to undermine the clerical 
claims of having the sole authoritative interpretation of the religious 
fundamncntals. The relevance of the latter to current realities is dismissed on 
three bases: '22 
- It serves to marginalisc the political role of the people. 
- It serves as a pretext to suppress those who hold different opinions. 
- It lacks scientific authenticity. 
The most rigorous argument over the scientific authenticity of traditional 
jurisprudence was advanced by Muhammad Mujtahid Shabcstaii, a cleric and 
I'" Soroush, ibid, p. 49. 
120 Soroush, ibid., p. 53. 
121 Soroush, ibid., p. 51. 
122 Shabcstan, VVagdi. op. cit.. p. 31 
169 
doctor of philosophy. Shabestari was born in 1936. He trained in the Qum 
seminaries and held the title of Ayatollah, signifying his attainment of the degree 
of Ijtihad. Between 1970 and 1979 he worked as the director of the Islamic 
Centre in Hamburg, Germany, where he became familiar with modern Christian 
theology. Shabestari is preoccupied with the reconciliation of religion and 
modernity. Like Soroush, he calls for the differentiation of religious knowledge 
from religion. 123 However, he focuses on the methodology of interpretation of 
the sacred texts and the methods of application of religious rules. His discourse is 
deeply influenced by the philosophical hermeneutics developed by Protestant 
theologians. Hermeneutics initially aimed to discover the values and message 
embedded in the sacred texts. In the twentieth century, however, it was 
expanded, notably by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1900-2002) to emphasise the broader realm of art and literature and to take 
human existence as its main question. In his Hermeneutics, Ketib va Sunhat 
(Hermnencutics, the Scripture and Tradition) and Naqdi bar Qar 'at-cRastni az 
Din (A Critique of the Official Reading of Religion), Shabestari offers many 
reflections on Heidegger, Gadamer, and Karl Barth (1886-1968). 
Heidegger signifies pre-understanding as the agency to determine what 
we understand, hence he holds that `no understanding without pre- 
understanding'. '24 Gadamer terms this as the `horizon' or the totality of our 
being as determined by the totality of past and present experiences . 
125 Thus, 
hermeneutic consciousness has an open horizon, a horizon in motion and 
constant change. According to Gadamer: 
The projecting of the historical horizon, then, is only a phase in the 
process of understanding, and does not become solidified into the 
self-alienation of a past consciousness, but is overtaken by our 
present horizon of understanding. In the process of understanding 
there takes place a real fusing of horizons, which means that as the 
historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed. 126 
123 Shabestari, ibid., p. 100. 
124 Achtemcier, Paul, An Introduction to the Nerv //enncneutic. (Philadelphia, 1969)., p. 
1 '` Scung, T., Semiotics and Theinatics in Hermeneutics. (New York. 1992), p. 173. 
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Shabestan employs the idea of `horizon' to undermine the method of 
literal interpretation common in the Shi'i seminaries. This method is based on 
the idea that the grammatical construction and the historical context of the text 
convey the plain meaning which is taken as a correspondent to the intention of 
the legislator. Following philosophical hermeneutics, Shabestafi contends that 
the linguistic form of Divine words corresponds to the horizon of the recipient 
community. This is understandable for the Divine message has to capture the 
hearts and minds of its primary recipients in order to be embraced and passed 
through to other communities. '27 The Divine message is about the values 
transmitted through forms and not the forms themselves. 128 He argues that the 
literal interpretation has lost its rational bedrock, for it has sanctioned forms 
which are contextual and temporary. This explains the gulf between religious 
teachings and the imperatives of contemporary life. 129 
Shabestaii takes the basic values of religion as the only institution 
possessing sanctity and universality. Values can embody different forms at 
different times. Almost all religious rules concerning aspects of life other than 
mere worship do not have a universal or sacred character. 13" This includes both 
the rules developed by scholars and those stated in the sacred texts. For 
Shabestami, each generation can formulate, on the basis of collective rationality, 
the institutions and regulations fulfilling the particular imperatives of their time. 
Forms should serve rational ends, nevertheless without violating the basic values 
of religion. One of the examples he notes is the model of government. He argues 
that Islam does not specify a certain model as its favourite. What concerns the 
legislator is the essence of government, i. e. justice, and not its form. 
131 
Shabcstari's hennencutical approach, together with Soroush's theory on 
religious knowledge, offers a distinct interpretational approach to religion. The 
127 Shabestari, Hcnnencutics, Ketäb va Sunnat. (Tehran 2000) p. 48. 
12" Shabcstarl. ibid, p. 66. 
12) Shabcstari, Nagdi.. op. cit., p. 65. 
Shabcstari, Hennencutic, op. cit.. p. RR 
ý'ý Shabcstari, Nagdi, op. cit., p. 150. 
171 
approach features a number of key notions, summed up by Khatami in seven 
principles: 132 
1- Man is self-sufficient by the fact that he bears the spirit of God 
and reason which is deemed as the internal messenger of God. 
2- The role of religion is more one of guidance. It might interfere 
wherever roan proves incapable, but for most of the aspects of life, 
apprehension, explanation and regulations are to be sought in 
science and collective rationality, rather than religion. 
3- Science is a distinct realm of human activity. It interacts with 
religion, yet each of the two retains its own sphere and objectives. 
This assumption is applicable to the natural, empirical, as well as 
human sciences. 
4- As a public affair, politics is a realen of reason and collective 
rationality where good and bad are discovered through methods of 
trial and error. In this realm, no value or rule is Divinely- 
sanctioned (ta`abbodi) or beyond human appraisal and 
verification. In the public sphere, religion offers basic values and 
general criteria according to which Islamic politics can take shape. 
The observance of such values and criteria is generally of a 
negative sense, i. e. it shows the final limits not to be breached 
rather than defining a plan to follow. 
5- Islam does not specify a definite model for state administration. 
6- Other than the fixed rules concerning mainly the worship of God, 
most religious rules are changeable in accordance with common 
sense and rational ends. 
7- Religion aims mainly to enrich man's consciousness of his 
existence and his understanding, thus ensuring his harmony with 
the surrounding world. 
Secularism 
As noted above, the secular character of democracy has been the chief 
point of contention among the conservatives. For the Rcfonnists, however, 
secularism is not seen as an inextricable part of democracy. Compared with the 
mainstream Islamists who indiscriminately reject secularism as contradictory to 
religion, the Iranian Reformists seen largely tolerant of it. This position is clear 
in their handling of such issues as the religion-state relation, culture, social 
behaviour and so on. They tend, however, to be careful not to stand with the 
132 Khataini, 'Mardornsalari-e', op. cit. 
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outspoken advocates of secularism. They insist on the claim that what they offer 
is an intellectual reading of Islam, distinct from both secularism and religious 
traditionalism. '33 To counter the conservative accusation that the Reformists' 
perception of religion is secular-oriented and Western-inspired, 134 Reformist 
thinkers insist on the differentiation between secularism as an ideology and 
secularisation as a process. The most rigorous account in this regard was made 
by Sa`ced I; lajjariän in his controversial book Az Shihed-e Qudsi to Shähed-e 
BazthZ Hajjariän denounces secularism but argues that the process of 
secularisation is inescapable. 135 Following the traditions of Max Weber, he 
asserts that the state is the most powerful means for secularisation. Thus he 
emphasises the rise of the Islamic Republic as the first step on a road leading 
eventually to the rise of a completely new type of religiosity. 136 
In 1996, Hajjarian provoked a fierce argument by claiming that 
Khomeini's theory of the jurist's absolute authority (wiläyat-e mutlagah) 
serves effectively to secularise religious law, or, in his words, reconciles figh 
with mores by reproducing the fonner within the limits of the latter., 
37 Until the 
rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, Hajjarian argues, Shi`i jurisprudence has been 
resistant to the new trends unleashed by the changes of its own social 
environment and the world. Khomeini's charismatic personality helped to impose 
his ideas at the expense of many of the principles established by the religious 
community. 139 
Hajjariän argues that Ayatollah Khomeini was aware of the cost to be 
paid for the adaptation of jurisprudential rules to the legal system of the state. 
He emphasises Khomeini's development - and indeed enforcement - of the 
rational-oriented notion of maslahat-e nezam (the regime's interest) as a major 
1" 'Alavitabar, op. cit.,, p. 25. 
114 Qäcmrnagämi, 'A., Qudrat va Mashro'iat, (Tehran 2000), p. 55. 
'3' Hajjariin, AzShahcd-c, op. cit., p. 89. 
"' Hajjarihn, ibid.. p. 97. 
1 `7 The article 'Faräicnd 'Urfi-shodan-c Fiqh-c Shi'i' was first published in lei}: in, no. 24 (April. 
1996) and then in his Az Shahed-c Qudsi, pp. 69-91- 
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instance of the way through which the state affects the function of religion. 
According to this notion, the expediency of the political system is a criterion to 
determine whether parliamentary legislations can be blocked on the basis of 
being incompatible with religious principles. As he puts it: 
The integration of the institution of jurisprudence into the 
institution of the state, and particularly the hegemony of the idea 
[propagated by Khomeini] that equates religion with politics, 139 led 
to the political institution imposing its requirements and features 
upon the religious institution. The State, particularly in modern 
times, is the strongest machine of secularisation. Statesmen act on 
the basis of conventional rationality and when the institution of 
jurisprudence is amalgamated with the state, the former will 
inescapably adapt to that type of function. 140 
To debate about secularism from a neutral platfonn is not an easy task in 
any Muslim society, let alone a religious system, as is the case in Iran. The issue, 
however, is too controversial and challenging to be brushed aside. It sits at the 
very heart of the debate on development, modernity and democratisation. The 
failure of the Muslim elites to properly address the issue has effectively hindered 
the emergence of a robust discourse fostering democracy and liberalisation in 
Iran as well as other Muslim societies. The problematic nature of secularism, 
especially its applicability to modernisation and democratisation, forms a major 
part of the Reformist discourse. There seems a general acquiescence that a 
degree of secularism is inevitable, yet new approaches have to be advanced in 
order to formulate a kind of localised conception of secularism, a conception that 
is able, on the one hand, to explain the functional correspondence between the 
religious and non-religious factors of worldly affairs, and on the other hand allow 
for an active role for both religion and reason, each in its own right. 
To put it differently, unlike the conservatives, who think of a religious 
world, the Reformist thinkers are convinced that there is, in the real world, two 
distinguishable realms, religious and non-religious. The application of reason in 
139 Khomeini takes religion and politics to be one and the same. He often reiterated a phrase 
attributed to Sayyid Hassan Mudarres, a religious leader and politician murdered by Reza 
Pahlavi in 1937, stating that 'our politics is exactly our religion and our religion is exactly our 
politics'. 
1411 Hajjariän, op. cit., pp. 94-5. 
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general and to its own realm in particular does not necessarily entail a 
contradiction with religion. 141 This realm is universally called secular. The notion 
was developed within the Western frame of knowledge and, due to this particular 
course of evolution, it took an anti-religious flavour. Yet this contextual 
condition does not change the actual situations, nor does it constrain other 
societies to develop a similar conception of the differentiation between the 
religious and non-religious. On this basis many of the Reformist thinkers, 
notably llajjariän and Soroush, made substantial efforts to formulate the term 
`urf as a synonym for secularism and `urfi-shodan for secularisation. The two 
terms have the same meanings as the English terms, but with a less aggressive 
connotation. 'Urf, an Arabic term common in Farsi, means `convention' or the 
ideas and modes of behaviour that are considered acceptable to most members of 
a society, hence it closely relates to common sense or public consent. 
Hajjariän puts forth the same idea with regard to the integration of 
religious values within social institutions. He also employs the notion of a civil 
religion to emphasise the difference between religious values in the abstract and 
social actions based upon them. "' He argues that the process of enactment of 
religious beliefs by the community involves a compromise between religious 
ideals, society's perception of them and the limitations pertaining to social 
institutions. Hajjariän holds that the conversion of religious values and ideals 
into localised conventions is an unstoppable process and represents a pcnnancnt 
associate of socialisation. The exchange between religious ideals and 
conventions takes two forms: conventions are created or modified to satisfy 
certain principles, or the principle is applied in a certain manner to satisfy an 
established convention. Thus he contends that many of the so-called religious 
traditions, especially those concerning social behaviour, are, in fact, social mores 
acknowledged by religious leaders, thereafter invested with religious values. 
1.43 
141 Shabestan, Nagdi, op. cit., p. 227. 
42 The notion of'civil religion' refers to a 'religion which serves secular as opposed to 
transcendent or otherworldly ends'. Sec, Kessler. Sanford 'Tocqucvillc on Civil Religion and 
Liberal Democracy', The Journal of Politics. vol. 39. no. I. (Feb., 1977). pp. 119-146. 
141 Hajjari in. S, 'Henjar-haye bi-Arzcsh, Arzcsh-h iye bi-Hcnjir' Alourooz (Mlar., 7,2002) 
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Soroush specifies three connotations of secularism, namely: 1) Action 
being based upon a non-religious platform; 2) interpretation of the world and 
roan outside of the religious framework; 3) such notions as science and politics 
being understood to be independent from religion. He favours the third 
connotation and asserts that like politics, science, art, and philosophy are all 
independent institutions. Thus he equates the course of secularisation with the 
exploration of the said independence: 
We had better replace the term `the separation of religion and 
politics' with the tern `the independence of politics from religion'. 
Yet we have to bear in mind that not only politics is evidently 
independent from religion, but that philosophy, art, sciences and 
many human affairs and social institutions are the same. Thus the 
separation must be taken in the sense of [obtaining] independence 
and people become secular by their recognition of that sense. 144 
He argues that secularism does not necessarily exclude religion from 
public life, yet he warns that the implementation of the religious legal system 
necessarily requires the spiritual character of religious teachings to be excluded, 
for they derive a good deal of their supernatural features from being mystical 
(reiz), whereas society's administration and the management of worldly affairs 
require rules and values to be capable of delivering tangible and calculable 
ends. 145 
The difference between secularism and secularisation is generally 
understood in terms of the fonner being more of a philosophical position about 
the way things should be, while the latter denotes the process through which that 
philosophy takes effect. '46 Hajjariän views the process of secularisation as a 
result of the transfer from a primitive community into a modem polity. 
147 The 
process is caused by the division of labour, the codification of law and the 
separation between public and private spheres. '4 
' Soroush, Bast, op. cit., p. 162. 
15 Soroush, ibid, p. 364. 
"Monshipouri, viahrnood, Islvnism, Secularism and Human Rights in the 1t/iddlc East. 
(London, 1998), p. 10. 
147 t1ajjariän. S., Tavan-c /slahät, (Tehran 2001) p. 65. 
1'Y Hajjarian, Az Shahed-c, op. cit., p. 88. 
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Given the religious orientation of the trend, it obviously advocates a 
robust role for religion in the state and society, but without a similar role for the 
formal religious authorities. To put it differently, Reformists acknowledge the 
role of religion but want the religious establishment to be independent from the 
state'49. Thereby the debate can be seen as revolving around the definition of the 
line separating the jurisdiction of religion from the jurisdiction of man. The 
debate is rooted in the primary disagreement over the role of religion and its 
ramifications. I have already noted that the conservatives define religion as 
perfect and all-inclusive and the religious scholars as the only legitimate source 
of religious standards. It follows that both the state and society are realms in 
which the rulings offered by the religious authorities are to be enacted. This idea 
is termed as din hadd-e akthari(the maximal application of religious rules). 
15() 
In contrast, the Reformists arc for din hadd-e aqalli (minimal application of 
religious rules). 151 In practice, the former notion means that every action should 
conform to religious advice, whereas the latter notion is of negative sense: every 
action can be carried out unless it breaches an agreed religious principle. 
In the final analysis, the Reformists' argument over secularisation serves 
to affirm their primary position concerning the conventional character of the 
state. As with Soroush, they believe that the state's claim to a religious character 
will inevitably lead to religion converting into a conventional order, just like the 
state law. It will thus lose its essential character, which is to be a force of 
spiritual inspiration to human life. 152 Spirituality is not a state business; it cannot 
be taught or enforced by the means of law but through the constant dialogue 
between man and God. Piety is a level of morality at which than sets his reason 
and senses free from the narrow borders of material reality. Thus he challenges 
149 Alavitab, ir. op. cit.. p. 192. 
150 For details on this topic, sec Muhcbbi, D., 'Nazarich Din Ijadde Akthar'. Nagd va Mwar, vol. 
6, issues land 2. (Winter 1999-Spring 2000) c. edition : 
www. hawzah. net/Per/Magazine/NN/021/nnO2lO7. hhn. Ayatollah Subl ni offers a critical 
account of the notion of minimal application, see: J. Subhäni, 'Vijcgcehyc Elm Fiqh', retrieved 
from : www. balagh. net/persian/feqh/maqalat/koliyat/29. 
htin 
151 Soroush, Bast, op. cit., pp. 93-112. 
X52 Soroush, ibid., p. 361. 
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its limits and pursues the territories hidden behind it. 153 Shabcstaii argues that 
state interference in religious affairs will inevitably lead to religious tyranny. 
During the post-revolutionary period, such interference was responsible for the 
violation of civil rights and the alienation of the youth and women as well as the 
intellectual elite. 154 On top of that, it relegated the role of religion to the limited 
scope of law, rather than facilitating its most important function, namely the 
generation of morals and meaning for the social life. 155 
Conclusion 
The rise of the Reformist discourse signifies the expansion of liberal 
tendencies unleashed by structural changes during the 1980s and the revival of 
the intellectual discourse of religious reform. It advocates modernity from a 
religious platform distinct, however, from both the clerical and secularist trends. 
The common theme in this discourse is the criticism of the official ideology of 
hegemony, notably traditional fiqh, and the advocacy of such notions as 
modernity, republicanism, democracy, plurality and power limitation. Their 
conception of democracy shows little difference from the universal model. The 
Reformuists reject secularism but take secularisation as an inescapable outcome of 
the integration of religion into the state system. 
For the Reformists, Islam is capable of developing a democratic 
discourse. It depends, however, on the method through which its fundamentals 
are interpreted. Thus they advocate a particular reading which rests on humanism 
and collective rationality. Their principal argument suggests that Islam does not 
advocate a particular model of government. The religious character of the state is 
understood either through the Muslim society acknowledging the government as 
such or by the state being observant of basic religious values. 
The Refonnist discourse has a good potential for reconciling Islam and 
modernity, especially with regard to political affairs. It involves a robust 
exchange with modern thought on the one hand and religious principles on the 
'" Khatami, Bim-c 1-lawj, (Tehran 1993), p. 149. 
"' Shabcstari. i\'agdi. Op. cit., p. 31. 
155 Shabestari, op. cit., p. 50. 
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other. Regardless of the controversy over the authenticity of its reference to 
either modernity or religion, which is, like every account, subjective and open to 
question, the discourse has had a strong appeal to the modern spectrum of Iranian 
society. The last three years have witnessed the appeal of the Reformist approach 
expanding beyond the Iranian borders, especially to the Arab world where the 
works of Reformist thinkers draw increasing attention from among Arab 
intellectuals. 
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Chapter VI 
The Composition of Political Factions 
In the previous chapters, I have discussed the political ideologies of the 
two major camps which contest for power in Iran. The aim was to explore the 
principal points of contention and their ideological foundations. Needless to say, 
ideology makes no difference unless it is translated into political action by 
powerful forces. For the political system to develop a democratic character, 
democracy has to evolve from an idea dreamt up by a few pioneering individuals 
into a popular demand. And here lies the role of political groups which transfonn 
general ideas into issues of interest, in political or social terms, for a large 
segment of society. In other words, democracy has to be integrated into society's 
culture, intertwining with the various aspects of its daily life, and thus evolving 
into a symbol of the people's aspirations for a better future. The study of 
factional structures in certain societies helps to understand properly whether the 
democratic forces are capable of delivering tangible change or not. 
This chapter discusses party politics in Iran and the way it reflects on the 
political system. I will start with a brief introduction to the role of political 
parties and the forms of identity expressed by them. The chapter proceeds with a 
brief account of the Islamic Republic Party which is regarded as the forerunner of 
the active factions in today's Iran. The discussion here is limited to the major 
factions in both the conservative and reformist camps, among which three parties 
are assessed in more detail: the Coalition of Abädgaran, for it represents a 
prototype of the new generation of conservatives which, in my opinion, will lead 
the camp in the future; Kargozaran, a pragmatic-liberal group representing the 
bureaucratic and professional elite; and finally, Moshttrekat, which represents the 
modernist middle-class with liberal and quasi-secular tendencies. 
My argument is that, although the Iranian social and political system is 
suffering from the symptoms of backwardness common to pre-industrial 
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societies, it has, nevertheless, some good opportunities to develop politically. 
The current process of reform, though slow and shaky, shows that political 
groups could play a decisive role in turning public opinion into a determining 
agent for opening up the political system and reshaping its structure. 
The body of literature dedicated to factional politics in Iran is relatively 
small. This is quite understandable for, at least until the late 1990s, the country's 
factional structure has not taken a definite shape. As the chapter will show, most 
of the currently active political parties were established or took distinctive shape 
in or after the mid-1990s. Generally speaking, most of the analyses and 
information about the Iranian political factions were offered through more 
general writings on political reforms. Inside Iran, the structure of party politics 
has attracted wider attention in recent years. 
Two points are worth noting here: first: analysis of the factional 
structure of Iran was advanced mainly by reformist writers. The conservatives 
seem less interested in sociological analyses, or probably they arc convinced that 
political rivalry does not necessarily indicate a fundamental difference among 
religious forces. As for Näteq NüfI, the former parliament speaker, political 
rivalry consists more in "different tastes" than different ideologies. ' Some recent 
accounts offered by the conservatives are of a defensive nature, aiming to stress 
the `otherness' of the reformist parties on the assumption that, by advocating 
liberal democracy, those parties are no longer identified as religious forces. 
2 
Second: all the concerned writers take for granted the allotting of the political 
factions in Iran into categories of Left and Right. The current attribution of 
groups to the conservative or reformist camps has not completely replaced the 
former categorisation. It is understood that political rivalry was caused by 
differences over the economic policy of the government3 which makes it natural 
for groups to be identified as Left or Right. The persistence of such 
Baktiari, Bahman, Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of 
Factional Politics, (University Press of Florida, 1996). p. 221. 
2 See, for example, Ahzäb va Tashkilht-e Si si /ran, compiled and published by the research 
centre of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (Qum, n. J. ) c. edition, retrieved August 16' 
°, 200 3, 
from: www. tooba-ir. org/siyasi/ahzab/kargo. /fchrest. htin 
Baktiari, op. cit., p. 94 
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categorisation, despite the fact that the economic factor is no longer an issue of 
rivalry, remains, however, a point of question. Relating to this point, it must be 
mentioned that the Left was primarily regarded by many researchers, outside Iran 
in particular, as radical or fundamentalist (see, for example, Menashri, 2001, 
Baktiari 1996, Tachau, 1994), and the conservatives as moderate. From the mid- 
1990s on, these designations were swapped between the two factions. Such a 
categorisation seems to be based on the political behaviour of the parties in 
question. In my opinion it is not relevant to categorise the political factions as 
radical or moderate, since every faction can bear both characteristics, each in its 
own right. In addition, the criterion to which this designation corresponds is by 
and large subjective and variable. 
The Role of Political Groups 
The flourishing of party politics signifies the shift of society from an 
attitude of passivity to one of activity. Communal groupings emerge when 
certain segments of the society develop a collective identity revolving around a 
particular range of demands or interests. Political parties are formed to handle 
the type of problems which require a change of state or its major policies. They 
also deter the inclination of the state apparatus to overstep the boundaries of law 
and represent a counter-balancing force to the arbitrariness of bureaucracy. 
4 
The relevance of party politics to the course of democratisation in 
developing societies is almost self-evident. Through organised and collective 
action, the aspiration to participate in public affairs evolves from mere individual 
or sporadic desires into a tangible and persistent movement capable of delivering 
an influential discourse competing for hegemony. Political groups help the course 
of democratisation by forming public opinion and integrating the general people 
into the political process. 5 The proponents of the elite theory view them, says 
Lester, as "the principal agencies for accomplishing the selection and 
For a comparative account on the approaches to the role of bureaucracy, see Gerald Heeber, 
`Bureaucracy, political Parties, and Political Development'. World Politics, vol. 25, issue 4, 
(July 1973) Pp. 600-07. 
5 Blondel, Jean. Comparative Government, (New York, 1995 ), p. 133. 
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representation of political elites". 6 The ability of parties to fulfill these functions 
is, however, contingent upon the actual state of affairs within the context in 
which they operate. 
The Social Background of Political Groups 
The question of `how the political groups identify with their social bases' 
has drawn wide attention from among Iranian researchers. Apparently, the debate 
stem from a previous disagreement over the principal determinants of social 
alignment, i. e. the way one identifies with a certain reference group. One trend 
views the social system as being divided on the basis of class, another 
emphasises the cultural elements of identity as the distinctive factor of one's 
preferences, and the third trend purports state interventionism as the centre of 
political rivalry. 
The first approach elaborates on the economic theory of political 
behaviour. Society is perceived as a collective system of upper, middle and lower 
classes, each of which acquires a distinctive identity and preferences. This 
approach sees party politics as the political expression of the conflicts of interest 
among the social classes. Political parties are formed to promote and defend the 
particular interests identified with a certain class. 7 Hence the political groups are 
identified according to the class they represent. Many researchers deny the 
existence of such clear-cut class divisions in Iran, and dispute the relevance of 
this approach. " Beeran views the traditional land owners and traders of the 
Bazaar as the only group potentially capable of developing a definable social 
class with a political function. ' Such a development, however, was hindered by 
the lack of security of private property which prompted that group to take refuge 
6 Lester, Seligman, 'Elite Recruitment and Political Development', TheJoumal o1'Politics. vol. 
26, issue 3 (Aug., 1964), 612-626, p. 61 S. 
7 Heath, Graaf, and Nicuwbeerta, 'Class Mobility and Political Preferences', Americanfotumal of 
Socioloýry. vol. 100, no. 4. (Jan., 1995), 997-1027: p 999. 
`Alavitabär, 'Alirezä, interview with Baliar, (Jul., 16,2000). retrieved from 
www. netiran. com/I ltdocs/Clippings/DPolitics/2007I6XX DP01. htinI 
Beeran, Barviz, 'Junbush-e Ejtema'i Shahri', Allab. vol. 20, (Oct., 2002). pp. 34-5. 
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in the shadow of the state instead of developing a class-based association of its 
own. 10 
The second approach assumes that one's identity develops through 
interaction with the other members of one's community. One's political 
preferences thereby embody the norms and values common to this reference 
group. " Elaborating on the theories of political culture, Hossein Bashiriyeh, a 
prominent Iranian sociologist, holds that social and political rivalry in Iranian 
society emanates from a cultural split between traditionalism and modernism. 
Each embodies a distinctive range of interests, concerns and relations. In this 
view, the political rivalry unfolds the conflict between the tendency to maintain 
the inherited social system and the one which seeks to change it. 12 
The third approach presumes that party politics revolves around the 
extent of state intervention in private affairs which are technically varied from 
the state's basic purpose. For this approach, the political factions arc categorised 
along the Right or Left divide. The former is associated with minimal state 
intervention while the Left is associated with interventionism. 
It is almost agreed that none of the active factions in today's Iran can be 
identified exclusively with one of the above categories, but neither is it fair to 
deny their applicability altogether. The relevance of each of the above categories 
is better understood in a relative sense. 13 Nowadays the Iranian political groups 
arc commonly categorised as for or against the political rcfonns which President 
Muhammad Khatarni proposed in 1997. In the conservative camp Mo'talefeh and 
Rohaniat Mobärez represent the traditional upper class. They advocate minimal 
state intervention in the economy but maximum supervisory intervention in 
other areas. The Coalition for the Development of Islamic Iran (Abädgariin) 
represents the middle class. It holds similar political and cultural views, however 
10 Katouzian, Huma, 'Problems of Democracy and Public Sphere in Modem Iran', Comparative 
Studies ofSouth Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 18, no. 2, (1998) pp 31-6: 31. 
Heath, op. cit. 
''- Bashiriyeh, Hossein, A4avane' Tavse'ah SiJsl dar /ran, (Tehran 2001), p. 133. 
'} Eta'at. J., 'Shekäfhäy-e Ejtcma'i va Gurouh-bandi Siäsi dar Iran'. Allab, vol. 19, Sept. 2002. p. 
to. 
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in a more moderate fashion. It also seeks more egalitarian economic relations, 
which inevitably entails state intervention in the economy. The three 
conservative factions are commonly categorised along side the right-wing. 
In the refonnist camp the party of Kargozarän-c Sazandagi (Executives 
for Reconstruction) represents the modern upper class. It advocates minimal 
state intervention in all areas but emphasises a leading role for the state in 
modernising the economy. Mojähedin Engheläb, as well as Rohanion Mobarcz, 
are commonly identified as leftist. They call for an egalitarian economy 
promoting the interests of the lower class. In respect of political and cultural 
issues they advocate moderate intervention by the state. Their middle class ally, 
Mosharckat, is more at the centre left. It advocates full scale democracy, a free- 
market economy and cultural liberalism. 
The Structure of Party Politics in Contemporary Iran 
The Iranian political scene was described by Mcnashcri as fluid and 
constantly changing in its positions and alliances. 14 During recent years, 
especially since 2000, positions and alliances seem more stable, with most groups 
having defined themselves in line with or against the model of democracy. Post- 
revolution party politics can be divided into three phases: the period of 
uncontrolled proliferation in the first three years; the period of the regime 
consolidation, which lasted until 1991 and the period after 1991. 
According to Tajik, more than eighty groups appeared during or soon 
after the revolution, representing all walks of life. 15 This relatively large number 
reflects the variety of interests which had the opportunity to be expressed 
through the revolution. '6 It is understandable, however, that the majority of these 
groups by and large lacked coherence in terms of ideology, organisation and 
political agenda. Such defects make it difficult to formulate a proper 
14 Nicna-sheri, David, Post-Revolution Politics in Iran, p. 49. 
15 Tajik. Muhammad Reza, 'Ahzäb: Furobashi Haviat-e Sunnati', ßaztub(Jan., 5.2003). 
16 Shah Alain, 'Conservatives, Liberals and the Struggle over Iranian Politics'. Strategic 
Analysis, vol. 24, no. 3, (Jun., 2000). www. ciaonct. org/olj/sa/sajunOOals0l. htinl. 
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categorisation of the many groups of that period. With recent developments, 
there can be seen a range of groups that are well-defined and coherent, each of 
which represents a particular range of interests and social segment. As I am 
concerned with the theoretical development of the religious-based Shi i doctrine 
of power, my discussion will be limited to the political groups that fall within the 
religious spectrum. 
The first major Islamist grouping to emerge was the so-called `The Line 
of the Imam' (Khatt-e Imam), a broad alliance of supporters of the religious 
agenda proposed by Ayatollah Khomeini. Apart from some independent figures, 
the Line of the Imam was dominated by three broad organisations, namely the 
Islamic Republic Party (IRP), Sazmän-c Mojahedin Enghclab Islami (SMEI) and 
Jamc'ah Rohaniat-c Mobärcz (JRM). Each of the three groups was composed of 
left and right wing factions. The leading role in the first party was played by the 
pragmatic trend led by Ayatollah Muhammad H. Behcshti, `Ali Khamanei and 
`Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The leading force in the Mojahedin was the left 
wing led by Bchzad Nabavi, while Jäme`ah Rohaniat was dominated mainly by 
right wing senior clerics, notably Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani. Although party 
politics of today is far different from that of the early 1980s, many of today's 
active elements have trained in the above groups. 
The Islamic Republic Party (IRP) 
According to the former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Islamic 
Republic Party was planned shortly before the Islamic Revolution, but was 
endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini only after the revolution succeeded. The 
purpose of the party was to organise the religious forces against their rivals, 
including the liberals, Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Communists and so on. 17 
Muhammad H. Bchcshti, the co-founder and first leader of the party suggested 
that the party had been meant to be the political wing of the `ulamiii. '8 Kamarava 
1' Cited in Satiiri, Mas'oud, Hagiqat-h: ý va, tila, lahat-hü. (Tehran 1999) p. 81. The same 
suggestion was made by Asadullah Badamchian, who was a member of the party, central 
committee, cited in Shah Alain, op. cit. 
Cited in Haidan, Muhammad, 'Hezb-c Jtunhun Islami: Tashakol-e Siäsi dar Rohaniat'. Iran. 
(Jun., 24,2002). 
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takes the formation of IRP as an instance of the clerical tendency to `redirect the 
popular enthusiasm generated during the revolution into an organised, 
institutional support base'. `' The party's manifesto states its chief objective, 
however, as the promotion of a `comprehensive Islamisation of the society in 
which Islamic values, commands, and laws govern all social relations'. 20 The 
party dominated political life from its formation in 1979 until its disbanding in 
1987. The IRP was more of a loose and ill-managed grouping of the various 
movements which accepted Ayatollah Khomeini as the absolute national leader. 
In a sense, the party was a bit like an archetype exemplifying the religious trend 
with all of its intellectual variety and political concerns. According to Beheshti, 
the crucial deficits of IRP were poor organisation and lack of cohesion, the lack 
of a precise ideology and an inefficient induction process. The party expanded 
without a pre-planned strategy, whereby its organisations, even at the higher 
ranks, were infiltrated by its rivals. In June 1981 the party received a devastating 
blow when a bomb claimed the lives of 72 of its top leaders. A few weeks later, 
another bomb killed the president and the prime minister, (who was also the 
recently elected party leader). These events devastated the IRP but made its 
government determined to suppress all its opponents without mercy. In fact, all 
other groups were suppressed during the period of 1981-1983.21 The absence of 
rival groups has had a negative impact on the party. With no serious rivals, says 
Rafsanjani, the party had no objectives to pursue and its members lost their 
enthusiasm to carry on. 22 Eventually, it was disbanded in 1987 on the advice of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. It was said that Khomeini was not happy with the fact that 
the dominance of the IRP caused discomfort to many of the religious notables 
who chose to remain independent. Khomeini saw this situation as a likely threat 
to the unity of the religious trend. 23 
1" Kamrava, Mchran, The Political History ofAlodcrrr lran" Freut Tribalism to Theocracy. 
(Westport 1992), p. 97. 
2i Baktiari, op. cit., p. 55. 
21 Tachau, Frank, Political Parties ofthe /Diddle East and North Aliica, (Westport. 1994). p. 
139. 
"' Cited in Safari, op. cit. 
21 Safiri, ibid. p. 83. 
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As indicated earlier, the party had within its organization three distinct 
trends: a traditional right-wing, a religious left-wing, and a pragmatic wing all of 
which were fairly represented in successive governments; nevertheless, their 
relationship was never friendly. As early as October 1981, the parliament voted 
against the right-wing candidate for prime minister in favour of the leftist Mir 
Hussayn Mosavi against the wishes of Khamenei, the newly elected president. 24 
In August 1983, two right-wing figures resigned their ministerial posts in protest 
over the state's handling of the economy. Interestingly, the president, the 
parliament, the prime minister and the resigned ministers were all of high rank in 
the Islamic Republic Party. 
With the conclusion of the eight-year war with Iraq in August 1988, the 
Iranian government began to case the rigid policies concerning political and 
social activities. A major step was the restoration of the Party Bill which had 
remained suspended since its formulation in 1981.25 However, the political 
atmosphere remained uneventful until the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 
1989. The absence of the regime's founder effectively removed the major barrier 
hindering party politics, namely the idea that independent activities might harn 
the unity of religious forces. One month after the death of Khomeini, four groups 
were granted official recognition under the 1981 Bill. From among those 
recognised, three were deemed Islamist left-wing, including the Islamic Republic 
Women's Association led by Zahrä Müstafavi, the daughter of Khomeini, 
Majma` Rohanion Mobs rez and Fedäiyyan Islam. 26 After his election in July 
1989, President Rafsanjani undertook what he called the Policy of Adjustment 
(sihsat-c to `o7n whereby the state acknowledged the plurality of ideas and 
promised less restrictions on independent activities. In the following years, the 
political scene saw the emergence of various groups, five of which would claim a 
major influence during the following decade. The political groups in Iran used to 
'; For some details, sec: Baktiari, op. cit.. p. 90. 
'' Shah Alain, up. cit. 
26 Khorassan, (Jul., 30,2000). p. 4. retrieved from: 
www. netiran. com/Htdocs/Clippings/DPolitics/20073OXXDPOI. htint 
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be identified as either Right or Left wing. From 1997, they would be categorised 
as ref'onnist or conservative. 
The Conservative Camp 
The conservative camp emerged within the traditional religious 
community in order to promote its aspiration for a pure religious state based on 
established Shi'ism. 27 The essence of the trend consists of an alliance between 
the religious seminaries and the notables of the traditional Bazaar. 2 The two 
groups made up the major opposition of the pre-revolutionary governments. 
Despite the close links binding the religious exemplars and their local 
representatives to the Bazaar traders, the alliance remained undefined with no 
particular organisation representing its political concerns, at least until the 
Islamic Revolution. Anjornan Hojjatiyeh was probably the first inclusive 
organisation embracing the concerns of the religious trend, notwithstanding the 
group's intentional limiting of itself to purely religious causes. llojjatiyeh was 
established in 1957 aiming to counter the proliferation of the Bahal faith. 29 It 
upheld the Shº i traditions as its official ideology, including the assumption that 
Shi'as had to stay away from politics until the return of the Twelfth lmiim. 3D 
Throughout the decade preceding the revolution, the group's relationship with 
Ayatollah Khomeini and his young supporters was far from friendly. This 
position earned it the tolerance of the Shah's government on the one hand, but 
the hostility of the revolutionaries on the other. The revolution was a devastating 
blow to Hojjatiych, which saw the majority of its members deserting their 
professed doctrine to join the revolution. In 1979 an attempt by the group's 
leader, Mahrnoud Halabi, to reconcile with Ayatollah Khomeini failed, due to the 
'' Hajari, Mohscn. 'Mugaddatnch bar Sinkh-shenasi Rast Jar Iran', Chashmandaz Iran. vvol. 9, 
(Jun., 2001), pp 59-66, P. 59. 
'' Zarifinia. Hamid, Kalbud-sheknfJcnih-hiycShsT Iran (Tehran 1999). pp. 97-8. 
"" For some details on the Baha'i faith and community, see Martin, Douglas, 'The Case of the 
Baha'i Minority in Iran', The Baha'i Work1, (1992-3), pp. 247-271. c. edition: 
www. bahai. org/article-l-8-3-7. htinl. Also Momen, Moojan, 'The Baha i Community of Iran: 
Patterns of Exile and Problems of Communication', in Fathi, A., (cd. ), Iranian Refu cti'., and 
Evilessincc Khomeini, (1991). c. edition, www. nortliill. demon. co. uk/reistud/Iran-patterns. htm 
'" Ahmedzädch. Taller, 'Anjoman Hojjatiych dar Bastar-c Zammtn'. C'hashinand az Iran. %-ol. 5. 
(May 2000). 
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latter's scepticism and conviction that the group retained affiliations with the 
remnants of the ousted regime. 31 Eventually the group decided to disband in 
July1983, apparently after Khomeini publicly criticised their political leanings. 
32 
Most of the group's members then joined the other right-wing groups and the 
government. 33 It is widely believed that the group retains underground activity at 
the present time. 34 Ayatollah Khaz`ali, an advocate of the group, implicitly 
admits the continuity of its underground existence, however, within a smaller 
scope. 35 The association of the conservative camp with Iiojjatiyeh attracted wide 
attention during the early 1980s when the conservative faction of the first post- 
revolutionary parliament was ascribed to Hojjatiyeh. 36 Such a strong relation is 
no longer emphasised. 
Hojjatiych is not significant, however, for any direct action, but for the 
way its ideology has shaped the political thought of the religious trend, 
especially its particular conception of pure Shi'ism. The group's principles have 
deeply influenced the conservative camp. The reflection of its principles on 
political and social action could be understood only by comparing it with the 
type of values upheld by revolutionary figures prior to and after the revolution. 
These include : 
o The strict commitment to traditional Shi`ism which is reflected in 
the form of sectarian fanaticism as well as hostility to all 
reformist trends. 
o Being preoccupied with the threat of the surrounding world. For 
the camp, conspiracy theories are the main framework to conceive 
the position of the foreign countries towards Iran. This tendency 
31 Ahmcdzadch, ibid. 
32 Razavi, H. 'Bäzkhuni Parvandch Anjoman Hojjatiych', Hainshahri. (Oct.. 23,2002) 
`' Tawakkul, Muhammad, 'Bazaar Sunnati Iran dar Sch Dawrch', Cha. hmandaz Iran, no. I6. 
(Oct. 2002). pp. 34-45, p. 42. 
34 Khiyati, Hassan, 'Siäsatgorizi va Tarvij Jedüyi din az Siäsat'. Jurnhuri ! slinli(Oct., 31,2002) 
35 Khaz'afi, Abol-Qäsirn, cited in Kayhan. (Dec.. 2,2002), p. 12. 
16 Baktiari, op. cit., p. 9 I. 
190 
explains as well the camp's exaggerated emphasis on protective 
policies. 
o The tendency to exercise self-designated authority over all other 
people in order to ensure their compliance with virtuous 
behaviour, while, in comparison, individual and public rights and 
freedoms are left neglected. This tendency is directly reflected in 
the strict rules concerning dress, personal appearance and leisure 
activities. 
In my opinion, many of the rigid policies held by the state, the cultural 
policies in general, and the policies concerning minorities and women in 
particular, cannot be understood without examining their roots in the model 
advocated by Hojjatiyeh. The group's ideals are still alive through its many 
veterans who found their way into the leading posts of the conservative camp, as 
well as into society and the state system. 
The conservative camp consists of around fifteen groups, 37 most 
prominent among which are Jame'ah Rohaniat, Mo'talefeh Party and the newly- 
formed Coalition of Abadgarän. in what follows, we look at each of the these in 
detail. 
Jämc'ah Rohaniat Mobärez (JRM) 
Rohaniat-e Mobarez (the Association of Combatant Clergy) was 
established a year before the 1979 Islamic Revolution aiming to bring together 
the politically-active clerics under the umbrella of Ayatollah Khomeini. Starting 
with a few members, the group developed into a central force in pursuing the 
revolutionary causes. 39 After the revolution, it expanded its membership, 
although the determining role remained in the hands of a few leading members 
holding its top ranks. Despite its leading role, JRM does not identify itself as a 
" Murtajä states the names of twelve groups comprising the affiliates of Rohaniat Mobarez. 
Murtajä, Hujjat, Jenih-hryeSiäsidar Iran Entrooz, (Tehran. 2000), p. 14. I add here the groups 
that remained outside this frame notwithstanding their sharing the ideals and political 
positions of the conservative camp. 
Zanfinii, op. cit. p. 99. 
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political party. It has not applied for official recognition nor has it had an official 
organ. 39 JRM had among its membership figures representing both the right and 
left wings. In 1984, the right wing became more distinct when four of its figures 
launched Resa7at, a daily newspaper which became the leading tribunal of the 
traditional conservatives. By 1988, the left wing walked out to establish its own 
clerical association, making JRM a purely conservative group. JRM is organically 
linked with the Association of Professors of Qum Seminaries (Jime'ah 
Mudarressin Hawzah Ehniyyah Qum (JMHI)). The two associations share ideals 
and objectives as well as some leading members. Since JMHI is the state- 
recognised commanding body of the clerical community, the close link between 
the two suggests that JRM is the political proxy of the former body. According 
to Rafsanjani, the former president and a leading member of Rohaniat, most of 
the political positions, as well as the nominations for elections on the part of the 
group were decided in consultation with the Quin professors' association . 
41, Tile 
group advocates a market economy but is strict on social and cultural affairs. As 
Tagavi, the group's spokesman, says: 
The cultural trend in the country has lost its balance... They [the 
liberals] propagate maximum freedom unobservant of any rule or 
principle, notwithstanding the likelihood of endangering others' 
rights and freedoms. The culture of society shows increasing signs 
of vulnerability, incited by the cultural encroachment of the 
enemy, as well as the presence of the sell-outs (A-hod-foroukhtch) 
and western-struck (gharbzadcb) intellectuals in the country's 
a' cultural domain. 
Between 1992 and 1997, Rohaniat and its allies were the dominant force 
in the parliament and the state institutions. They were overpowered by the leftist 
camp in the presidential, local and legislative elections of 1997,1999 and 2000. 
Since then the group seems to have lost its energy. In the presidential election of 
2002, it refrained from nominating or supporting any of the candidates. In the 
local elections of 2003 and legislative elections of 2004 the group was not 
3') Zarifinia, ibid. pp. 90-I. 
40 Sabn, op. cit., p.. 186 
41 Cited in Shadlo, `Abbäs, Ettela'äti darbirch Ahz; ib va Jcn; h-hiye Si: isi Iran Emroz, (Tehran 
1999), p. 62. 
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accounted for and the commanding role was taken by the young pragmatists 
loyal to the person of the Supreme Leader. 
Mo'talefeh Party 
Mezb-e Mo'talefeh Islain7 (Islamic Coalition Party) has been considered 
by some political figures as the dynamo of the traditional conservatives. 42 It was 
formed in the wake of the Khordad Revolt, a civil insurrection which erupted on 
the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1963.33 At the outbreak of the Islamic 
Revolution, the group resumed its activity among the traders of the Tehran and 
Esfahan Bazaars where it recruited the majority of its members. 44 The group 
joined the Islamic Republic Party until its dissolution in 1987. From then on it 
was established as an independent party. Between 1981 and 1997, five or its 
leading members had ministerial posts, others had parliamentary scats, the 
headship of the Open University, the Chamber of Commerce, and Buniiiid 
Mostaz'afan, the largest state-owned holding corporation. 45 Being dominated by 
wealthy traders, the group was sensitive to the state's handling of the economy. 
In 1983 two of the group's members gave up their ministerial posts in protest 
over the cabinet's endorsement of the first development plan which had a strong 
leftist flavour. In general, Mo'talefeh was the strongest opponent of the 
economic strategies adopted by the government after the rcvolution. 46 This 
tendency is seen in line with that of the Reformists, which is to amend the 
Constitution's articles that affirm the state's interference in the market. On the 
political front, the party advocates wilayat al-fagih as the only religious basis for 
political legitimacy, hence it only recognises groups whose adherence to the 
doctrine is unequivocal. These are designated by the party as khodi (insiders) 
compared with ghair-e khod (outsiders), i. e. the groups which arc not 
wholeheartedly loyal to the doctrine. The idea of political pluralism is applicable 
''- Yaztf, Ibrahim, Schiwnhour% (Tehran 2001) p. 296 
4.1 Shadlo, op. cit., p. 157. 
1° Gholami, F., 'Kalbud-shekafi Mo'talefeh-I', Baztah(Fcb., 4,2003) 
www. baztab. com/index. asp'? I D-2525&S ubjcct=News 
'S Shadlo, op. cit. p. 160. 
46 Shadlo, ibid., 170. 
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to the insiders only, outsiders should be barred. '" Religious pluralism is seen by 
the party as nonsense, in the words of `Abbaspour, a member of the party's 
central committee: 
Religious pluralism, whether within or without Islam, is 
inconsistent with the principles of the authentic (nab-c 
Muhammad Islam. Those who advocate such notions have to 
seek the advice of the real experts of Islatn. Otherwise people 
would view them as heretics. What conception of the religion do 
they have to boldly tell us that neither Shi'as nor Sunnis possess 
the absolute right. 48 
For a while Mo'talefeh was felt to have lost its appeal . 
49 In the general 
elections of 1996 three of the group's top leaders lost their seats, despite the 
overwhelming victory of the conservative camp. The same misfortune was seen 
in 2000. In the 2004 elections, the conservative alliance refused to support the 
nomination of the group's leader and his deputy on its list, indicating a 
significant fall of in group's popularity. 5" During its 2004 congress, the group's 
leaders were urged to surrender their role to the younger gencration. s' 
Mo'talcfch's influence is largely dependent on its close links with the religious 
establishment and clergy members in general. Historically speaking the clergy 
has been dependent on the market traders for financial support. Although it large 
segment of the clergy joined the Islamic government, the majority remained 
independent. This includes the most influential figures of the religious 
establishment, i. e. the great exemplars, their local representatives and senior 
disciples. This is one of the interesting points about the behaviour of the Shia 
clergy, whose endorsement of the government entails no submission to, or 
financial dependence on it. Mo'talefch secures its influence by supporting the 
cultural and charitable activities promoted by the clergy. It has, for example, the 
upper hand in Kornitch Eindid, the largest charity in the country. It also provides 
a good deal of the budgets of the religious schools, mosques, educational 
" Shadlo, ibid., 167. 
4% Shadlo, ibid., p. 168 
49 Ghulämi, F., 'Kalbud-shckafi Mo'talfch-2', Baztab(Fcb. 8,2003). 
www. baztab. com/index. asp? I D=? 649&Subjcct=News 
$1 Dcfiii, J.. 'Shekl-girl Dou E'teläf va Chahär Fraxion dar Majlis Haftum', ! ran, (May. 24,2004). 
ISM-1. (Feb., 8,2004). 
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programs based on voluntary basis, and so on. However, Mo'talefeh could not 
translate these impressive works into reciprocal support for its political agenda 
and figures. 
The group's dependence on the clergy has so far helped it to secure it 
relatively strong position, particularly in the institutions supervised by the 
Supreme Leader. Due to the group lacking the capacity to act politically on its 
own, its future seems uncertain. Its major clerical affiliate, Rohaniat Mobarez 
has lost its political primacy, whereas its middle class affiliate, the Islamic 
Association of Engineers is moving away from its traditional affiliations towards 
the newly-formed Coalition of Abadgaran. 
E'telaf-e Abadgarän Iran Islami 
Despite its low-profile, the Coalition for the Development of Islamic Iran 
(Abidgaran-c Iran Islam} was widely expected to win the highest stake in the 
legislative election of 2004, thanks mainly to the Council for the Guardianship of 
the Constitution which arbitrarily removed the majority of the reformist 
candidates from the contest. Abfidgariin first appeared on the eve of the local 
elections of 2003, where it achieved a surprise victory and removed the 
Reformists from the council of Tehran. Statistically, the Reformists won the 
majority of the seats contested in that election, notably in the peripheral areas, 52 
but failed in the capital and major cities. The failure was taken as an indication 
of the political mood of the society, the urban middle class in particular. Among 
the thirty members of Abädgarän who won the council of Tehran, only two 
members were relatively known: `Abbas Shibani and Mehdi Chamrfin. The others 
are completely new to the political arena, including Ahmacfi-Najhd, the new 
Mayor53 (who, in June 2005, won the presidential election). 
The emergence of Abadgaran was explained in different ways, with the 
most common explanation linking it to the structural changes within the 
conservative camp. After 1997 there was increasing discontentment within the 
2 Tajbakhsh. Kiän, 'The Fate of Local Democracy in the Islamic Republic', Iran'lna/ si., 
Quarterly. vol. I, issue 2. (Fall 2003), 5-9, p. 7. 
Iran. (Feb 25,2004). 
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camp over its performance, policies, and particularly the hegemony of the 
traditional and elderly figures. The sentiment reached a climax in mid-1999 with 
the clash between university students and the police. 54 The events were a great 
shock to the regime. The mood of the universities used to be seen as the 
barometer of the general mood of the nation. The student protests and ensuing 
clashes with the police and Bash, the revolutionary reserve forces, indicated the 
erosion of traditional support for the religious leadership among students. The 
events frustrated younger conservatives, resulting in a wide-spread demand for a 
meaningful change to the structure and language of their camp. The defeat of the 
conservatives in the local and legislative elections of 1999 and 2000 respectively 
gnade the call for change more credible. 
It is believed that, since then, the commanding body of the conservative 
camp, known as `The Alliance of the Line of of Imam and Leader' has broken up, 
notably after the retirement of Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, the ailing leader of 
Rohaniat Mobarcz. Another board was formed wherein the commanding role of 
the traditional clergy and Mo'talefeh was entrusted to younger groups 
comprising mainly pragmatic bureaucrats and academic figures. The new E'tcl i/= 
c Nrohayc F_nghe/äb (The Alliance of the Revolutionary Forces) was closely 
managed by the office of the Supreme Leader through his special adviser Nateq 
Nüri and chaired by Muhammad Rezil Bahonar, the leader of the `Islamic Society 
of Engineers'. 
Nüri, a middle rank cleric, was born in 1943 and studied in the Quin 
seminaries. He served in J/häd-c Srizandcgi (Jihad of Reconstruction), as interior 
minister (1981-1985), parliamentary speaker (1992-2000) and finally as a 
member of the Expediency Council. Bahonar was born in 1953. Despite his long 
record of service in the parliament and Expediency Council, he remained in the 
shadow of his superiors. With the elections of 2004, he was promoted to the 
position of deputy speaker of the Majlis. During recent years, Nu-ii has been a 
strong advocate of change within his camp. In February 2004, most of his speech 
54 For some details on the incident and the immediate reactions, see Ifamchahri, (Jul., I I, 1999). 
www. hainslialiri. org/liainiicws/1378/790420/index. htin 
196 
before the congress of Mo'talefeh was dedicated to urging the group to adapt to 
modern methods of party organisation, to focus on the young generation, and for 
its leadership to be invested in the young membcrs. 55 The idea of regeneration 
was also asserted by M. Javäd Larijani, the conservative theorist, and explained 
within the framework of the regime's renovation. 56 The idea is seen as 
significant, for it reflects a common cry among the young members and 
supporters of the camp who feel alienated by their leaders. This feeling was 
voiced by many activists. Hussayn Harandi, the deputy chief editor of l ayhnn 
newspaper and an activist in the radical group Ansir Hizbulk lb, explains the 
emergence of Abadgaran as a solution to the long-running conflict between the 
upper and lower echelons of the camp: 
Our forces have made a remarkable success this year. Trusting 
their own intellect, they broke out of the moral hegemony of a 
score of notables whom we highly regard and respect. However, 
we have stopped paying them blind obedience. In the past, our 
activities were restricted to the frameworks they defined and we 
had to disregard our own viewpoints and sacrifice valuable time in 
order to secure their satisfaction. Today, however, Ilizbullah 
forces have reached the conviction that only the supreme leader 
would receive full obedience. Pure obedience as a religious 
principle is realised in the strict following of a single leader. 
Unfortunately, until recently we have been caught in the outdated 
ideas of our elders. Now we are free, we have realised that we 
could free ourselves. We will retain respect for our elders, 
nevertheless we have to tell them that the direction is no longer 
dictated by the 111.57 
The Abadgaran Coalition was formed within the `Alliance of the 
Revolutionary Forces', headed by Nu-6 and Bahonar, to express the new 
tendencies of the conservative camp. The group is dominated by the Islamic 
Society of Engineers and the Society of Devotees of the Islamic Revolution 
(Janriyat-c E. snrgarän Enghc%b Jslam). Esargarin was fonned in 1996 to 
Roh, M. 'Mo'taIefch Hczb Shod' Shargh, (Jan., 10,2004). 
www. shar,, hnewspaper. coin/921020/indcx. htili 
56 Larijani, M. J.. 'Zohd-c Siäsi', Jun-c-Jam, (Sep., 6,3004). 
www. jaincjaindaily. net/shownews2. asp? n=63602&t=pot 
Cited in SharSh(Jun., 12.2004). www. sharghnewspaper. com/830323/polit. htm 
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promote the interests of the veterans of the revolution and the war with Iraq. 58 
The society remained relatively unknown until the election of Ahmadi-najäd, one 
of its activists, as Mayor of Tehran in 2003. The group is seen as a minor player 
in Iranian politics in terms of size and daily activity. It is based mainly in the 
southern suburbs of Tehran, 59 an area dominated by lower class migrants. The 
group operates within the conservative camp and shares its ideals; nevertheless, 
'AH Dambi, the deputy leader, asserts its modernist orientation as the principal 
feature distinguishing it from the traditional groups such as Rohanion, 
Mo'talefeh, and the association of Qum professors. 6° 
Esargarän explains the country's current difficulties as an `administrative 
deficiency' and puts the blame on `incompetent politicians and executives'. The 
group's second congress put forward a fifteen-article agenda to solve the 
country's crises, nine of which focused on the state administration. 6' For 
Ahmadi-najhd, the solution rests on the faithful forces of 1; lizbullah taking over 
the state. `We have already witnessed the trend of failure and destruction rising 
wherever the venues of service and work are deserted by the revolutionary and 
Hizbullahi forces'. 62 
For the group, the Islamic regime does not face a crisis in respect of 
legitimacy or political ideology, hence the call to follow the liberal model is 
nonsense, 
The doctrine of wiläyat al-fagih represents a new trend in the 
political philosophy and the foundational principles of sovereignty 
[... ] With the collapse of socialism, the world is bound to choose 
between liberal democracy and an Islamic revolution. The liberal 
discourse is falling apart due to its lack of capacity to open up new 
perspectives for humanity as well as its impotency to renovate its 
philosophical and intellectual foundations. Thus it is not an 
exaggeration to claim that the discourse of the Islamic Revolution 
penetrates the heart and mind of today's man, even without his 
Shadlo. op. cit. p. 315. 
$9 Shadlo, ibid., p. 314. 
60 Daräbi, `Ali, interview with ISNA, (Jan., 2,2004). 
littp: //www. isna. ir/news/NewsContcnt. asp? id-326923&, lang=P 
61 The final communique of the second congress of Esärgarin Society, /SNV, 1. (Jan., 24,2004). 
62 Cited in Shargh, (Jan., 3,2004) www. sharghnewspapcr. coin/821013/polit. htm 
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realising it. 63 
The group dismisses both the programs of `economic development' 
pursued by Hashemi Rafsanjani and `political refonns' proposed by Khatarni. 
Hussayn Fada'ie, the group's leader, is suspicious of the notions of political 
reform and civil society which he regards as a mask disguising chaos and 
indiscipline. He is also worried about the return of the counter-revolutionary 
forces under the umbrella of the Reformists. 64 Esärgarän seeks to cooperate with 
the religious trend of the Reformists, notably Rohanion Mobarez, but rejects any 
dealing with Moshrekat, for it is regarded by the group as a secular and counter- 
revolutionary force. 65 In a sense, the group's leaders look hopeful about a project 
joining the `good' ideas of the Reformists with the `good' people of the 
conservatives to form the real force of future Iran. 66 
It is still early to judge the policies of the new conservative generation as 
expressed through Abadgarän. Their proclamations, however, indicate a 
distinctive moderation. Abadgarän asserts that it is a `working team' rather than 
a party or an advocate of a certain political ideology. 67 It has already declared its 
respect for the political openness called for by the Reformists; nevertheless it 
expresses concern at the rise of non-religious attitudes. `We are not going to turn 
the clock back on reforms', says Haddad `Adel, the parliament speaker. `We will 
only adjust the clock's hands'. 65 In respect of the economy, Abadgaran pledges to 
carry on with the Reformist's policy of liberalisation, but with some adjustments 
aiming to strengthen the middle class, as suggested by Tavakküfi, the chief 
economist of the group. 69 
63 The final communique, op. cit. 
68 Cited in Shargh, (Jan., 3.2004) www. sharghnewspapcr. com/921013/polit. htin 
n5 Mujtabä Shaken, a member of the central committee. Cited in Jumhuri. V6117i, (Oct., 20, 
2003) http: //www. jomhourieslaini. coin/1392/13820729/ 
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`'" Cited in Kayhän, (Feb., 25,2004), p. 14. 
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To apprehend the general flavour of the new group's tendencies, I would 
like to borrow Quchäni's comparison between the orientation of Abädgaran and 
that of the traditional segment of the conservative camp. It is argued that the 
established alliance between Mo'talefeh and Rohaniat Mobärcz represents a 
model of power relations grounded in the unified interests of the proprietors and 
clergy. 70 The alliance derives its power from outside the state but employs the 
state to secure its interests. 7' By contrast, Abadgari n comprises mainly petit 
bourgeois elements who have made their careers within the state bureaucracy, 
whereby property does not represent a pivot of interest or a source of political 
power. On the other hand, the clergy is not seen by this group as a distinct class 
or political elite but as a professional group. 72 In fact their discontentment with 
the excessive involvement of the clergy in state matters is no less than the 
Reformists', although they express these sentiments in a rather muted fashion. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the Majlis, dominated by Abtidgaraan, has been 
the first since the revolution to be chaired by a non-clerical speaker, a step that 
has disappointed the Association of Professors of Qum Seminaries. 73 
Both Abi dgaran and the traditional conservatives emphasise the 
religious orientation of state legitimacy. For the latter, however, the state secures 
legitimacy if it is supervised by the clergy, who act as the interpreters of 
religious principles, while for the former, legitimacy rests on the state's pursuit 
of social justice, notably realised in the equal distribution of material goods. 74 
Thereby, Abadgarän seems more interested in economic issues, as they are the 
main subject of social justice, while their elders were preoccupied with cultural 
issues. For Haddad `Adel, `issues such as hab (dress code) and the like are 
Qüch; ini, MI.. Pcdarkhondch va ChabhaycJav. in, (Tchran 2000), p. I I5. 
71 Qüchäni, M., 'Dou Jcnah-c Räst', Shargh, (Apr.. 8,2004). 
www. sharghiicwspaper. coiii/830120/index. htin 
72 Qüchhni, ibid. 
Jomhouri Islami, (Apr.. 6,2004). 
www. joinhourieslami. coin/1393/138301 18/13930118 jomhori_islaini_02 jahat_cttcla. html 
74 Rczäic. A., 'Technocrat-häye Mohäfezch-Ur' Sharph, (Apr.. 10,2004) 
www. sharghnewspapcr. com/930122/cconoin. htin 
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neither a priority for society nor for the Majlis'. 75 Instead, Bahonar, the deputy 
speaker, argues that the most urgent concerns include unemployment, low 
income, inequality, as well as corruption. He goes further to acknowledge the 
reformist principles of economic development: 
We share with the religious reformists [i. e. Rohanion] the idea 
that reforms should concern principally a comprehensive endeavor 
to boost the rate of national production, ensure a fair distribution 
of income, equality, and the sovereignty of law. 76 
Given the emphasis on social justice on the one hand and the lack of 
interest in political reforms on the other hand, Abädgaran can be justifiably 
categorised as pragmatic and an advocate of statism. For some analysts, the 
group's rise is explained in terms of `state reconsolidation' after a period of 
duality of power under the previous parliament. 77 Despite his conservative 
inclination, the supreme leader is more identified with the pragmatic trend as 
much as his immediate advisor, Hashemi Rafsanjani. 
The Reformist Camp 
The core of the Islamist left consists of Sazindn-c Mojahcdin Enghcläb 
Islami (SMEI), the clerical Majina' Rohanion Mobirez (MRM) and the Islamic 
Society of Students (Anjoman-c Islamit Dancshjouyan, later known as Daftar-c 
Tahkün-e Val}dat). The trend appeared in the early 1970s with the flourishing of 
leftist tendencies in Iran.? At the time, the political opposition was dominated 
by the Tudeh Communist party, while the Islamist trends were seen to be 
generally impotent, as in the case of the formal religious establishment, or highly 
influenced by socialism, as was the case with the militant group Moj5hcdin-e 
Khalq. The Islamist left had overwhelming popularity during the first post- 
revolutionary decade, enabling it to secure the majority in the parliament until 
1992. After the rise of Ayatollah Khamenei to supreme leadership in 19R9, the 
75 `Ariesh Gurouhhä dar Entekhabät' . 
Harnshahri, (Feb.. 18 2004). 
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faction carne under intense pressure to force it out of the political arena. 
79 
According to Mosavi Läri, the minister of internal affairs and a member of 
Rohanion, the conservative campaign took the Corm of slander and 
intimidation. 1° The faction's decline was worsened by the sweeping victory of 
the right wing in the general elections of 1992, which caused the left wing to lose 
almost all its positions in the government. 
The transformation of the leftist faction into a democratic movement was 
incited by the change of the political atmosphere in the early 1990s, on both 
internal and international levels. The conclusion of the war with Iraq in 1988 and 
the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 resulted in a wide decline of 
revolutionary and leftist tendencies among the population. The international 
development, notably the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 also has an 
impact in this respect. As noted in chapter V, proposals for religious reformation 
had been already in the public domain since early 1988. Nevertheless, they were 
viewed as an elitist concern. The earliest political expression of the reformist 
trend emerged in February 1991. Ayatollah Mosavi Khoainihä, a radical leftist 
cleric published his daily paper Salm. Its early issues focused on the critique of 
the economic policies of Rafsanjani's government, but gradually developed a 
general theme of political reform criticising the autocratic rule and calling for 
openness and plurality. In October, Kiyin appeared as a monthly journal 
dedicated to new thinking on religion and the state. Coining at the right time, 
both publications gave a great boost to the reformist tendency and drew 
attention to the split within the religious trend on both theoretical and political 
levels. In fact, they paved the way for the reformist trend to be recognised as an 
insider force, though distinguished from the mainstream within the political 
System. 
Kargozarän Säzandegi 
The Party of Kargozaran Sazandcgi (The Executives tier Reconstruction) 
Evas formed in January 1996 by sixteen of President Rafsanjanº's assistants and 
Baktiari, op. cit, p. 217 
Cited in %Iurtajfi, op. cit. p. 18 
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cabinet members. Its immediate aim was to defend the reforming agenda of 
Rafsanjani which is known as Siäsat-e Ta`dil, or the Policy of Adjustment. The 
most significant point in the party's experiment has been its breaking of the 
clerical control of nomination for the Majlis. After the 1984 legislative elections, 
there was a common feeling that only the candidates supported by Rohaniat 
Mobarez had the chance of winning the elections. This was particularly asserted 
in respect of the major cities. President Rafsanjani's technocratic group used to 
fight elections on the conservative lists. On the eve of 1996 legislative elections 
Rohaniat Mobarez decided to exclude the group from the camp's lists due to 
their liberal propensity. The decision was apparently influenced by Mo'talefeh 
which, according to Shadlo, had warned that it would block its financial 
contributions which make up the bulk of the camp's budget for the electoral 
campaign. "' As a reaction, the party was formed and allied with the leftist camp 
to fight the elections against the conservative lists. The result was impressive; 
the party and its allies won forty one seats, "'' although the majority (around 170 
seats) remained with the traditional right. 83 The unexpected success of the new 
group was surprising to both factions. The general impression, however, was that 
the political atmosphere was about to change decisively. The influence of the 
clergy showed a relative decline compared to the rise of lay professionals. 
Kargozaräin's successful alliance with the left-wing was the first indication of the 
emergence of the reformist camp. On the other hand, that success has drawn the 
attention of the left-wing to the increasing appeal of such ideas as political 
reform, democracy, freedoms and so on. 
The emergence of Kargozaran highlights the conflict between the 
revolution and the state as different institutions with distinctive objectives, 
requirements and mechanisms of action. Such a difference was obvious since the 
first days of the revolution. The post-revolutionary interim government made an 
abortive attempt to bring the revolutionary forces under state control. The 
decision came at the wrong time and thus failed to make any difference. That 
x' Shadlo, op. cit. p. 104. 
X2 Shah Alain, op. cit. 
ý' Dcliri. J., 'Farzandan-c 'Asr-c Enghclsb va Islahät dar Rcgabati T,, -izah', Iran, (Jan. 11,2004). 
203 
was, according to Barzin, a result of the hostility of the then powerful 
revolutionary forces to state bureaucracy. It is argued that the left-wing deemed 
the state bureaucracy as being inherently conservative and lacking in sensitivity 
to popular concerns, while the religious-traditional trend was suspicious of its 
inherent tendency to expand its control over social and cultural activities. "-' 
After a decade, most of the state institutions, as well as the state-owned 
industries, came under the dominance of the revolutionaries who would gradually 
adapt to the distinctive preoccupations of bureaucracy. The rise of the 
professional and pragmatic forces in the wake of the eight-year war with Iraq 
effectively blurred the lines between the state and the revolutionary institutions. 
This was just another example of how the bureaucracy relaxes the fever of 
revolution and accommodates its forces. Through their presence in the state's 
upper and middle ranks, the new bureaucrats came to recognise the difference 
between paying lip-service to political objectives and having the means to put 
them into effect. The advance of this trend aided the rise of a rational and 
pragmatic type of culture at the expense of idealism and passionate types of 
action familiar among the revolutionaries. In a sense, the rise of Kargozariin 
reflected the decline of revolutionary momentum and the emergence of a new 
reference group, characteristically pragmatic and professional. 
"5 
Since its formation, Kargozaran has remained an elitist circle limited, in 
tenns of membership, to high and middle ranking professionals and cxccutivcs. 
S6 
The bureaucratic background of the party has earned it some of its distinctive 
features, such as the advocacy of statism, pragmatism and technocracy. 
" Its 
advocacy of economic development and its moderate attitude in respect of 
political and cultural issues has earned it the support of the urban middle class. 
Nevertheless, this support has not been translated into organisational power, 
simply because the party itself show, no interest in expansion. According to 11. 
Mar`ashi, the deputy leader, `the party is more concerned with the quality than 
Barzin, Sa'id, Jcnih-bandi Siäsi dar Iran, (Tehran 2000), p. 60. 
Qüchi ni. M., Ycgch-Scrdha, (Tehran 2000), p. 86. 
Shadlo, op. cit. p. 1 10. 
X7 Barzin, op. cit., 59. 
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the quantity of its membership, thus it focuses on attracting the elite'. "' Such a 
tendency emanates from a conviction that the elite collectively represent the real 
power for change in the country. In the words of Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, the 
party leader: 
The political party is an effective means for bringing about a 
consensus among the national elite [... ] Such a consensus is the 
most agreeable basis for development and the most viable means 
of countering threats to national security [... ] If we fail to bring 
together the national elite and introduce a consensual long-term 
strategy, the socio-political system will gradually wear out and 
erosion will be a serious possibility. s9 
Economic progress is the major preoccupation of Kargozarän. Indeed, it 
deems itself the pioneer of the idea in the Islamic Republic. 90 The party is of the 
idea that political, cultural and economic development is so intertwined that any 
reasonable progress in the political respect cannot be achieved without a 
considerable improvement in the living standards of citizens. To achieve such an 
objective, the country has to push towards a level of urbanisation and economic 
efficiency that meets international standards. The predominance of the economy 
among the party's concerns is the principal source of contention between it and 
other supporters of President Khatami, since the latter's overemphasis on 
political development, says Muhammad Ilashcmi, a leading figure in the party, 
`will get nowhere'. `'' 
During his first term in office (1988-1992), President Rafsanjani's plans 
to liberalise the economy won stable support from the traditional conservatives, 
in spite of being modelled on the advice of the International Monetary Fund. The 
support has by and large declined during his second tern due to his tendency to 
elevate the industrial sector to the status of mainstay of the Iranian economy, at 
the expense of traditional trade which hitherto made up an essential part of the 
N's Cited in Shadlo, op. cit. p. 110. 
Cited in Hainshahr7 (Sep., 3,2000). www. hainshahri. org/hainnews/I379/790613/siasi. htin 
'" Shadlo, op. cit. p. 122. 
91 Cited in: Sepdh Islamic Research Centre, Ahzäb va Tnshki/at-c S/is? Iran, (Quin. n. d. ) c. 
edition, retrieved in August 16 '", 1004, from: www. tooba-ir. org/siyasi/ahzab/kargo/fehrest. htnt 
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conservative's strcngth. 92 The inclination of the party towards a modern 
industrial economy caused some analysts to identify it as the representative of 
the modem upper class. 93 
The party advocates a strong and effective government. Its model of 
government lies between the rule of an experienced oligarchy and a 
representative government. The best rule is embodied by the professionals who 
enjoy the trust and support of the public. 
94 In fact, the party prefers the rule by 
technocrats to the rule by politicians. I-lussayn Mar`ashi, the deputy leader, 
describes the party members as Muslim technocrats `technocracy is part of our 
cssence'. 9 According to Centcno, the most common perspective on technocracy 
is a variant of elite theory `that asks whether or not an oligarchy of technicians 
controls the administrative, economic, and political arms of a given state'. 
96 The 
idea had long been established in the traditions of the Greek philosophers as well 
as the nineteenth century works of Auguste Comte (1799-1857) and Saint- 
Simon (1760-1825), where the idea of the separation between ownership and the 
effective control of power was applied to the decisions being taken by those who 
control the means of production, namely, the learned technicians. 
97 In the 1930s 
the idea attracted more attention aided by the flourishing of the assumption that 
progress is owed to the advancement of technology. On the other hand, 
technocratic rule was criticised on the basis that the technician's view of his 
fellow human being is likely to be utilitarian, i. e. people are to be treated as a 
means of production. " The core distinction between technocratic and democratic 
rule lies in the philosophy of government, being an administration of things or a 
representative of its citizens' interests. " 
Qu-chäni, N1., Ycgch-Scrdhi, p. 78. 
Qüchani, ibid., p. 126. 
91 Barzin, op. cit. p. 59. 
" Cited in Shadlo, op. cit., p. 110. 
96 Centeno, Miguel, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Thcoij, and 
Society vol. 22, no. 3. (Jun., 1993), 307-335, p. 309. 
`" Carlisle, Robert, 'The Birth of Technocracy: Science, Society, and Saint-Simonians', Journal of 
the Histor}' ol'/deas, vol. 35, no. 3. (Jul. - Sep., 1974). 445-464, p. 449. 
0X Centeno. op. cit. 
"" Centeno. ibid. 
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Kargozarän's focus on the technical skills of state officials discomforts 
the conservatives who see it as inferior to an ethical commit tncnt. 1 (x) Its 
economic policy is another point of contention and seen, as argued by Bahonar, 
to be inconsistent with the revolution's values: `they [Kargozaran] put 
rationality and rational administration before a religious one, while the others 
[the conservatives] emphasise simultaneously economic development, justice, 
values and the maintenance of the regime'. 101 In response, Muhajeräni, a senior 
member of the party, argues that it is logical that each working unit is 
administered by the most learned. Technocracy is not a value-free model of rule, 
the party's focus on the skills does not contradict its religious commitment. 102 
The party views the religious establishment as an essential ally of the 
government. However it prefers the former to be subordinate to the latter, rather 
than vice versa, as argued by the clergy. 103 At the same time, the party is less 
interested in the theoretical issues related to religion and religious reformation. It 
takes a pragmatic approach to the application of religious rules and emphasises 
the calculable interests borne out by the rule rather than its metaphysical 
authority. Rafsanjani's experience as chairman of the Expediency Council offers 
a good example of the way he likes to organise the interaction between religion 
and government. In this respect, the relevance of religious rules is judged upon 
their capacity to deliver the interests identified by the government or the 
Parliament. The party's standpoint towards wiläyat al-fagih is another example 
of its pragmatism, as Karbäschi says: 
We accept wiläyat al-fagih within the frame of the people's 
sovereignty [... ] The fagih is the leader elected by the majority 
and not the appointee of God. The authority of the fagih is 
grounded in the Constitution. In fact our acceptance of wildyat al- 
fagih is originated in our adherence to the Constitution. "" 
"" See for example the speech of Ayatollah Khamenci on the eve of the 1996 elections in 
Sarjouei and Sadatian, Entekhabät-e Majlis Panjom darA_}eneh Rtatbo'at, (Tehran 1999), p. 
259. 
M. R. Bahonar. cited in Zarifiniä, op. cit. p. 102. 
Cited in Scpih Islamic Research Centre, op. cit. 
Barzin. op. cit., 59 
"'4 Cited in Shadlo, op. cit., p. 116 
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The party holds a liberal propensity to social and cultural issues, 
forwarding an agenda entitled `leniency and tolerance' (tasahul va tasarnuh). 
Karbaschi, the former Mayor of Tehran, and Muhäjeränº, the former minister of 
information, held the responsibility for putting the agenda into action. 
Consequently, the two have been singled out for criticism by the conservatives. 
In 1998, the mayor was sentenced to five years in prison and banned from 
political activity for ten years. "15 Muhdjerani, who dedicated two of his books to 
defend his liberal agenda, ""' was forced out of the cabinet in 2000. In 2004, he 
was subjected to a smear campaign to force him out of the political arena amid 
rumours about his possible nomination for president in the 2005 elections. 107 
The party operates within the reformist Front of 2"" Khordhtd. After 
pioneering political refonns in the early 1990s, the party was overtaken by other 
reformist groups, due to the advance of the reformist discourse, as suggested by 
Muhäjcräni. 10`ý 
It is commonly felt that Kargozaran's sole purpose is to win elections. 
After its formation, its activity was limited only to election times. The lack of 
any broad organisation and membership puts some constraints upon the party's 
movements. Its efficiency in political contests is widely dependent upon its 
alliance with other factions. For this reason, the party has to be very moderate 
and intrinsically pragmatic in dealing with political and social issues, keeping a 
reasonable distance from all active factions. " '9 This tendency can be interpreted 
as a strength, as all other factions can see the party as a possible ally. The other 
side of the coin, however, suggests that the party is no more than a half-way ally. 
It could be allied with on a tactical basis, but with no security in the long run. 110 
The relationship between the party and the former president Rafsanjani is 
quite complex. The party leaders do not deny the `special' link with Raf., anjani. 
1"s BBCNcivs, (Jan., 35,2000). http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/iniddlc_cast/6IS35I. stm, 
"K' Muhajerini, 'Ata'ollah, Hckiyat Hamchenin Baqiest, (Tehran 1999) and E, tizih(Tchran 
1999). 
ISiVA. (Nov., 17,2004). 
1ON Muhijeräni, A., interview with Iran, (Jun., 3,2003). 
1"y Quchani, Ycgeh-Sefidha, p. 88. 
'Ali Darabi, cited in Mehr News Agency, (Feb., 9,2004). 
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In the list of the party founders, there are four Rafsanjanis, including his younger 
brother and daughter. ' The central committee comprises mainly Rafsanjani's 
former assistants. Muhäjerani admits that the party observes the views of the 
former president regarding major issues but denies that he is the party's 
'Godfather'. 112 Rafsanjani is one of the top three men of the regime; 
nevertheless, he could neither protect the party leaders from conservative 
hostility, nor did he help them to have access to the state institutions dominated 
by the conservatives, such as the judiciary, the armed forces, and so on. 
Mojähedin Engheläb 
Säzmhn-c Mojähedin Engheläb Islami (The Organisation of the Fighters 
of the Islamic Revolution) was established in 1980 as a merger of seven smaller 
groups. Apparently, it was meant to counter Moji hcdin-c Khalq, the quasi- 
Marxist Islamist group. 113 Its presence in the state was noticeable after the 
revolution. Many of its members have occupied senior positions in the anned 
forces, intelligence units, cabinet, academic and parliamentary posts. The group 
is seen as the dynamo of the left wing and generally treated by both the 
pragmatist and right wing factions in a manner which is far from friendly. 
14 
Since 1982, Mojahcdin Enghelib has been in decline. First, Ayatollah 
Khomeini outlawed the membership of military personnel in political groups, 
resulting in scores of the group's cadres walking out. A year later, thirty seven 
leading figures left the group in the middle of internal differences over its leftist 
tendencies. Finally the group was disbanded in 1986 on the advice of Rösti 
Kashäni, a senior right-wing cleric designated by Ayatollah Khomeini to oversee 
the group's operations. 11s 
In 1991 the group was restored by the left-wing. In 1994 the group started 
publishing 'A. ý; rc-mä, a fortnightly paper which deeply influenced the political 
"' For some details, see Qu-chäni. Pedar-khondeh, p. 30. 
Iran, (Jun., 3,2002) 
' Mohsen Rczäyt, cited in Kayhan(Feb.. 8,2000). 
114 Haidari. h1., 'Engcläb-e Islami dar'Asr-c Mä', Irin(May, 20,2002). 
115 Mturtaj . op. cit. p. 
22. 
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scene in this period. "6 It was known for its thorough analysis on issues 
previously left untouched, including the structure of the political scene, the 
composition of influential factions, state-religion and state-society relations and 
so on. 1 7 It has also paved the way for the next wave of writings on such issues as 
democracy, civil liberties and the role of modem elites. Before it was shut down 
by the judiciary in March 2002, `Acre-1nä was among the most influential 
publications of the country. It has played a prominent role in advancing the 
reformist discourse among the supporters of left. 
Mojahecdin Engheläb of today is far removed from its professed principles 
of the early 1980s. Its leftist tendency has been extensively modified, it came to 
advocate public consent, rather than wiläyat al- faqºh, which it upheld in the past 
as the basis for the legitimacy of the regime. Its rigid interpretation of religion 
was also replaced by a more liberal one. ' "' The group has been harshly treated by 
the conservatives and slandered as being secular, a conspirator and so on. In 
2002, the Association of the Professors of Qum Seminaries (JMHI) issued it 
communique declaring the group religiously illegitimate and appealing for its 
exclusion. 119 This came shortly after Hi shim Aghajaii, a leading member of the 
group, was arrested and later sentenced to death for blasphemy and insulting 
religious beliefs. '20 
The group made a crucial contribution to the rise of the refonnist camp 
and after 2000 it became a major partner in the government. It is this 
determining role that caused the group's rivals to regard it as the hidden power 
behind the reformist camp, '2' not least because the dominant partner of the 
camp, the Mosharckat party, is led mainly by former members of Mojhhcdin. 
116 Haidari, M., op. cit. 
11' l laidari, tit.. ibid. 
1't Shadlo, op. cit, pp. 247-258. 
1 19 ISNA (Jul., 9,2002). 
12" The sentence was later quashed by the Supreme Court of Justice and Aghajari was released in 
the early 2005. An English translation of the lecture upon which Aghajari was arrested, is 
available in Faith. http: //ilrs. org/faith/aghajaritext. htinl 
121 Amir Mohcbiän, cited in Resa7at (Dec., 23,2002) p. 2. 
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Mojähedin Engheläb has never had clergy members within its 
organisation, 1" probably for an anti-clerical tendency common among those who 
have been influenced by `AG Shari'afi. It resembles Kargozaran in its elitist 
composition. The group remained relatively small and dominated by professional 
politicians and intellectuals. 123 It also emphasises an industrial-based economy 
against the dominance of traditional trade. 124 In respect of state-society relation, 
most of the group's views resemble those held by the Mosharekat party. 
Mojihedin was banned from participation in the legislative election of 2004. 
Since then it has tried to shift from its tradition of elitism and secrecy to being a 
popular and broad-based organisation. The new policy of expansion was declared 
in the group's seventh general congress, the first held in public, in April 2004.125 
Majma' Rohanion Mobärez (MRM) 
Rohanion (Assembly of Combatant Clergy), the faction of the clerical 
left, has been the closest group to Ayatollah Khomeini. Its differences with the 
mainstream traditional and pragmatic right came to the fore after the death of 
Muhammad Hussayn Bcheshti, the leader of the Islamic Republic Party in June 
1981. Beheshti was able to keep the revolutionary groups together despite their 
contradictions. '26 The leftist group was operating within the clerical association 
of Rohaniat Mobärez (JRM) until 1988 when an internal dispute reached 
deadlock, days ahead of the legislative election. '27 The conservative trend was 
generally supported by the senior clerics, the religious establishment and the 
pragmatic wing of the Islamic Republican Party. The leftist faction had the 
support of Ayatollah Khomeini, Mojähedin Enghelab, the younger clerics and the 
student organisations. According to Rafsanjani, Khomeini's support of the 
faction was due to its being informally led by Ahmad, Khomeini's son and his 
12 Qüchini, Ycqch-Sefdhl"4 op. cit., p. 109. 
12' Haidan, Iv1., op. cit. 
124 Murtajä, op. cit., p. 109. 
1'5 Rahimi, R., 'Kongerch Haftom ya Kongcrch Avval', Shargh. (May, I. 2004). 
www. sharghnewspaper. com/830212/polit. htin 
126 Shadlo, op. cit. 70. 
127 Murtajä, op. cit. p. 16 
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personal assistant. 128 Apparently, the group was the only political party whose 
formation was publicly endorsed by Khomeini, not surprising when ten out of 
twcntyscven of its founders had been working at Khomeini's office and six 
others were among his representatives. Like Kargozarän, Rohanion lacks the 
basic features of a political party. It has no organisation of its own, no distinctive 
ideology, and even no definite position with regard to many of the issues posed 
in the political fray. The final commnunique of its first congress (November 2003) 
expresses a deep concern over the hegemonic attitudes of the conservatives and 
emphasises the group's commitment to reform. Nevertheless, the position taken 
in respect of many of the controversial issues is mostly vague. 129 The viewpoints 
expressed by the group's members diverge widely, implying the lack of a 
coherent ideology that otherwise would have fostered collective and united 
positions towards the major issues posed in the political arena. 130 The group had 
a good link with the students' associations brokered notably by Mosavi 
Khocinihä, which was a great help to Rohanion in political contests. Since 2002 
however, this relationship seems to have weakened due to disillusionment, and 
the rise of secular tendencies among students. In the legislative elections of 
2004, many of the group's candidates were disqualified. The others have failed to 
retain their seats, including Mahd Karrübi and Majid Ansari, two leading figures 
with pragmatic tendencies. The failure was blamed on the reformist allies' 
retreat from the fray. In fact, the group was not capable of winning battles on its 
own. The withdrawal of its younger allies has left Rohanion with no means to 
fight. 131 
Jebhe Moshärekat Iran Islami (JMII) 
Despite its short history, the Islamic Iran Participation Front (Jcb/ic 
Moshärckat Iran I. slainr) has proved remarkably competent in mobilising the 
people behind its programs. Only six months after it was established, the party 
12" Safiri, op. cit. p. 84 
12' See the final communique of the group's congress, ISAIA, (Jan., 12,2004). 
1 31) See the speeches delivered in and about the first congress of the group, ! SM-t, (Dec., 4-7, 
2003). 
11 Ebrthimi, N.. 'Unhi Sherkat Kardand' Shar'h, (Feb.. 17,2004). 
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secured the majority of the local councils elected in February 1999.132 This was 
followed by a similar victory in the legislative elections held in February 2000 
securing the upper hand in both the Majlis and cabinet. 133 The party is 
categorised as liberal democratic. Some Iranian analysts view it as a social 
democratic party in line with the modem left, apparently because of the leftist 
orientation of its founders. ' 34 
The seeds of the party were planted in the `Ayes Circle', a group of 
intellectuals who, during the period of 1994-95, were busy preparing to publish a 
new liberal-oriented journal. With the nomination of Khatami, the group's 
leader, for the presidential elections in early 1997, the circle shifted into the 
headquarters of his campaign. With Khatami elected as president, the circle's 
focus moved towards establishing a political party advocating the proposals that 
won him the presidency. ' 35 The party was established by a group of 110 of 
politicians, professionals and journalists. At this early stage, Sa'ecd 1.1ajjärii-an 
was said to have been the brain behind the party, 136 traces of his opinions are 
easily found throughout the its publications. For many Reformists, Elajjariän is 
the principal theorist of the political reforms in today's Iran. 137 Like many of the 
party leaders, Hajjarian has been a member of Mojähedin Enghel<ib . 
The two 
groups are so interlinked that their rivals deem Moshärckat to be the public 
proxy of Mojähcdin. 135 
13' Abdo, Geneive, 'Electoral Politics in Iran', Middle East Po/ic}. v. 6, no. (Jun., 4,1999). 
www. inepc. org/public_asp/journal 
- 
vol6/9906 
- 
abdo. asp 
"; In the 2000 parliamentary elections, Moshärekat won 80 seats, Rohanion 60, Kargozaran 15. 
Hambastagi 30. the conservative faction 50 out of a total of 290 scats. lbrahimi, Z., 'Jcnih- 
bandihaye Siäsi Majlis Sheshum'. Hamshahri (Sep., 9.2000). According to Na'imipour, the 
head of Mosharekat parliamentary faction, his faction consists of 120 MPs among which 30 are 
committed members of the party. Nourüz. (Jun., 2,2002) p. 7. 
"4 Shadlo, op. cit., p. 127 
135 Jebhc Moshärekat Iran Islami, Bayänät va Afavizv'to Congereh Avi'a/, (Tehran 2001). p. 222. 
''` 'Eslahät dar ivlosharckat', Hainshahri (Aug., 22,2002) 
1" Jalaipour, Hamid, Dawclat-c Penhin. (Tehran 2000). p. 205. 
13's Amir Muhebian, cited in: Jebhe Mosharckat, op. cit., p. 194. 
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Moshärekat is thought to be the largest political group in respect of 
membership and regional presence. 139 Before it was shut down by the 
conservative-dominated judiciary in July 2002, the party's newspaper, Nourooz, 
was one of the top Iranian dailies in terms of circulation. 140 
According to `Alavitabhr, an Iranian analyst, three trends could be 
identified within Moshärekat party: 
a) The traditional left with religious orientation originated in the 
Line of the Imam, which developed into a moderate advocate of 
broader public participation and controlled political contest. 
b) The centre left, oriented in the intellectual, religious reformist 
trend which supports a quasi-secular democracy. 
c) The professional politicians who hold pragmatic, liberal views and 
moderate religious attitudes. 
`Alavitabar suggests the latter trend is more likely to determine the future 
direction of the party. If it happens, the party will develop into a professional 
political party, whose activity revolves around the contest for power. '4' 
The party's proposals have so far proved to have a significant appeal to 
the new generation. Its main slogan `Iran for all the Iranians' had a great 
influence on the segments of the society which felt alienated, notably the youth 
and women. Thus it is widely believed that the party has attracted to the 
political fray a segment of the population which hitherto was indifferent. An 
opinion poll carried out in January 2004 showed that despite the public 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the outgoing parliament, which was 
dominated by Moshi rekat, the party was still the favourite party among the 
electorate. 142 
I3) 'Kongoreh Sevom Moshärckat dar Astanch Tahavul', (Report on the 3" annual conference of 
the party) Iran, (Jul., 22,2002). 
140 Hainshahri, (Jun., 27,2002). 
141 'Alavitabär, 'Ali, 'Moshärekat va Mojähe(fin Enghcläb Dou Hasteh Asti Dovorn Khordad', 
\'ourooz( Jul.. 11,2002). 
142 The official website of the Council for the Maintenance of the Constitution, (Jan., 18.2004). 
www. irisn. coi-n/akhbar/1392/13821029/13821029-irisn_00005. htiti 
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Political refonn represents the major preoccupation of Moshärekat. It 
holds the idea that the new socio-political situation of the country and the world 
requires an extensive rethinking of political culture, structure and the standards 
by which the Islamic state functions. '43 It advocates liberal democracy as the 
only model of government capable of meeting the challenges of modern times. 
Thus it emphasises such notions as civil constitutional rights, the establishment 
of the public will as the essence of the regime's legitimacy, the sovereignty of 
law, transparency and accountability as the major objectives of the reformist 
movement. 144 For the party, the rise of the reformist trend embodies the shift of 
the revolutionary movement brought by the Islamic revolution towards rational, 
practical, peaceful and locally-developed forms of action. Muhammad Reza 
Khatarni, the party's leader argues that the course of democratisation has been 
hindered by idealist tendencies, populism and autocracy on the part of the 
conservative rulers, and on the other hand by the yearning on the part of the 
secular opposition for an intervention by foreign forces. '45 
The fifth general conference of the party (2003) dedicated a good deal of 
its time to considering what the party members, indeed most of the democratic 
forces, take as a dead end reached by the reform movement. Nevertheless, in the 
final communique, the party reaffirmed its primary principle of peaceful struggle 
within the limits of the Constitution and the country's laws. This assertion was 
meant to highlight the line distinguishing the party from the groups which seek a 
wholesale change of the Islamic regime, as well as the friends of the party who 
sec no way out under the current system. '46 
The party views the extensive powers retained by the supreme leader in 
the absence of a systematic means of accountability as a major source for 
"' See the party agenda for the legislative elections of 2000 in: Jcbhc `1oshärekat, op. cit., p. 
229. 
144 Jebhc Moshärckat, ibid., pp. 222-8. 
145 Khatami. M. Reza. `Inauguratory speech of the party's fifth general congress'. (Oct., 16. 
2003). Retrieved from http: //news. gooya. coin/politics/archivcs/000487. php. 
"6 The final communique of the the party's fifth general congress. (Oct., 17,2003). Retrieved on 
Jan., 8,2004 from www. ardekan. com/msh_bayaniejebhe. htin 
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political irregularities. 147 Its four-year parliamentary experiment is characterised 
by serious endeavors to adjust the legal system and power relations to enhance 
public rights. The controversy between the Moshärekat-dominated Majlis and 
the conservative-dominated Council for the Guardianship of the Constitution 
shows that the former was principally aiming to enhance the people's influence 
on the political process. 148 For Moshärekat, the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic has fundamental defects, yet this cannot be entirely blamed for the 
hesitant progress of reforms, as Reza Khatami says: 
The existing Constitution has serious shortcomings in such 
respects as the definition of the power relations and power 
distribution within the political system [... ] Given that, we do not 
believe that the advance of refonns is contingent upon the change 
of the Constitution [... ] We believe that the fundamental defect in 
the country is the lack of an absolute and impartial sovereignty of 
law [... ] Even if our Constitution and other laws are perfectly 
democratic, given the current situation, there is absolutely no 
guarantee of having them implemented. Therefore the ultimate 
assignment of the reformist movement must be to establish the 
sovereignty of law. '49 
The party is of the opinion that the course of democratisation can 
advance properly only with structural changes leading to the balance of power 
becoming in favour of the society and its democratic forces. The seventh general 
conference has seen a strong emphasis on the role of political parties and other 
civil society groups as the principal means of translating public opinion into 
political power. 15() 
The party identifies itself as the intellectual trend of religious 
reformation. It advocates a wide role for religion in both public and private 
life. '-'; ' However, it rejects the extension of the sanctity of religion to the state. It 
deals with the religious branch of the state, including wil5yat al-fagih, the 
1" The final communique of the the party's fifth general congress, ibid. 
"'. 4 See for instance the list of the bills passed by the Majlis but rejected by the constitutional 
council published by Nourr7z, (10,11,12,13, and 20 June 2002). The list covers the first year 
of the sixth Majlis works. 
14" Khatami. M. Rezä, Inauguratory speech of the party's fifth general congress. 
1"" The final communique of the party's seventh general congress, Ernrooz, (Aug., 4.2004) 
www. emrooz. ws: R1 /Show Item. aspx'? I D=4980&p= 1. 
151 Jcbhe titoshärekat, op. cit., p 233. 
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Council for the Guardianship of the Constitution, and so on, on a legal or a 
political rather than a religious basis. In the same line, the party does not sec 
religion as a part of the state's business and calls for the separation between the 
religious establishment and state institutions. 152 
Although President Khatami is a member of the clerical assembly of 
Rollanion Mobärez (MRM) rather than Moshärekat, his campaign promises and 
intellectual publications make up the essence of the party's teachings. 
153 
Therefore, it is widely believed that he is actually the founding father of the 
party, a similar relationship to that of Kargozarän with Rafsanjani . 
's' Two points 
however, might be considered in this regard. First: as a large and country-wide 
organisation, the making of Mosharekat's common views and positions is 
primarily a function of the organisation, rather than the persons of the leadership. 
This function was very clear in the seventh congress held in July 2004.15 
Second: the presence of a considerable number of intellectuals, professionals and 
politicians within the party's organisations enhances the value of collective 
opinion and reduces the influence of individual charisma in the process of 
decision-making. Among all of the political groups in the country, Mosharekat 
seems to have the largest number of thinkers and professionals. On the other 
hand, many intellectuals who have been alienated during the last two decades 
were able to voice their ideas through the party-inspired publications. 
'5 
Prior to the legislative elections of 2004, all of the party's candidates 
were disqualified by the Council for the Guardianship of the Constitution, 
forcing the party out of the contest. Previously, it was thought that the party was 
not going to win the same majority as it enjoyed in the sixth Majlis (2000-2004). 
In the second local election of 2003, the party endured a sweeping defeat in the 
152 Khatarni. M. Reza. Inauguratory speech of the party's seventh general congress, ISNA. (Jul.. 
23,2004). www. isna. ir/news/NewsContcnt. asp? id=409466&lang=P 
1" Jebhc Moshärekat, op. cit., p. 222. 
154 Sal; 1m Iran. (Dec. 7,1998). www. salaiiiiraii. org/NIcdia/IranNcws/981207.11(lill. 
155 Roh, M. J., 'Moze' Moshärekat darbareh Nlmzadii Mosavi' (Report on the 7'" congress of the 
party) Shargh. (Jul., 22,2004). www. sharghnewspaper. coin/830503/indcx. htin. 
156 Kiyän, 'Alireza. 'Ustad wa Shagerdanesh', Hamshahri (Naurtizspecial edition) (Mar., 20. 
2003). 
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major cities at the hands of the new conservative Coalition of Abadgarän. This 
setback was blamed on the party's failure to deliver on its promises at the local 
level, in addition to its engagement in fierce rivalries which frustrated its 
electorate. 157 
Conclusion 
Despite the emergence of political parties after the Islamic Revolution, 
their effectiveness became tangible only after the changing of the political 
environment in the 1990s. The Iranian parties, notwithstanding their many 
defects, have helped at least to hinder the evolution of totalitarianism which 
seems to have been pursued by both the left-wing in the 1980s and the 
conservatives in the 1990s. This shows that political groups are, even in difficult 
circumstances, crucial for maintaining pluralism, and, when the situation 
improves, they can be helpful in accelerating the course of democratisation. 
This chapter shows that among the factions discussed, only two have the 
shape and machinary of a modern party, namely, Mo'talefeh and Mosharckat. 
Three other groups, namely Rohaniat, Rohanion and Kargozaran are more like 
elitist clubs with no coherent organisation. The first two appear to be 
increasingly losing their power and political influence, probably due to the 
general decline in the hitherto exemplary status of the clergy. 
Some analysts assumed that Iranian politics were characteristically fluid. 
I contend that such an assumption has to be taken very reservedly. As we have 
seen throughout the chapter, the composition of each of the two broad camps 
remained by and large stable. The change of positions and alliances resulted 
mostly from the sharpening of the lines which differentiate the factions from 
each other. In my opinion, the said changes resemble the overall evolution of the 
political system of the Islamic Republic. Since the rise of the Reformists in 1997, 
however, the line separating the modernists from their traditionalist rivals has 
become clearly demarcated as it never was before. This was aided by the 
accentuation of the different ideologies standing each of the two trends. 
'57 Razavi, H.. 'Saff-äray-e Tazeh', Hamshahn, (May, 12.2003). 
%vww. liainshaliri. org/hainnews/i 382/820222/world/intep. htin 
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Most of the assumptions about fluidity relate to the changing alliances 
during the running for general elections. It is a matter of fact that the majority of 
party politics in Iran revolves around elections. As Baktiari rightly noticed, the 
Majlis has been at the centre of elite factionalism and power rivalry, `who 
controls the Majlis, and in what numbers, has become an important indicator of 
factional victory in revolutionary Iran'. 158 This chapter shows that four of the 
eight parties studied have been formed shortly before elections. The others have 
weakened after they lost elections. It is understood that power represents the 
pivot of party politics, and a party is defined as `a team seeking to control the 
governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election'. 159 The 
problem with the Iranian parties, however, is seen in their exaggerated 
attachment to elections, and hence power, in the sense that, if there is no 
election, there is no activity, while for the course of democracy to mature, an 
effective opposition is as necessary as an effective government. This requires the 
political groups to remain active at all times and not only at the time of 
elections. This idea seems to have been finally understood as we sec three 
groups, Mo'talefch, Mojähedin and Moshärekat, declaring plans to expand their 
organisations and focus on civil society, a typical propensity of an `outside- 
government' party politics. 
The rise of the coalition of Abadgaran has attracted little analytical 
attention outside Iran as it was generally perceived to involve more of change of 
personnel rather than of ideology. '60 In this chapter I have tried to locate this 
development within the structural transformations of the society, which 
inevitably affect the conservative camp, as well as the other parties. For the 
conservatives, however, it signifies that domination within the camp has shifted 
from the traditional clergy and market traders to the middle-class technocrats. 
The change will probably ease the camp's rigidity, nevertheless its implications 
in the course of political reform arc yet open to question. 
Baktiari, op. cit.. p. 235. 
14' Schlesinger, J., op. cit., p. 374. 
"'" See, for instance, M. Amin, 'Iran Politics Turns to Right'? ', The Washington Tünc. s (May, 29. 
2004). http: //washingtontimes. com'upi-breaking/20040538-035432-9502r. htm 
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Conclusion 
For some researchers, the rising trend of political reform in Iran signifies 
a reversal of the religious-political model which prevailed since the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979. The tendency by the Islamic Republic in recent years to 
cone into line with the universal standards of politics and administration is 
explained by this group of researchers as an evidence of the failure of religion to 
meet the demands of a changing world. There is nothing novel in this assumption 
since it affirms a common theme in the study of development suggesting that the 
religion will inescapably give up to the compelling realities produced through the 
process of modernisation. 
While appreciating the above argument, this study seeks to develop a 
different hypothesis on the possibility of fonnulating a model of relationship 
between religion and modem politics capable of fostering a viable democracy. 
The thesis puts forward two major arguments: the first concerns the adaptability 
of religious principles, particularly those which concern public affairs, to modern 
demands. The second emphasises the crucial role of religion in bringing about a 
consensual and participatory political system. The two arguments have been 
advanced through a threefold scheme of analysis including a historical analysis of 
the evolution of the Shi i political worldview, an analysis of the present debate 
over the correspondence between Islam and modernity in Iran, and an empirical 
assessment of the achievements and failures which were made through the 
ongoing experience of the Islamic Republic. 
Adaptability 
Throughout the long history of Shia, the changing realities of the 
community's life have been mirrored by a reciprocal change in their religious 
woridview. The latter change took the form of a continuous reinterpretation of 
the basic principles of religion, signifying its disposition to free itself from the 
contextually conditioned relations and interpretations. The adaptive character of 
the religion is explained on four bases: 
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First: there is a relatively clear distinction between two scopes of 
religiosity, the scope of worship, or the pure relation between man and God 
(i'haddt), and the scope of mutual relations between the people (mu'atnatit). In 
the latter scope, religion offers mainly general principles most of which are in 
line with common rationality. Thus it leaves a wider room for reasoning with 
reference to the society's collective rationality and changing needs. 
Second: the absence of a formal religious establishment, hence it single 
authority to interpret and enact the religious rules, allows the religious Schulur tu 
review his peers' interpretations in the light of the new demands and realities of 
life. 
Third: the production of ideas by the religious scholars and thinkers is 
highly influenced by their relations with the intellectual and social trends outside 
the religious realm. Thus we can Lind among the religious trends group, leaning 
towards socialism or liberalism, nationalism or internationalism, traditionalism 
or modernity, authoritarianism or democracy, and so on. All these groups ground 
their claims on a religious basis. Nevertheless, they can be properly understood 
only by locating them within the broader variety of ideologies and trends on the 
global level. 
Fourth: the above process highlights also an inherent tendency among the 
religious leaders to ensure religion's responsiveness to the varying concerns kit' 
the community. This tendency is meant to preserve the basic threads which tie 
the believers to their basic beliefs. Therefore the religious- leaders tend not to tic 
too rigid about the change of attitudes and lifestyle, as long as they . top short of 
damaging the bedrocks of the religious association. 
From the historical experience of the Shi'i community, we learn that the 
evolution of its political worldvicw has been profoundly influenced by the tlcpree 
of its political engagement. Thus, I have argued that the more religion engage: in 
the political process the more it evolves. The direction of the evolution is 
determined by factors outside the religious realm. An accurate judgment of the 
capacity of religion to adapt to the modern pattems of politics and sokialkation 
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has to consider the sociological dimension, i. e. the compelling imperatives of the 
society at question. 
The Role of the Religion 
This study appreciates the argument that religious traditions are 
inherently unhelpful for the process of democratisation. Nevertheless it does not 
view secularisation as a viable answer to the problem. The major reservation on 
the public role of religion is related to its emotional effect which hinders the 
individual from grounding his intentions and actions on a rational basis. It is also 
argued that the organic relationships within the community of believers 
downgrades individuality and lures individual to accept a status of subject rather 
than an equal citizen. As a result, a religious-based power will likely justify a 
kind of dictatorship in the guise of a virtuous authority. 
While this thesis is not aiming to refute these assumptions, it tries to 
expand the scope of investigation, hence probabilities, by redefining the core of 
the religion-politics problem on the one hand, and assessing the function of the 
religion from a sociological point of view on the other hand. 
Religion-State Antipathy: The study has argued that the religion- 
democracy aversion is an offshoot of an historical antipathy between Shi'ism and 
state. The said antipathy, which ensued form the hostility of the state, has been a 
residual element in the Shi i system of thought. After the rise of Pahlavi regime 
in the early twentieth century, this antipathy was reaffirmed by the tendency of 
the Iranian state to secularise the society through the course of modernisation. 
The strategy of removing religion from the public sphere was reacted against by 
the religious community alienating themselves from the political process and 
denying the legitimacy of the state and its eligibility to represent them. In this 
light, I argue that democratisation in Iran has not been hindered by the individual 
giving up his individuality or the community surrendering its choices to the 
religious leaders. It was rather that a secular state could not win the hearts and 
minds of the people as the state of their own. 
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Accordingly, the reconciliation between the religion and democracy had 
to be preceded with a reconciliation between Shi'ism and the state in order to 
bring about a sense of consensus among the people themselves on the kind of 
political system which meets their ideals and wants. Such a consensus is crucial 
to revitalise the public willingness to come out of their cognitive confinements, 
i. e. the traditions of self-alienation, and take part in the process of change. If the 
course of democratisation is destined to advance vigorously, it has to expand on 
a renewed willingness on the part of the population to prefer democracy over all 
the other alternatives. Given that religion remains an agent of social solidarity 
and its long-established contribution to the national identity of Iran, the 
stipulation of secularism for democracy, particularly in the sense common in the 
Western world, is hardly helpful to the course of democratisation in Iran. 
Basically because it hinders the evolution of a new political culture in the society 
capable of fostering an active participation in the political affairs. 
Religion and Democracy: Whether religion functions in favor of 
democracy or otherwise depends on factors outside the religious realm. In the 
modern history of Iran, the change of lifestyle, roles, and institutions have 
instigated a parallel transformation in the culture including the religious 
worldview. In this light, we have noticed for example that the wide popular 
participation in the revolution of 1979 served to affirm the role of the people 
both as a source of authority and a force of political reform. This is significant 
particularly because the hitherto-established religious doctrine of authority does 
not ground authority in the popular will nor does it sanction the people's 
preferences. Since the revolution, religious doctrine of authority has undergone 
profound and constant revisions aiming to get it in tune with the compelling 
requirements of the modern state. These modifications have been undoubtedly 
the fruit of the structural transformations and particularly its reflections on the 
tendencies and ideals of the Iranian society. 
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The Process of Reconciliation 
The reconciliation between the religion and democracy involves 
modifications in the religious worldvicw as well as some of the principles of 
democracy. This is seen essential to facilitate a model of governance which 
concurrently honors the major principles of democracy and the ideals of the 
society. This is rather a complex process. The current debates over the issue in 
Iran show that, although a promising advance is being made, a complete harmony 
between the two is contingent upon resolving a considerable number of issues 
none of which is negligible or easy to skirt around. Questions like the source of 
sovereignty, the state's role in regard of the religion, constitutional rights, and so 
forth are all novel to the religious thought. Some important answers have been 
given. Thanks to Ayatollah Khomeini who crossed the first but most critical mile 
on that long road, nevertheless, more theoretical work needs to be done before 
the new notions get established within the religious school of thought. 
Interestingly, the challenge of modernity has brought a renewed tendency within 
the religious scholarly circles to question many of the assumptions that were 
hitherto taken for granted. It has also boosted the interest in philosophy, 
sociology, economics, and other disciplines related to political theorisation, 
which remained by and large at the margin of the scholarly interest until 
recently. 
The course of reconciliation between Shi`ism and democracy in post- 
revolutionary Iran can be divided into two phases. The first phase was carried out 
aftermath the Islamic revolution and aimed to integrate the religion into state 
institutions. In this phase, the state was endowed with religious value providing 
the possibility of modifying the religious rules in relation to the state's 
imperatives. The second phase, which is still carrying on, is being undertaken by 
a reforming trend seeking to bring about a democratic political system on a 
religious platform. Its aim thus is to reconcile the religious state with democracy 
through a broader modification of the religious framework. 
The first phase was led by religious leaders with traditional-revivalist 
background. The second phase is driven by modernist intellectuals and activists 
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and advanced by the civil activities of the middle class and young generations. 
The reformist trend was instigated by the failure of the revolutionary paradigm 
to cope with the changing conditions on both the local and international levels. 
On the local level, the study has highlighted the social transformations which 
were brought up by the revolution and the war with Iraq, especially the 
emergence of a new generation unsatisfied with the post-revolutionary's 
ideology of government. On the international level, the major source of influence 
has been the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 which profoundly discredited 
the totalitarian and centralised political systems. 
The rise of the new paradigm took the fonn of a spontaneous, cross 
sectional movement aiming to put into effect a political agenda which involves a 
broad deviation from the hitherto established principles of ruling, religiosity, and 
socialisation. The reformist's advent to power in 1997 was labeled by some 
researchers as the second republic or second revolution. 
After eight years in political power, the reformists cannot claim it 
complete success in conquering the traditional-authoritarian strongholds within 
the state. The long list of failed attempts to push ahead the course of 
democratisation brought many analysts to believe that the reformist project had 
no chance of continuing. Among the reformists themselves, some figures and 
groups started to propagate a different paradigm involving substantial changes to 
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. For example, Akbar Ganli, who has 
been in jail since 2000, published in 2002 his Manifesto for Republicanism, 
calling for a complete separation between religion and state. A similar call was 
supported by one of the major student associations. 
Despite the uncertain progress of the course of democratisation, the 
reformist paradigm seems to have achieved a fair proportion of its 
objectives. In this regard, I would like to draw a clear line between the 
evolution of the paradigm itself and the success, in the political sense, of 
the reformist faction. This differentiation is necessary because the latter is 
usually assessed according to its assumption of political power. By 
comparison, the advance of the paradigm must be assessed through its 
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various effects on the function of the society at large. Thus we deal with 
three distinct aspects: 
A- The success or failure of the reformist faction to translate the 
paradigmatic advance into political strength. 
B- The effects of the new paradigm on the functioning of the 
state. 
C- The effects of the new paradigm on the functioning of the 
society. 
The success at the first level is obviously limited compared with the 
achievements at the institutional and structural levels. On the other hand, we 
know that the reformist faction does not seek to replace the existing political 
system. Thus, its pursuit of democratisation has to be understood as one of 
reform, not one of replacement. This choice is fairly justifiable from the view 
that the existing regime does not blindly reject democracy nor does it lack the 
institutions of a democratic system. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
and many of the conventions which have become established throughout the last 
twenty five years bear many of the features of other democratic systems. The 
reform mission thus seeks to redefine the principles, roles and institutions within 
the political system so as to empower the people to choose and set the 
preferences of their government. In other words, it is a mission to change the 
position of the state from being a government above the people to a government 
of the people. ' 
For the particular purpose of this study, I would like to put a special 
emphasis on the main characteristic of the reformist paradigm, i. e. its being a 
religious discourse embracing liberal democracy and producing a range of 
theoretical formulations seeking to break spine of the major deadlocks in the 
religion-modernity debate. Questions like the religious character of the state, the 
source of sovereignty, the role of the people, and so forth have been addressed 
1 Khatami, M., Tavsc'ah SiäsZ, p. 88. 
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from an authentic religious platform but in a close correspondence with their 
counterparts in the liberal thought. 
The two phases through which the political thought in Shi`ism has been 
developing show that the prospect of a religious-based democracy is both 
realistic and achievable. Such a model provides a practical solution to the 
impasse of democratisation in many other Muslim societies. 
The Way Ahead 
Considering both the positive and negative developments, Iran appears in 
2005 closer to democracy than it was in the 1970s. The last decade in particular 
saw a tangible progress in this respect permitting to argue that the course of 
democratisation, despite all the hurdles, is becoming day after day the 
compelling among all other choices. There arc nevertheless much works to be 
done before the Islamic regime can stand along the democratic systems. 
Democracy is not a project to enforce by law nor is it an overnight change of 
policies or staff. It is rather a long process which often involves difficulties and 
setbacks. The process of democratisation in Iran is promising because the 
foundation stones are already in place. The study has shown that many of the 
previously-assumed impediments to democracy were already addressed 
theoretically or practically, including the role of the people, the relevance of 
modernity to religion. It also highlighted the evolution on the cultural and 
structural levels as well as the gradual upturn of institutionalisation. The shift 
from the revolutionary-traditional paradigm to the refonnist one was an 
embodiment of the society's awareness of its role. Since then, this role became 
even more effective and compelling in a way that no political faction could trade 
on the public ignorance or indifference any more. 
Despite the claimed progress, there remain many questions pertained to 
the Constitution, culture, elite structure, and other institutions that have to be 
addressed theoretically as well as institutionally. Here are some of these 
questions. 
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1- The Sovereignty of God 
The religious perspective of the political participation is considered in 
relation to the principle of the sovereignty of God over the universe and roan. In 
contrast, democracy is grounded on the idea that sovereignty is naturally 
oriented in the society. The question of sovereignty is crucial because almost all 
the institutions within the political system function with reference to the 
particular definition of sovereignty upon which the system is grounded. 
Among the contemporary Muslim leaders, the legislative application of 
the idea was emphasized by the Indian scholar Abu'l-A`la al-Mawdüdi vis-a-vis 
the idea of legislation by man which was advocated by the secular elite after the 
formation of the state of Pakistan. Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian theorist took the 
idea beyond that certain limit and asserted that the sovereignty of God ought to 
reflect on every aspect of life, and on the government actions in particular. 
Although the earlier views of Khomeini are similar to Qutb's, at least in the 
outset, 2 his later views and practice lean towards investing the sovereignty in the 
society. In October, 11,1981, he ruled that a two-thirds majority of the Majlis's 
deputies could override the views of the Constitutional Council regarding the 
compatibility of the parliamentary bills with the religious principles. 
3 He also 
ruled in 1987 that the government could refer to pure rational justifications to 
formulate and enforce the executive policies regardless the differing views of the 
ulami. This principle was eventually furnished by the Constitution and 
institutionalized through the newly-formed Expediency Council. 
The idea of linking the state policies to the common interest on the one 
hand and to the public consent on the other started to attract a widening 
attention among the religious scholars. Nevertheless it is not yet established on 
undisputable theoretical grounds. Thereby, it is likely to be open for differing 
interpretations especially with regard to the powers of the fagih in comparison 
with those of the directly-elected institutions. The current debate has not yet 
tackled the core question of sovereignty, that is the recognition of the will of the 
2 Euben. Roxanne. Enemy in the iVirror, (Princeton, 1999), p. I 18 
Khomeini. Sahithh Vnr. vol. 15, p. 142. 
228 
people as the ultimate and unfettered reference for decision-making in the public 
sphere. 
The question of sovereignty can be sorted out only if the political role of 
religion, and consequently the function of the state in this respect are redefined. 
It seems that a good deal of the problem emanates from the perception that state 
functions as a guardian and propagator of religion. Due to the notion of free 
choice is not deeply seated in the Iranian social system, religious propagation 
does not take the form of cultural exchange between the various views. It rather 
unfolds through imposing the particular ideology and lifestyle of the hegemonic 
group over the whole nation which inescapably infringes their rights as free and 
equal citizens. 
2-The role of the ulamä 
The clerical hegemony represents an impediment to the evolution of 
democracy in the Islamic Republic. It involves a kind of discrimination against 
the majority, it substitutes merit with status, and bestows infallibility and 
holiness upon the rulers which in turn hinders them being held to account or their 
authority contested. In comparison, democracy is basically about restricting the 
powers of ruler and enabling the public or their representatives to scrutinize his 
work. As maintained by Lord Acton, "The danger is not that a particular class is 
unfit to govern. [... ] Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely". 
The clerical domination was brought about by a certain chain of events 
more than a pre-determined policy, however it has been substantially aided by a 
large body of literature claiming the superiority of the ulami1, in addition to the 
natural disposition to power in every group. The emphasis of the clerical 
hegemony reached a point where Ayatollah Behcshti, a notable revolutionary 
leader, asserted once that the ulamil "will continuously and determinately 
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supervise the political process. All the executives must accept this supervision or 
surrender their positions to those who accept". 
4 
The role of the clergy is deeply seated in the social culture where the 
adherence to religion symbolizes the highest personal credential. In the early 
phase of the revolution, people seem to have trusted the religious leaders as 
humble and graceful persons regardless their capability to deliver on their 
promises. In the traditional societies, and especially during the revolutionary 
periods, persons rather than ideas evolve to the focus of public attention. Since 
the mid-1980s, the clerical role took a downturn; the clerical representation in 
the parliament has dropped from 45.4 percent in the first two terms (1980-1988) 
to 28.7 and 25 percent in the third and fourth tenns. 
s In the last elections (2004), 
clergy won 41 seats, or 18 percent of the total. A field research by Raf'i'pour 
found that although the belief in religion, in the broader sense, was still strong 
among the general people, it was no longer associated with a similar trust in the 
ulainä or interest in the lifestyle they propagate. 
6 In comparison, the 1990s saw 
the religious intellectuals emerging as an influential group especially among the 
youths. According to an official survey in 2004, the religious speeches given on 
the state TV by lay thinkers attracted more watchers than the ones given by 
clergy members. 7 
The decline of the clerical popularity will certainly affect their political 
role. However, a major shift in this regard is not likely to occur soon unless the 
notions of equal opportunities and accountability are finnly institutionalised. 
Democratisation requires primarily that roles be linked to merit rather than 
status, and privileges be offset by accountability and responsibility. 
Cited in Haidari, "Hizb-e Jumhüri Islämi", /rm. Jun., 24,2002 
$ Sarjouei. M., & Sadatian, J., Entckhabät-c, lLajlis Panjurn darAycnch itfatbo : it, (Tehran 1999). 
p. 124 
`' Rafi`pour. Tawvsc .? h va Tazidd, p. 318 
Baztab, May, I. 2004 
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3- Equality 
In a democratic system all individuals are potentially equal. It is 
understood that people are usually different in various respects with the effect 
that some of them get more opportunities than the others. Nevertheless, the law 
must ensure potential equality and help the less advantaged to overcome their 
inferiority and achieve the same conditions enjoyed by the average citizens. In 
the case of Iran, the law restricts the right to assume the highest office in the 
state not only to the Shi i citizens who make the sweeping majority of the 
population, but to the male ulamä which make just a small fraction of the 
society. In a recent ruling by the Constitutional Council, women were denied the 
right to contest for the presidency, although the Constitution does not plainly 
define the gender of the president. The Constitution opts for equal citizen-based 
rights for all the Iranians, but it has also some elements which directly conflict 
this principle. These elements are affirmed by the lack of democratic traditions in 
the society. The treatment of women and ethnic minorities provide clear 
evidence on the implications of such discriminatory traditions: 
The Rights of Women: Initially, the traditional jurisprudence denies 
woman eligibility to hold public authority, or the so-called wi/ yah. One of the 
interesting things about the Islamic Republic is that, although its leaders 
promote a kind of sexist society, their strategy of `Islamising' the universities 
has unleashed a fresh desire among the rural families to allow their girls to move 
away from their villages to join the city-based universities. The number of 
female students has tripled during the 1990s, a development that deeply 
enhanced the feminist movement and undermined the traditional pattern of 
socialisation. ` In 2003, the debate over woman rights reached climax by the 
predominantly-reformist Majlis ratifying the United Nations' Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The fierce 
argumentation by both factions provided an opportunity to reveal the division 
within the religious seminaries over such a sensitive issue. As expected, the 
majority of conservative clergy and politicians stood against the Convention 
Sachs, S.. "In Iran, More Women Leaving Nest for University" Mn' cYork Tii, ws. Jul., 22.2000 
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while it was supported by the reformist ones. 9 The ratification bill was blocked 
by the Constitutional Council. Nevertheless the debate continued to attract more 
participants. Ayatollah Sänei, an exemplar with reformist inclinations made a 
breakthrough by ruling that woman was eligible to assume all the public offices 
that were available for man. He also ruled that woman and man were equal in 
blood money (Diyah). In his view, the distinction between man and woman in 
this respect was not indefinite, it was made to meet the particular economic 
conditions of the early Islamic period and. ") 
The debate on woman rights shows promising signals due mainly to the 
robust activities by the feminist movement. In 2004, Zainab Association, the 
main conservative women organization joined the campaign for the woman 
eligibility to assume presidency implying a major shift within the conservative 
trend. " Karroubi, the former Majlis speaker, 12 and Zibakalam, a university 
professor, 13 are of the idea that the reservations in this regard are oriented in the 
sexist character of the religious seminaries rather than religious principles in the 
strict sense. Both the two are adamant that the society shows increasing 
tendency to recognize equal rights for woman and sooner or later Iranian women 
will obtain full rights. 
The Rights of Minorities : The handling of the ethnic diversity represents 
one of the intrinsic deficits in the Iranian political system. The Islamic Republic 
bears a responsibility to do away with this defect, not only to meet the criteria of 
modern state but also to honor its own commitment as a religious system. Iran's 
drive to democracy depends to a large extent on its readiness to ensure equal 
rights for all citizens regardless their communal belongings. The minorities 
should be given extra attention in order to help them catching up with the 
average national lifestyle, growth, and participation in the public affairs. 
9 For some details on the different positions in this regard, see Emrvoz, 
www. einrooz. org/woiiien/Arciiivc`/`2OWoiiicii. htin 
Ayatollah Sane`i webpage: www. saanci. org/fa/page. php'? pg=womcn 
/ran, Feb., 5,2005 
/SNA, Oct., 29,2004 
Shargh, Oct., 24,2004 
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Iran is a multi-ethnic society. Persians represent the majority with nearly 
50%. The other half includes around twelve ethnic groups. Turkish Azeris are the 
largest minority group with nearly 35 percent of the total, followed by the Kurd 
with 10%, Arab 5%, Turkmens and Baluchis with 2.5% each'4. In respect of 
religion, Sunni Muslims represent the largest minority with around 10%, 
Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christians, and Bahais make together nearly 1%. The 
question of ethnic rights came to the fore first during the Constitutional 
Revolution as a reflection to the Azeri's significant contribution to that event. 
The demands of ethnic minorities were recognized by the 1906 Constitution 
which adopted the system of regional governments as a means to distribute the 
powers from the central government onto the regional ones. In reality, the law of 
local government has never been implemented and the successive governments 
could not restrict its tendency to centralize. Aftermath the 1979 revolution, the 
Western regions witnessed insurgencies among the Arabs and Kurds. There were 
also signals of discontent among the Azcris and Baluchis, all of which were 
crushed immediately. The ethnic issue does not represent an eminent threat to 
the national security. Nevertheless, there is no insurance on the long-term; the 
situation may change in the future especially with recent revival of the ethnic 
identities in the Middle East and Central Asia. 
The rights of the ethnic and religious minorities were recognized by the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic through the articles 15,19, and 48. Yet, the 
current situation of the minorities is far from satisfactory. Except for the Azeris, 
the others are generally underrepresented in the state system, their regions are 
underdeveloped, and the right to freely express the peculiars related to their 
identities is largely restricted or oversight. Undoubtedly, this is a symptom of a 
common deficit in the region. In Iran, like all other Middle Eastern countries, the 
concept of multi-cultural society as well as the state belonging to the whole 
nation is not deeply-seated in the political culture and state structure. The 
minorities arc viewed as `others' to the majority and their presence is dealt with 
14 Bam-Taraf, Yousif A., Qawrni},. at-h i va Tui', c'uh dar /ran. (research paper. 2003). Retrieved on 
Jan, 20,2005 from: 
www. ali%N, azst udies. org/Nationalq/nationalities'/020and%2Odc: %, eloprncnt. lit in 
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as a problem or a possible source of problems rather than an opportunity to 
enriching the cultural diversity of the nation. To this extent, the secular 
governments of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria do not differ from the religious Iran or 
traditional Saudi Arabia. In all these cases, the national government is 
exclusively attributed to the majority and all `the others' are treated as 
`different' or second-class citizens. 
In addition, there appears a correlation between the life standard of the 
minorities and the distance of their regions from the country centres. 
Statistically, the less advantaged minorities in Iran arc the Kurds, the Arabs, and 
Baluchis, all of whom live in peripheral areas. This location involves two 
damaging implications; on the one hand, the Middle Eastern state is highly 
centralised and urban-based in the sense that national affairs as well as the 
allocation of resources arc conducted from the centre and by the centre-based 
elite. On the other hand, and due particularly to the inherent sense of insecurity 
among the ruling elites, the inhabitants of frontiers are usually seen as a possible 
conduit of the outside problems, especially when it occurs among their fellows 
on the other side of the boarder. In the case of Iran, the state's treatment of the 
Kurds is highly reflected upon by the insurgency of their fellow Kurds in Turkey 
and Iraq. The same can be said about the Sunni minority in the cast and 
southeast after the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Arabs during the war 
with Iraq. 
The rise of the Islamic Republic has brought up a sense of optimism 
based on the presupposition that an Islamic state would likely call off the 
discrimination which was common under the previous regime. This supposition 
was not realistic for it disregarded the structural impediments whose removal 
required more than the rhetoric or even the constitutional acknowledgment of the 
minorities rights. 15 
For Bani-taraf, an Arab writer and activist from Khouzistan, culture is the 
main area of discrimination. He argues that the state's disregard of the 
minorities' cultures has resulted in them failing to make use of the available 
's Mahdi Karroubi, the former Majlis speaker, cited in /SN, 1, Jan., 2,2005 
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resources, in such fields as education and economic development. In the Arab 
regions for instance, 33% of the pupils in the primary schools quit before 
finishing the teen. The figure reaches 50% in the middle schools and 60-70% in 
the high schools. In 2003, the Arab university students made 1,5 of every one 
thousand students nationwide. This figure is by no means comparable to the 
astonishing ones of the Baluchi community which counts only 5 in 10,000.16 
The demands of the minorities were substantially aided by the reformists' 
rise, especially with their assertion of the principle of `Iran for all the Iranians'. 
Both the Arab and Kurds were represented in the cabinet of President Khatami. 
The role of the minorities, their concerns, and share of national development was 
first addressed in a comprehensive and explicit fashion through the Fourth Five- 
Year Development Plan (2005-2009). In the theorizing process for the plan, the 
issue of `ethnicity and development' was put up as one of the eighteen grounding 
principles for the long-term development. Representatives of the major 
minorities participated in the Conference of Country's Theorists and Researchers 
which was held in 2002 by the state's Planning Organisation to discuss the major 
goals that the plan is set to achieve. During the three-day conference, five papers 
were dedicated to the rights and demands of the minorities. 
Recent political advance of the Iraqi Kurds seems to have had profound 
impacts on their fellow Iranians. In a recent development, a meeting held by 100 
Kurd activists spelled out a set of high-flying demands. The meeting which was 
organized by the reformist faction has urged the Kurdish community to use their 
voting power in the presidential elections of 2005 to impose their demands. In a 
speech before the meeting, Abdullah Ramadhan-Zadch, a Kurdish activist and 
the cabinet's spokesman, put this argument; 
Kurds have around three million votes to cast in the coining 
presidential election which can make a big difference. We should 
not give our votes for free... We can exchange them with certain 
demands including an appropriate share in the public 
administration. Sunni community in particular has to be fairly 
represented in the cabinet, in the embassies, and regional 
governments. Incomes in the Kurdish regions are the lowest 
16 Bani-Taraf, op. cit. 
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nationally. The presidential candidates have to pledge extra 
allocations to address this deprivation. '7 
A similar initiative was taken by the leaders of the Balushi community 
who held a meeting in Tehran and made extensive attempts to lobby the 
presidential candidates. In brief, the structural change within Iran and the parallel 
change of the political weigh of the ethnic groups in the countries surrounding 
Iran have both contributed to the revival of the ethnic identities in the country. 
These developments will inevitably undermine the centre-periphery relations, 
and the established domination of one culture. The Islamic Republic will have to 
redefine its conception of the state-society relations so to get rid of the type of 
majority-minority relations that have prevailed for a very long time. This is not 
only necessary to boost the process of democratisation, but also to maintain the 
religious credentials of the regime. It is absolutely unthinkable that the claim of 
religious character runs side by side with discrimination. To deal with this 
problem, Iran needs more than the rhetoric or even the constitutional 
acknowledgment of the grievances and rights of the minorities. The problem is 
so deeply-seated in the social and political structure. It can be cured only through 
a comprehensive and far reaching strategy aiming to enable the minorities to 
catch up with the national average of development and participation. Such an 
objective can be achieved only through recognizing the identities and cultures of 
the minorities and ensuring an appropriate involvement in the state 
administration, the allocation of economic and other resources, and helping them 
to have a sounding voice in the national politics. 
*** 
The Islamic Republic has a good potential to evolve into a democratic 
political system. Nevertheless, there is much work to be done to arrive at that 
point. Firstly, it has to put up democracy as its ultimate choice. Secondly, it has 
to redefine the grounding principles and institutions of its political system so to 
come in line with the democratic patterns of government and socialisation. 
Thirdly, it has to snake extra efforts to deal with the components of 
1' Shargh, Jan., 31,2005 
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authoritarianism, discrimination, and suppression which are inherent in the social 
and political structure. 
In the Islamic Republic, Islam is at stake. A vigorous push towards 
democracy will put an end to the contention over the capacity of religion to 
foster modernity. In contrast, the reluctance, on whatever justification, will 
damage not only the credibility of the religious establishment, but the credibility 
of the religion itself. Modernisation and democratisation arc long and 
continuous processes. A complete transformation of a traditional society requires 
time and enormous efforts. Nevertheless, it would be much easier with the 
existence of a model of transformation with a strong appeal to the public and 
viable capacity for producing solutions to the unforeseen problems. 
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